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For a number of years, budget support has been a preferred aid modality 
for implementing the principles of effective aid formulated in the 2005 
Paris Declaration. Various evaluations find that aid provided through this 
modality contributes to increased budget allocation towards poverty 
reduction and improved development outcomes in a number of countries. 
Nonetheless, budget support has increasingly come under criticism in 
recent years, and many bilateral donors have either partly or fully stopped 
using this modality.
Against this background, DEval conducted a comprehensive and systematic 
review of existing evidence on the effectiveness of budget support, based 
on a considerably larger number and greater variety of sources than 
previous synthetic work. To close important remaining knowledge gaps 
this evaluation synthesis draws together different perspectives on the 
impact of budget support from a total of 95 evaluations and studies.
The findings substantiate existing knowledge on the effectiveness of 
budget support and at the same time generate new insights for decision 
makers in German and international development cooperation.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Background 
Around the turn of the millennium, international development 
cooperation underwent a paradigm shift. Mounting evidence 
showed that over the past decades development aid had often 
failed to achieve its frequently shifting, yet always ambitious, 
goals. The evidence also suggested that the ineffectiveness 
had at least partly to do with the way aid was provided. 
Past approaches to development cooperation were based on 
tightly donor-controlled projects and political conditionality  
of often limited credibility. In many cases they failed to 
produce the intended development outcomes. Instead,  
donor-driven and often highly fragmented aid projects  
lacked systemic effects on the social, economic and political 
development in aid-recipient countries, among other reasons 
caused by unintended effects. Often, this form of development 
cooperation, although aimed at strengthening domestic 
institutions and governments, instead established additional 
layers of aid-management institutions, that increased 
transaction costs, and undermined democratic control, 
ownership, and local capacities.6 i
Besides identified shortcomings in development projects, 
criticism has also been directed at the so-called structural 
adjustment programmes (SAP) of the Bretton-Woods-
Institutions. With the SAP, International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank provided concessional loans to indebted 
or bankrupt countries, linked to the recipient government’s 
commitment to implement a predefined reform plan. In 
retrospect, these SAPs did not achieve the desired objective 
 to reshape economic governance in the recipient countries.7
Based on the problematic experience with conventional 
project aid and SAP, donors and recipients were committed to 
rearranging aid relations and to increasing the effectiveness  
of development cooperation. In the course of several summits, 
the international community formulated step-by-step a new 
agenda for more effective aid. In 2005, with the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the agenda was summarized 
in five central principles for more effective aid:8
i In the entire evaluation synthesis, sources are listed in endnotes (Arabic numeral system) while explanations or illustrations are given in footnotes (Latin numeral system).
 • ownership by recipient governments 
 • the alignment of donor support with recipient strategies 
and systems 
 • the harmonization of procedures and approaches among 
donors 
 • results-orientation 
 • mutual accountability 
To implement these principles in practice, new aid modalities 
had to be adopted, commonly subsumed under the term 
programme-based approaches (PBA). PBAs require ownership 
by the partner government, a formalized process for donor 
co-ordination, harmonization of donor procedures, and 
stronger use of local systems.
Belonging to the PBAs, budget support became increasingly 
popular towards the second half of the 2000s as one of the 
most consequent modalities for implementing the principles 
of effective aid formulated in the 2005 Paris Declaration. 
Usually provided jointly by multiple donors, its core objectives 
are to support the implementation of a country’s national 
strategy for poverty reduction (financing function) and to 
promote good governance through support for jointly agreed 
reform processes (governance function). While general budget 
support (GBS) represents a non-earmarked contribution to 
support government spending, in sector budget support (SBS) 
the funds are usually earmarked for utilisation in a specific 
sector.
The budget support package consists of financial inputs, 
channelled into the treasury of the recipient country and of 
non-financial inputs, which support the reform process of the 
recipient. The non-financial inputs include conditionalities, a 
policy dialogue and technical assistance/capacity development 
(TA/CD). Budget support conditionality consists of two pillars: 
underlying principles and a Performance Assessment 
Framework (PAF). Underlying principles form the conditionality 
basis for providing general budget support. PAFs are negotiated 
among donors and partner governments and consist of 
performance indicators that help to monitor the government 
performance in the reform process. Disbursements of budget 
support instalments are linked to performance in the PAF. The 
policy dialogue between donors and partner governments 
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takes place on a technical level, in particular to assess the 
partner government’s performance in PAF indicators, and on a 
strategic, higher-ranking level. TA/CD, as third non-financial 
input, serves to strengthen the capacities of the partner 
government and institutions to increase the effectiveness and 
efficiency in the use of the financial input. The combination of 
financial and non-financial inputs is expected to have reciprocal 
effects, increasing the effectiveness of both financial and non-
financial inputs in their impact to reduce poverty.
Soon, a controversial debate on budget support started among 
development experts. In this debate two views dominate. 
Among the proponents, budget support, in particular GBS, is 
seen as particularly suitable instrument to intensify ownership 
of the partner governments, alignment with national structures 
of the partner and harmonization among donors. In the 
combination of financial inputs and the support of sector-
specific and cross-sectoral reforms, systemic impacts on the 
partner country are expected. The reduction of poverty is to 
be achieved indirectly in supporting the activities of the 
partner government and the use of national systems of the 
partner. In contrast, the debate also revolves around fiduciary 
and political risks of budget support in case the quality of  
the partner governments’ systems is insufficient or changes  
to the negative. As fiduciary risks, the debate discusses the 
misappropriation of budget support funds, such as corruption, 
as well as a misallocation of funds in non-poverty relevant 
sectors. On the side of political risks, budget support 
opponents fear negative effects on domestic accountability 
due to the one-sided support of the executive, and less 
incentives to mobilize domestic revenues.
During early stages of budget support programmes, the prime 
objective was to finance recipient countries’ poverty-reduction 
strategies. Later, mostly among bilateral donors, budget 
support’s function to promote good governance shifted to  
the centre of interest.9
The growing use of budget support led to an increase in 
evaluation work, analysing the effectiveness through an 
intervention logic recognized by the OECD Development 
Assistance Committee (OECD DAC).ii The intervention logic 
ii The intervention logic is described in the “Comprehensive Evaluation Framework (CEF)”, developed as part of the methodological approach for evaluating budget support under the aegis of the 
OECD DAC and the European Commission (EC). 
describes the expected effects of budget support. The 
achievement of those effects is supported by implementing 
the principles of effective aid, such as alignment to recipient 
governments’ policies and systems, harmonization among 
donors and increased predictability in the disbursement of 
funds. By using the systems of the recipient country, also a 
reduction in transaction costs is expected. Expected effects 
include increased government spending in social sectors, 
strengthened PFM, less corruption, and improvements in 
domestic accountability and democratic governance. On 
outcome and impact level, the expected effects are improved 
macroeconomic performance and reduced income poverty, as 
well as an increase in service delivery of public goods and 
reduced non-income poverty. 
Some of these joint donor evaluations point to positive effects 
of budget support regarding the financing function, and 
indicate impacts in the area of public financial management 
(PFM). In spite of these evaluations and their findings, they 
have had hardly any influence on the critical debate about 
budget support. The evaluations were perceived as single 
cases, taking the perspective of individual donors or 
organizations. To remedy this perception, evidence from 
evaluations has been summarized in a number of synthesis 
studies. However, the synthesis studies are often based on a 
limited number of cases and it is not always possible to 
identify which of the presented effects are widely backed by 
evidence.
In recent years, the acceptance of budget support in donor 
countries has declined significantly, causing many donor 
governments to suspend or stop budget support. Meanwhile, 
on the background of a vast financing gap for achieving the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), the debate on suitable 
financing approaches mostly focuses on new finance 
modalities. The discussion covers a broad spectrum of 
modalities, but not all of them can be described as new. 
Prominently discussed are results-oriented modalities. The 
so-called results-based aid defines measurable outputs and 
outcomes, and financial means are disbursed once the agreed 
output or outcome is achieved. The aim is to incentivize 
partner governments to achieve the desired outputs or 
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outcomes and to reduce fiduciary risks. While some modalities 
link all payments to the achievement of predefined results, 
others only incorporate results-oriented components. This is 
the case for budget support, using variable performance 
tranches to link single disbursement tranches to the success in 
defined PAF indicators. The similarity of the modalities in their 
performance orientation, the focus on outputs and outcomes 
and the use of recipient countries’ systems allows to derive 
lessons from the case of budget support for results-based aid 
- even more so as practical experience with newer forms of 
results-based aid, such as Cash on Delivery, is so far rare.10
Objective
Against this background, this evaluation synthesis addresses 
the task of systematically reviewing existing evidence related 
to the effectiveness of budget support. With the intent to 
close important knowledge gaps in previous work, the 
synthesis was based on a large number of sources (95) and 
analysed different perspectives on the impact of budget 
support. Also, the evaluation synthesis analyses the qualitative 
heterogeneity of individual evaluations in a quality assessment 
and consistently describes the coverage of evidence for all 
findings.
The aim of this evaluation synthesis is to provide lessons 
learned for the design and implementation of future budget 
support programmes and related financing instruments. 
Through the systematic review of the evidence the aim is also 
to contribute to an objective debate on the impact of budget 
support.
To this aim, the evaluation synthesis answers the following 
two evaluation questions:
1.  Which effects of budget support are substantiated by 
reliable evidence?
2.  Under which contextual conditions does budget support 
generate results?
Methodology
The present evaluation synthesis adopts a theory-based 
approach, analysing the expected outcomes described in an 
intervention logic of budget support, recognized by the OECD 
DAC. The intervention logic is also used in many similar 
evaluations. The evaluation synthesis includes a total of 95 
different sources: 32 evaluations, 42 academic papers, and 21 
“grey” literature sources. The sources cover analyses on GBS 
and SBS. The evaluation synthesis thus offers broad coverage 
and the analysis of different perspectives on budget support 
effects.
The results of predominantly qualitative evaluations and 
studies are systematically synthesized in line with the 
standards of a “systematic review”. Consequently, this 
evaluation synthesis follows a three-step process that  
includes an explicit search strategy, clear inclusion criteria,  
and systematic and software based coding and analysis. As 
central element of the methodology, a quality assessment  
of the sources was carried out. The quality assessment  
shows high homogeneity in the methodical quality of the 
evaluations, as well as scientific and “grey” literature. The 
overall methodological quality is sufficiently high to use all 
reports as the basis for this evaluation synthesis.
Aiming to assess the reliable effects of budget support, a 
distinction was made between empirically proven and 
inadequately documented effects on the basis of the coverage 
in the sources. The effects of budget support were analysed on 
two levels: effects of the entire budget support programme 
and effects of individual budget support inputs (financial and 
non-financial inputs). Effects are only accepted as reliable in 
the evaluation synthesis when they are described by at least 10 
different sources. Also, based on the quality assessment, the 
sources were classified into two categories, “best evidence” 
and “second-best evidence” based on their methodological 
quality. This classification has been used for a robustness test, 
which is positive if results are based on sources from the “best 
evidence” category or on sources from both categories.
Findings
The findings summarized below are based on both quantitative 
and qualitative synthesis results related to effects of budget 
support, as presented in the intervention logic. 
In this summary of findings, there is a clear differentiation 
between findings for which there is strong evidence in the 
x  Executive Summary
sources (frequent and consistent occurrence in the sources), 
and which can thus be viewed as reliably established effects, 
and those for which no clear picture emerges due to 
insufficient coverage in the sources. An overview of all 
empirically established effects is presented in Table 9.
From this evaluation synthesis, the following main findings 
emerge:
 • Most expected effects of budget support are backed by 
sufficient evidence.
 • Most proven effects of budget support are positive or at 
least in presence of certain context factors positive (e.g. 
high number and quality of donors’ common interests and 
the adherence of partner governments to the 
conditionalities).
 • Observed effects are mostly attributed to the whole budget 
support programme. Information on the specific effects of 
individual inputs of budget support (financial input, 
conditionalities, policy dialogue and TA/CD) is rarely 
provided.
 • A multitude of sources convincingly describes the 
attribution of observed changes to budget support on 
output and induced output level. On the outcome and 
especially the impact level, attribution of observed changes 
to budget support programmes is often not plausibly 
supported by evidence.
 • Important and highly debated risks of budget support are 
inadequately researched by the covered sources, thus 
statements on risks are not possible.
 • The strength of budget support effects depends strongly on 
context conditions, such as institutional capacity and 
political will for reform of the recipient government.
Aid-effectiveness principlesiii
Budget support programmes have a positive effect on 
alignment of programmes to strategies and approaches of the 
recipient, consequent harmonization of donor programmes, 
and ownership of the recipient countries, although this 
effectiveness depends on the number and quality of common 
interests among donors and between donors and partner 
governments, as well as the adherence of partner governments 
iii These principles are derived from the intervention logic of budget support and are not identical with the Principles of the Paris Declaration, but comprise the alignment of donor support with 
recipient priorities and systems, the harmonization of procedures and approaches among donors, the ownership and responsibility by recipient governments, predictable disbursements of aid and 
a reduction in transaction costs.
to the conditionalities attached to budget support programmes. 
Budget support programmes have a positive effect on the 
reduction of transaction costs, but not on predictability. This is 
due to the delay of aid disbursements and uncoordinated 
decisions by donors following breaches of the conditionalities 
by partner governments. Transaction costs increased after the 
introduction of budget support, but declined again after joint 
processes were established. When donors withdraw from 
budget support, the suspension of tranches increases 
transaction costs again, as only small sums are paid out in 
relation to the operating expenses. 
The non-financial inputs of budget support, in particular policy 
dialogue and conditionality, have a positive effect on 
harmonization, but do not contribute to increase ownership. 
Conditionality might even have a negative effect on 
predictability. 
Regarding other specific budget support inputs, generalizable 
conclusions on the effects on aid-effectiveness principles 
cannot be drawn due to insufficient evidence. For example, no 
statement can be made about the effect of specific inputs on 
the alignment of the donor programmes to the procedures of 
the partner governments and, in the case of the transaction 
costs, no valid conclusion can be drawn regarding non-
financial inputs. For all five principles, the inputs’ effect on TA/
CD is insufficiently covered. 
Government expenditure
Budget support, especially the financial input, increases public 
spending. This increase is mostly apparent in social sectors 
such as health and education. One of the suspected risks of 
budget support provision was that this aid modality would 
reduce incentives for governments to raise domestic revenues 
and, as a consequence, crowd out domestic revenue; the 
“crowding-out effect”. However, the sources analysed in this 
evaluation synthesis do not offer evidence that access to 
budget support funds reduces the mobilization of domestic 
revenues. At the same time, there are no or only slight 
improvements in domestic revenue mobilization through PFM 
reforms, putting at risk the sustainability of budget support 
xi
effects on (pro-poor) public spending.
While effects of financial budget support inputs are often 
mentioned, the sources offer insufficient evidence on the 
effect of non-financial inputs on government expenditure. Due 
to this substantial deficit, no generalizable conclusions on the 
expected positive influence of non-financial inputs going 
beyond the sole financing function of budget support can be 
drawn for future programmes or related aid instruments.
Public financial management
Budget support programmes have a positive effect on the  
PFM of recipient countries, especially on budget formulation 
and planning, and the comprehensiveness and transparency  
of the budget. The improvements in PFM are best covered by 
the evidence. These improvements are specifically attributed 
to the non-financial inputs policy dialogue and TA/CD, as 
priority is generally given to improving PFM within these 
inputs. In particular, more recent evaluations recognize the 
contributions of TA/CD as an important element of budget 
support to directly strengthen national systems, particularly the 
PFM. However, the progress in PFM depends on institutional 
capacity and the recipient government’s political will for PFM 
reform. 
Corruption
The analysed data show no systematic negative effect of 
budget support on corruption and thus do not confirm this 
assumed risk. Budget support has a positive effect on the 
degree of monitoring efforts on corruption, due to the PAF. 
However, the evidence suggests that the prosecution and 
accusation of suspects is still rare, and a conviction even rarer.
Apart from that, budget support’s effects on corruption  
are scarcely researched in the sources. Thus, it cannot be 
determined whether budget support reduces corruption  
or has no effect. 
Domestic accountability and democratic governance
Budget support contributes to improvements on the supply 
side of domestic accountability.iv
iv Institutions on the supply side of domestic accountability include government institutions, such as the ministry of finance, and statistic offices expected to supply (budget) information to the 
general public. Supreme audit institutions (SAI) can be part of the demand as well as the supply side, and fulfil both functions, depending on their institutional and legal status.
v The demand side of domestic accountability consists of actors such as the parliament, civil society, and the media, who demand information from government to hold the government to account.
Budget support strengthens the budget process, as it is 
channelled through the national budget system. It substantially 
augments the role of the supreme audit institutions (SAIs), 
where improvements are found regarding the quality and 
quantity of audit reports. With regard to the demand side of 
accountability,v long-term effects of budget support on the 
role of parliament and civil society could not be identified, as 
the described effects are weak and inconsistent. 
However, due to insufficient coverage by evidence, it cannot 
be answered if the positive influence on the supply side of 
domestic accountability stems from financial or non-financial 
budget support inputs.
Economic performance and income poverty
The evidence shows that budget support programmes 
reinforce pre-existing macroeconomic stability. Repayment  
of domestic debt as one trigger of economic growth is also 
plausibly attributed to budget support programmes. The 
evidence describes further positive effects on economic 
performance, but these are not attributed to budget support 
alone. 
Effects of budget support on income poverty cannot be 
presented with certainty, due to challenges in the attribution 
of observed effects to budget support on outcome and impact 
level. Concerning specific budget support inputs, only the 
effect of funding on income poverty is sufficiently covered.  
The effect is slightly positive, although no distinct effect is 
reported in the evidence. For all other inputs, no generalizable 
conclusions on effects on economic performance and income 
poverty can be drawn. 
Service delivery and non-income poverty
Overall, budget support is effective in increasing access to 
public services. Funds from SBS and GBS are decisive in 
increasing service delivery, particularly in the education and 
health sectors. Yet, budget support does not prove to be 
effective in improving the quality of provided services or the 
administration responsible for delivering the services. The 
evidence describes positive effects on non-income poverty in 
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the recipient countries, but the effects are not attributed to 
budget support with certainty.
Regarding specific budget support inputs, the effects of 
funding, policy dialogue and accompanying TA/CD on public 
service delivery are sufficiently covered. On the contrary, 
conclusions for the effects of conditionality on public service 
delivery are not possible. Effects of specific inputs on 
administration of service delivery and non-income poverty 
have also not been sufficiently covered.
Conclusion
This evaluation synthesis presents the most comprehensive 
analysis to date of existing evidence on the effectiveness of 
budget support, a highly controversial modality of development 
cooperation. The findings systematically substantiate existing 
knowledge and generate new insights for decision makers in 
German and international development cooperation.
The study finds convincingly broad evidence that budget 
support is indeed an effective modality in promoting 
important development outcomes, such as improvements in 
public financial management and budget processes and 
improved provision of public goods and services. In view of 
these findings it appears worthwhile for donors – including 
those who have largely withdrawn from budget support –  
to re-assess the modality. In doing so, however, particular 
attention will need to be paid to the remaining evidence gaps 
identified in this evaluation synthesis. Specifically, there is a 
lack of knowledge with regard to the effectiveness of budget 
support at outcome and impact level due to unresolved 
methodological challenges and problems of attribution.  
Also, while the evidence proves effects of budget support 
programmes on a general level, little is known on the specific 
contribution of individual, particularly non-financial, budget 
support inputs. The same is true for hitherto largely neglected 
cross-cutting topics, such as budget support’s effects on 
gender equality and distributional effects of growth. 
Furthermore, a serious knowledge deficit exists with regard  
to potential risks of the modality, such as corruption. This  
lack of evidence is particularly surprising as the political 
debate on budget support revolves to a large extent around 
corruption risks.
Outlook
The remaining gaps imply that, even from an extensive 
analysis of existing evidence such as this and despite strong 
evidence for positive effects of budget support in general,  
only limited conclusions can be drawn with regard to specific 
effects attributable to individual budget support inputs. Going 
hand in hand, there are only limited lessons to be learned for 
the design and implementation of aid modalities with similar 
features as budget support, such as results-based approaches. 
This also makes it difficult to predict the impact on development 
outcomes achieved through budget support of a widespread 
withdrawal of bilateral donors from the instrument. 
Future empirical work therefore needs to closely analyse the 
effects and causal mechanisms of specific budget support 
inputs, as well as budget support effects on important cross-
cutting issues. Also, future work should analyse in more depth 
in how far potential risks of budget support materialise in 
practice and how those risks can be mitigated.
To account for this need of more empirical work on the topic, 
DEval conducts a complementary evaluation of the exit from 
budget support, building on the findings of this evaluation 
synthesis and investigating the sustainability of budget 
support effects when donors suspend or exit from budget 
support. In conjunction with the findings presented here, this 
evaluation contributes to forming a more complete picture of 
the effectiveness of budget support, the consequences when 
donors exit from the aid modality, and the lessons for the 
design and implementation of future budget support 
programmes and related aid instruments.
 Executive Summary
xiii
Hintergrund 
Um die Jahrtausendwende vollzog sich in der internationalen 
Entwicklungszusammenarbeit (EZ) ein Paradigmenwechsel, 
der nicht zuletzt durch eine wachsende Anzahl von Wirksam-
keitsuntersuchungen ausgelöst wurde. Diese Untersuchungen 
legten nahe, dass die Entwicklungspolitik der letzten Jahrzehn-
te ihre häufig wechselnden, jedoch immer ambitionierten Ziele 
oftmals nicht erreicht hatte. Gleichzeitig deuteten sie darauf 
hin, dass die fehlende Wirksamkeit zumindest teilweise auf die 
Art und Weise zurückgeführt werden konnte, wie die Zusam-
menarbeit gestaltet wurde. 
EZ-Ansätze waren bis dahin von einer starken Geberkontrolle 
und politischen Konditionalitäten begrenzter Glaubwürdigkeit 
geprägt. Statt die gewünschten entwicklungspolitischen Erfol-
ge zu erzielen,  gingen diese gebergelenkten und oft stark 
fragmentierten Ansätze häufig mit fehlenden systemischen 
Wirkungen auf die soziale, ökonomische und politische Ent-
wicklung der Partnerländer einher, unter anderem verursacht 
durch nicht-intendierte Wirkungen. Denn diese – in der Regel 
projektbasierten – EZ-Ansätze machten, trotz ihrer Absicht 
landeseigene Institutionen und die Regierungen zu stärken, 
Parallelstrukturen notwendig, die zu hohen Transaktionskos-
ten führten und die demokratische Kontrolle, die Eigenverant-
wortung der Partnerregierungen sowie die lokalen Kapazitäten 
schwächten.1 vi
Neben erkannten Schwächen von projektbasierten Ansätzen 
standen vor allem die sogenannten Strukturanpassungspro-
gramme der Bretton-Woods-Institutionen in der Kritik. Im 
Rahmen dieser Programme vergaben der Internationale Wäh-
rungsfonds und die Weltbank vergünstigte Kredite an ver-
schuldete oder insolvente Staaten, die im Gegenzug einem 
vorgefertigten Reformplan zustimmen mussten. Im Rückblick 
zeigte sich, dass der Versuch, mittels Strukturanpassungspro-
grammen die Wirtschaftspolitik in den Partnerländern zu re-
formieren, nicht die gewünschten Ergebnisse gebracht hatte.2 
Angesichts der problematischen Erfahrungen mit konventio-
neller projektbasierter EZ und Strukturanpassungskrediten 
verstärkten Geber und Partnerregierungen ihre Anstrengun-
gen, die Zusammenarbeit neu zu definieren und damit die 
vi In der gesamten Evaluationssynthese werden die verwendeten Quellen in Endnoten (arabisches Zahlensystem) und Erklärungen sowie Beispiele in Fußnoten (römisches Zahlensystem) aufgeführt.
Effektivität der EZ voranzutreiben. Auf mehreren Gipfeltreffen 
formulierte die internationale Gemeinschaft schrittweise eine 
neue Agenda für eine wirksamere EZ, die 2005 in der Erklärung 
von Paris über die Wirksamkeit der EZ in fünf zentrale Prinzipi-
en gefasst wurde:3
 • Eigenverantwortung der Partnerregierungen
 • Ausrichtung der Programme an den Strategien und 
Verfahren der Partnerregierungen
 • Harmonisierung von Programmen und Verfahren der Geber 
 • Ergebnisorientierung
 • Gegenseitige Rechenschaftspflicht
Zur Umsetzung dieser Prinzipien in der Praxis mussten neue 
Modalitäten eingesetzt werden, die weithin unter dem Begriff 
„Programmbasierte Ansätze“ gefasst werden. Sie erfordern die 
Eigenverantwortung der Partnerregierung, einen formalisier-
ten Prozess für Geberkoordinierung, Harmonisierung der Ge-
ber sowie die verstärkte Nutzung der landeseigenen Systeme.
Den programmbasierten Ansätzen zugehörend gilt die Budget-
hilfe, die in der zweiten Hälfte der 2000er Jahre an Bedeutung 
gewann, als eine der konsequentesten Modalitäten für die 
Umsetzung der in der Erklärung von Paris formulierten Prinzi-
pien. Meist als Gemeinschaftsvorhaben mehrerer Geber konzi-
piert, besteht das Hauptziel der Budgethilfe darin, die Imple-
mentierung der nationalen Armutsbekämpfungsstrategie der 
jeweiligen Partnerregierung finanziell zu unterstützen (Finan-
zierungsfunktion) und durch in nationalen Institutionen und 
Foren ausgehandelte Reformprozesse gute Regierungsführung 
zu fördern (Governancefunktion). Während die allgemeine 
Budgethilfe einen nicht zweckgebundenen Beitrag zu den 
Staatsausgaben der Partnerregierung darstellt, werden die 
Beiträge der Sektorbudgethilfe an die Nutzung für einen spezi-
fischen Sektor geknüpft.
Zu diesem Zweck besteht die Budgethilfe sowohl aus finanziel-
len Inputs der Geber, die direkt in den Haushalt der Partnerre-
gierung fließen wie auch aus nicht-finanziellen Inputs, die den 
Reformprozess unterstützen sollen. Die nicht-finanziellen 
Beiträge setzen sich aus drei Inputs zusammen: Konditionalitä-
ten, Politikdialog und begleitendem Kapazitätsaufbau. Die 
Konditionalitäten bestehen dabei in der Regel auf zwei 
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Ebenen: den sogenannten Underlying Principles, die Grundla-
ge für die Vergabe allgemeiner Budgethilfe darstellen; und 
sogenannte Performance Assessment Frameworks, in deren 
Rahmen zwischen Partnerregierungen und den Gebern Ziel-
werte und Indikatoren verhandelt werden, die dem Monitoring 
der Umsetzung der nationalen Entwicklungsstrategie und der 
verschiedenen Reformprozesse dienen. Der Politikdialog zwi-
schen Partnerregierungen und Gebern findet sowohl auf tech-
nischer Ebene (insbesondere wird hier die Erfüllung der im 
Performance Assessment Framework festgelegten Ziele be-
wertet), als auch auf einer übergreifenden, strategischen Ebe-
ne statt. Der begleitende Kapazitätsaufbau, als dritter nicht-
finanzieller Input, dient der Stärkung von Kapazitäten der 
Regierung und Institutionen im Partnerland und soll damit die 
Mittelverwendung der Partnerregierung positiv beeinflussen. 
In der Kombination von finanziellen und nicht-finanziellen 
Inputs sollen Wechselwirkungen entstehen, die die entwick-
lungspolitische Effektivität beider Inputs erhöhen.
Um die Budgethilfe entspann sich bald eine kontroverse De-
batte in der entwicklungspolitischen Fachöffentlichkeit. In 
dieser Debatte dominieren zwei Ansichten: Unter den Befür-
worterinnen und Befürwortern gilt speziell die allgemeine 
Budgethilfe als besonders geeignetes Instrument zur Intensi-
vierung von Eigenverantwortung der Partnerregierungen, 
Ausrichtung an Partnerstrukturen und Harmonisierung unter 
den Gebern. Durch die Kombination aus externen Finanzmit-
teln und der Förderung von sektorspezifischen und übergrei-
fenden Reformen wird von systemischen Wirkungen auf das 
Partnerland ausgegangen. Das Ziel der Armutsreduzierung 
wird dabei indirekt über die Unterstützung von Aktivitäten der 
Partnerregierung und die Nutzung von landeseigenen Syste-
men realisiert. Demgegenüber steht die Sorge um treuhänderi-
sche und politische Risiken der Budgethilfe, sollte die Qualität 
der Systeme auf Partnerseite unzureichend sein bzw. sich nach 
anfänglicher Prüfung verschlechtern. Als treuhänderische 
Risiken nennen Kritikerinnen und Kritiker eine Veruntreuung 
der mit der Budgethilfe bereitgestellten Gelder, zum Beispiel 
durch Korruption, wie auch die Fehlallokation von Mitteln 
durch die Partnerregierung, beispielsweise in nicht-armutsrele-
vante Sektoren. Aufseiten der politischen Risiken werden 
mögliche negative Effekte auf die interne Rechenschaftslegung 
vii Die Wirkungslogik ist im „Comprehensive Evaluation Framework (CEF)“ beschrieben, der als Teil des methodischen Ansatzes zur Evaluierung der Budgethilfe unter der Federführung des OECD 
DAC und der Europäischen Kommission entwickelt wurde. 
der Regierung gegenüber Parlament und Bevölkerung (erklärt 
durch eine primäre Unterstützung der Exekutive) und vermin-
derte Anreize zur Generierung eigener Einnahmen befürchtet.
Während zu Beginn der Debatte stärker die Finanzierungsfunk-
tion der Budgethilfe als primäres Ziel im Vordergrund stand, 
rückte später, insbesondere unter den bilateralen Gebern, die 
Governance- bzw. Reformfunktion der Modalität in den Fokus.4
Mit wachsender Bedeutung der Budgethilfe wurden auch ver-
stärkt Evaluierungen durchgeführt, die die Wirksamkeit der 
Modalität anhand einer von dem Entwicklungsausschuss der 
OECD (Development Assistance Committee, DAC) anerkann-
ten Wirkungslogik überprüfen sollten.vii Diese Wirkungslogik 
beschreibt die angestrebten Ergebnisse von Budgethilfe, die 
mit Hilfe der Umsetzung der oben beschriebenen Paris-Prinzi-
pien der Wirksamkeit von Entwicklungszusammenarbeit er-
reicht werden sollen. Es wird eine stärkere Ausrichtung der 
Geber an den Politiken und Systemen der Partnerregierung 
erwartet sowie eine stärkere Harmonisierung unter Gebern 
und eine bessere Vorhersagbarkeit der Mittel erhofft. Durch 
die Nutzung nationaler Systeme verspricht man sich zudem 
eine Senkung der Transaktionskosten. Es werden erhöhte Re-
gierungsausgaben für soziale Sektoren, ein gestärktes öffentli-
ches Finanzwesen, weniger Korruption, eine erhöhte inner-
staatliche Rechenschaftspflicht und demokratisches Regieren 
als Ergebnis der Budgethilfe angenommen. Auf Ebene von 
Outcomes und Impact werden eine verbesserte wirtschaftliche 
Leistung und reduzierte Einkommensarmut sowie eine ver-
mehrte Bereitstellung öffentlicher Güter und eine verringerte 
Nicht-Einkommensarmut erwartet. 
Einige dieser (meist von mehreren Gebern gemeinsam durch-
geführten) Evaluierungen bescheinigen der Budgethilfe positi-
ve Effekte in Bezug auf ihre Finanzierungsfunktion und attes-
tieren ihr positive Wirkungen im Bereich des öffentlichen 
Finanzmanagements. Die übergeordnete kritische Diskussion 
über die Budgethilfe blieb von diesen Evaluierungen allerdings 
weitgehend unbeeinflusst, da diese als Einzelergebnisse wahr-
genommen wurden, die die Perspektive eines einzelnen Ge-
bers oder einer individuellen Organisation widerspiegeln. Um 
diese Wahrnehmung zu ändern, wurden die Ergebnisse 
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einzelner Evaluierungen in Synthesestudien zusammengefasst. 
Jedoch basieren diese meist auf einer begrenzten Anzahl an 
Fällen und lassen nicht immer erkennen, wie flächendeckend 
die dargestellten Ergebnisse durch Evidenz gestützt sind. 
In den letzten Jahren hat die Akzeptanz für Budgethilfe in den 
Geberländern deutlich abgenommen, woraufhin viele Geberre-
gierungen die Hilfen ausgesetzt oder ganz gestoppt haben. 
Inzwischen konzentriert sich die Debatte um geeignete Finan-
zierungsformen meist auf neue Modalitäten, auch vor dem 
Hintergrund einer großen Finanzierungslücke zur Erreichung 
der Agenda 2030. Diskutiert wird ein breites Spektrum an 
Modalitäten, obwohl nicht alle als neu bezeichnet werden 
können. Besonders prominent werden ergebnisbasierte Moda-
litäten diskutiert. Die sogenannte ergebnisorientierte Hilfe 
(results-based aid) identifiziert bewertbare – und auch quantifi-
zierbare – Leistungen und Ergebnisse. Die Auszahlung der 
Gelder erfolgt erst, wenn die zuvor definierten Leistungen 
oder Ergebnisse durch die Partnerregierung erreicht worden 
sind. Auf diese Weise sollen Anreize zur Zielerreichung gesetzt 
und befürchtete treuhänderische Risiken reduziert werden. 
Während manche ergebnisbasierten Modalitäten alle Auszah-
lungen an zuvor erbrachte Leistungen knüpfen, integrieren 
andere nur einzelne Komponenten. Dies ist der Fall bei Bud-
gethilfe, die über leistungsbasierte Tranchen einzelne Auszah-
lungen von der Erfüllung von Indikatoren des Performance 
Assessment Frameworks abhängig macht. Die Ähnlichkeit in 
der Ergebnisorientierung, der Fokus auf Outputs und Outco-
mes und auch die Nutzung nationaler Systeme der Partnerre-
gierung bei der Budgethilfe und der ergebnisorientierten Hilfe 
erlauben es, aus den Erfahrungen der Budgethilfe Lehren für 
die ergebnisbasierte Hilfe zu ziehen. Dies ist insbesondere von 
Relevanz, da bisher nur wenig praktische Erfahrung mit neue-
ren Formen von ergebnisorientierter Hilfe besteht, zum Bei-
spiel cash on delivery.5
Zielsetzung
Vor diesem Hintergrund widmet sich die vorliegende Evaluati-
onssynthese der Aufgabe, die vorhandene Evidenz zur Wirk-
samkeit von Budgethilfe systematisch aufzuarbeiten. Mit der 
Absicht, wichtige Wissenslücken zu schließen, wurde eine 
große Anzahl an Quellen (95) zugrunde gelegt und gezielt 
unterschiedliche Perspektiven auf die Wirkungen der 
Budgethilfe analysiert. Zudem wurde die qualitative Heteroge-
nität der einzelnen Berichte mithilfe einer Qualitätsbewertung 
untersucht und konsequent die Abdeckung durch Evidenz für 
alle Ergebnisse dargestellt.
Zielsetzung der Evaluationssynthese ist es, neben Empfehlun-
gen für Budgethilfe-Programme auch Implikationen für die 
Ausgestaltung und die Implementierung zukünftiger Finanzie-
rungsinstrumente herauszuarbeiten, die der Budgethilfe äh-
nelnde Attribute aufweisen. Durch die systematische Aufarbei-
tung der vorhandenen Evidenz soll außerdem auf eine 
Objektivierung der Debatte um die Wirksamkeit der Budget-
hilfe hingewirkt werden.
Zu diesem Zweck werden die folgenden beiden Evaluierungs-
fragen beantwortet:
1. Welche Effekte von Budgethilfe werden durch verlässliche 
Evidenz bestätigt?
2. Unter welchen Bedingungen führt Budgethilfe zu 
Ergebnissen? 
Methode
Die vorliegende Evaluationssynthese folgt einem theorieba-
sierten Ansatz. Grundlage bildet hierzu die durch den OECD 
DAC anerkannte Wirkungslogik, die in bisherigen Evaluierun-
gen verwendet wurde und die erwarteten Wirkungen der  
Budgethilfe beschreibt. Insgesamt wurden 95 Quellen ausge-
wertet, davon 32 Evaluierungen, 42 wissenschaftliche Veröf-
fentlichungen und 21 Werke aus dem Bereich der „grauen“ 
Literatur. Die Quellen umfassen sowohl Untersuchungen der 
allgemeinen Budgethilfe als auch der Sektorbudgethilfe. Somit 
ist gewährleistet, dass eine große Anzahl an Quellen und ver-
schiedene Perspektiven auf die Wirkungen der Budgethilfe 
abgedeckt und analysiert werden. 
Die Ergebnisse aus überwiegend qualitativen Evaluierungen 
und Studien werden in Anlehnung an die hohen Standards 
einer systematischen Überprüfung (systematic review) synthe-
tisiert. Dazu folgt die Evaluationssynthese einem dreistufigen 
Ansatz, der eine explizite Suchstrategie, klare Einschlusskrite-
rien sowie eine systematische und softwaregestützte Codie-
rung und Analyse beinhaltet. Als ein zentrales Element der 
Zusammenfassung
xvi
Methode wurde eine Qualitätsbewertung der Quellen durch-
geführt. Die Beurteilung zeigt eine hohe Homogenität in der 
methodischen Qualität der Evaluationen sowie der wissen-
schaftlichen und „grauen“ Literatur. Die methodische Qualität 
der Evidenz ist ausreichend hoch, um alle Berichte als Basis 
dieser Evaluationssynthese zu nutzen.
Mit dem Ziel, die durch verlässliche Evidenz gesicherten Effek-
te der Budgethilfe herauszuarbeiten, wurde zum einen anhand 
der Abdeckung in den Quellen zwischen empirisch belegten 
und nicht hinreichend belegten Effekten unterschieden, wobei 
sowohl die Effekte des gesamten Budgethilfe-Programms wie 
auch Effekte der einzelnen (finanziellen und nicht-finanziellen) 
Inputs betrachtet wurden. Ergebnisse wurden nur dann als 
evident in die Evaluationssynthese aufgenommen, wenn sie 
von mindestens zehn verschiedenen Quellen beschrieben 
werden. Zum anderen wurden die Quellen anhand der Quali-
tätsbewertung in zwei Kategorien – „best evidence“ und  
„second best evidence“ – eingeteilt. Diese Differenzierung 
wurde für einen Robustheitstest verwendet, der positiv aus-
fällt, sofern Ergebnisse durch Quellen aus der Kategorie „best 
evidence“ oder aus beiden Kategorien gestützt sind.
Ergebnisse
Die hier zusammengefassten Ergebnisse basieren auf der qua-
litativen und quantitativen Analyse der Budgethilfe-Wirkungen 
entlang der erwarteten Effekte aus der durch den OECD DAC 
anerkannten Wirkungslogik. 
In dieser Zusammenfassung der Ergebnisse wird unterschie-
den zwischen Ergebnissen, die durch häufige und konsistente 
Nennung in den Quellen als verlässlich angesehen werden 
können, und solchen, die nicht durch ausreichende Evidenz 
untermauert sind, da sie nur selten angeführt werden. Eine 
Übersicht aller empirisch belegten Ergebnisse befindet sich in 
Tabelle 9.
Aus der Evaluationssynthese lassen sich die folgenden Haupt-
ergebnisse ableiten:
 • Die meisten erwarteten Effekte der Budgethilfe sind ausrei-
chend durch Evidenz abgedeckt.
viii Diese Prinzipien wurden aus der Interventionslogik der Budgethilfe abgeleitet und sind nicht identisch mit den Prinzipien der Erklärung von Paris, sondern umfassen die Ausrichtung der 
Programme an Strategien und Verfahren der Partner, die Harmonisierung von Programmen und Verfahren der Geber, die Eigenverantwortung der Partnerländer, verlässliche Zahlungen und eine 
Reduktion der Transaktionskosten. 
 • Die meisten belegten Wirkungen der Budgethilfe sind posi-
tiv oder zumindest bei Präsenz entsprechender Kontextbe-
dingungen positiv (zum Beispiel bei einer hohen Anzahl und 
Qualität gemeinsamer Geberinteressen und Erfüllung von 
Konditionalitäten durch die Partnerregierung).
 • Die beobachteten Effekte werden meist der Wirkung eines 
gesamten Budgethilfe-Programms zugeschrieben. Nur sel-
ten erfolgt die Zuordnung zu einzelnen Budgethilfe-Inputs 
wie Finanzierung, Konditionalitäten, Politikdialog oder Be-
gleitenden Maßnahmen.
 • Eine Vielzahl der Quellen vermittelt glaubhaft die Zuord-
nung beobachteter Entwicklungen zur Budgethilfe auf Ebe-
ne der Outputs und Induced Outputs. Auf Ebene von Out-
comes und Impacts der Wirkungslogik wird die 
Zuschreibung zu Budgethilfe-Programmen meist nicht mehr 
mit ausreichender Evidenz abgedeckt.
 • Wichtige und viel diskutierte Risiken der Budgethilfe wur-
den von den zugrundeliegenden Quellen nur unzureichend 
untersucht, so dass hierzu keine Aussagen möglich sind.
 • Die Stärke der Budgethilfe-Effekte ist stark abhängig von 
Kontextfaktoren wie institutionellen Kapazitäten und Re-
formwillen der Partnerregierung. 
Prinzipien für die Wirksamkeit der Entwicklungszusammenarbeitviii
Im Ergebnis zeigen Budgethilfe-Programme einen positiven 
Effekt auf die stärkere Ausrichtung der Programme an den 
Strategien und Verfahren der Partnerregierungen, die konse-
quentere Harmonisierung von Programmen und Verfahren der 
Geber sowie die Stärkung der Eigenverantwortung der Ent-
wicklungsländer. Allerdings ist der Wirkungsgrad abhängig 
vom Umfang und von der Qualität der gemeinsamen Interes-
sen, die einerseits zwischen den Gebern und andererseits 
zwischen den Gebern und Partnerregierungen bestehen. Ent-
scheidend ist zudem die Einhaltung der mit dem Programm 
verbundenen Konditionalitäten durch die Partnerregierung. 
Die Budgethilfe-Programme zeigen einen insgesamt reduzie-
renden Effekt auf die Höhe der Transaktionskosten, nicht je-
doch auf die Verlässlichkeit der Zahlungen. Der Grund dafür ist 
zum einen die häufig verspätete Auszahlung der Finanzhilfen 
im Fiskaljahr, zum anderen das unkoordinierte Aussetzen von 
Auszahlungen infolge des Nichteinhaltens von abgestimmten 
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Konditionalitäten. Im Zeitverlauf zeigt sich, dass die Transakti-
onskosten nach der Einführung von Budgethilfe zunächst stie-
gen, nach der Etablierung gemeinsamer Prozesse aber wieder 
sanken. Wenn sich Geber aus der Budgethilfe zurückziehen, 
lässt das Aussetzen von Tranchen die Transaktionskosten je-
doch in der Regel wieder steigen, da nur noch geringe Summen 
im Verhältnis zum operativen Aufwand ausgezahlt werden.
Bei den nicht-finanziellen Inputs der Budgethilfe, insbesondere 
beim Politikdialog und der Konditionalität, zeigt sich eine 
stärkere Harmonisierung der Programme und Verfahren der 
Geber. Sie tragen jedoch nicht dazu bei, die Eigenverantwor-
tung der Entwicklungsländer zu erhöhen, und die Konditionali-
tät hat eventuell sogar einen negativen Einfluss auf die Ver-
lässlichkeit von Zahlungen. 
Zu den Wirkungen weiterer spezifischer Budgethilfe-Inputs auf 
die Prinzipien wirksamer EZ können keine generalisierbaren 
Aussagen getroffen werden, da diese nicht hinreichend durch 
die vorhandene Evidenz abgedeckt sind. Zum Beispiel kann 
nicht beantwortet werden, ob sich spezifische Budgethilfe-
Inputs auf eine stärkere Ausrichtung der Geberprogramme an 
Verfahren der Partnerregierungen auswirken und ob nicht-
finanzielle Inputs der Budgethilfe zu einer Minderung der 
Transaktionskosten führen. Es können außerdem keine 
Schlussfolgerungen im Hinblick auf die Wirkung von techni-
scher Zusammenarbeit/Entwicklung von Kapazitäten auf alle 
fünf Prinzipien gezogen werden.
Regierungsausgaben
Budgethilfe, dabei vor allem die Finanzhilfe, führt zu einem 
Ansteigen öffentlicher Ausgaben, besonders deutlich in den 
sozialen Sektoren Bildung und Gesundheit. Ein debattiertes 
Risiko, nämlich dass Budgethilfe den Anreiz für die Erhöhung 
von Inlandseinnahmen reduziere und diese damit verdränge 
(der sogenannte Crowding-out-Effekt), wird durch die Evaluati-
onssynthese nicht bestätigt. Tatsächlich lässt sich nicht beob-
achten, dass Budgethilfe die Mobilisierung von Inlandseinnah-
men reduziert. Gleichzeitig zeigt sich kein oder nur ein sehr 
geringer Anstieg der Inlandseinnahmen durch Reformen des 
öffentlichen Finanzwesens, was die Nachhaltigkeit der Effekte 
von Budgethilfe auf die (armutsrelevanten) öffentlichen Aus-
gaben beeinträchtigt.
Während die Wirkungen von finanziellen Budgethilfe-Inputs in 
den der Evaluationssynthese zugrundeliegenden Quellen häu-
fig genannt werden, finden sich kaum Beschreibungen über die 
Wirkungen von nicht-finanziellen Inputs auf die Regierungs-
ausgaben. Aufgrund dieser defizitären Abdeckung in der Evi-
denz konnte nicht untersucht werden, ob sich nicht-finanzielle 
Inputs entsprechend der Wirkungslogik positiv auf armutsori-
entierte Regierungsausgaben auswirken. Deshalb kann auch 
für zukünftige Programme oder verwandte Instrumente wenig 
gelernt werden.
Öffentliches Finanzwesen
Die Evaluationssynthese belegt, dass sich Budgethilfe-Pro-
gramme positiv auf die Qualität des öffentlichen Finanzwesens 
der Partnerregierungen auswirken, insbesondere auf die Bud-
getplanung und -formulierung sowie die Verständlichkeit und 
Transparenz des Budgets. Diese Wirkung erfährt in den zu-
grunde gelegten Quellen die größte Abdeckung. Die Verbesse-
rungen sind hauptsächlich zurückzuführen auf die nicht-finan-
ziellen Inputs Politikdialog und die Kapazitätsentwicklung, da 
in beiden Bereichen ein Fokus auf die Verbesserung des öffent-
lichen Finanzwesens gelegt wird. Speziell spätere Evaluierun-
gen erkennen an, dass im Rahmen der Budgethilfe durchge-
führte Maßnahmen nationale Systeme, vor allem das 
öffentliche Finanzwesen, stärken. Das Ausmaß des Fortschritts 
im öffentlichen Finanzwesen hängt allerdings von den institu-
tionellen Kapazitäten und dem politischen Reformwillen auf-
seiten der Partnerregierung ab. 
Korruption
Die Synthese zeigt keinen systematischen negativen Effekt von 
Budgethilfe auf Korruption und bestätigt damit ein solches 
befürchtetes Risiko nicht. Budgethilfe wirkt sich vielmehr 
aufgrund der Durchführung einer jährlichen Leistungskontrolle 
(Performance Assessment Framework) positiv auf die Monito-
ring-Anstrengungen von Korruption aus. Allerdings deuten die 
genutzten Quellen gleichzeitig daraufhin, dass eine Strafver-
folgung und Anklage von Verdächtigen weiterhin selten bleibt 
und eine Verurteilung noch seltener stattfindet.
Zusammenfassung
xviii
Von diesen Effekten abgesehen, wird der Effekt von Budget-
hilfe auf Korruption in den Studien kaum untersucht. Es kann 
damit nicht beantwortet werden, ob Budgethilfe Korruption 
reduziert oder kein Effekt besteht. 
Innerstaatliche Rechenschaftspflicht  
und demokratisches Regieren
Budgethilfe stärkt die „Angebotsseite“ix der innerstaatlichen 
Rechenschaftspflicht, insbesondere durch die Stärkung des 
Budgetprozesses über die Nutzung der nationalen Systeme. 
Die Rolle der obersten Rechnungskontrollbehörden wird durch 
Budgethilfe erheblich gestärkt. Dies zeigt sich hauptsächlich in 
der Qualität und der Quantität von Prüfungsberichten. Im 
Hinblick auf die Nachfrageseitex der innerstaatlichen Rechen-
schaftspflicht konnten Langzeiteffekte der Budgethilfe auf die 
Rolle des Parlaments und der Zivilgesellschaft nicht identifi-
ziert werden, da in den Quellen nur schwache, inkonsistente 
Effekte beschrieben werden. 
Aus welchen Budgethilfe-Inputs (finanzieller oder nicht-finan-
zieller Natur) die positiven Effekte auf die Angebotsseite der 
innerstaatlichen Rechenschaftspflicht resultieren, lässt sich 
aufgrund geringer Abdeckung in den Quellen nicht hinrei-
chend sicher herleiten. 
Wirtschaftsleistung und Einkommensarmut
Budgethilfe verstärkt bestehende makroökonomische Stabili-
tät. Die Tilgung von Inlandsschulden wird als ein Katalysator 
des Wirtschaftswachstums außerdem den Effekten der Bud-
gethilfe zugesprochen. Weitere positive Entwicklungen in der 
Wirtschaftsleistung werden ihr nicht eindeutig zugewiesen.
Effekte der Budgethilfe auf Einkommensarmut können eben-
falls nicht mit ausreichender Sicherheit dargestellt werden. 
Dies ist darauf zurückzuführen, dass sich auf dieser Ebene die 
Zuschreibung beobachteter Effekte auf die Budgethilfe schwie-
rig gestaltet. Mit Blick auf die Wirksamkeit spezifischer Bud-
gethilfe-Inputs liegt eine hinreichende Evidenz lediglich für die 
Wirkung finanzieller Inputs auf die Einkommensarmut vor; es 
lässt sich ein leicht positiver, wenn auch kein eindeutiger 
Trend konstatieren. Für alle weiteren Inputs können aufgrund 
ix Institutionen der Angebotsseite innerstaatlicher Rechenschaftspflicht umfassen Institutionen wie das Finanzministerium und statistische Ämter, die der Öffentlichkeit Informationen zur 
Verfügung stellen, zum Beispiel zu Fragen des Haushalts. Rechnungskontrollbehörden können in Abhängigkeit ihres institutionellen wie rechtlichen Status der Angebots- oder Nachfrageseite 
angehören.
x Die Nachfrageseite innerstaatlicher Rechenschaftspflicht umfasst Akteure wie das Parlament, die Zivilgesellschaft und die Medien, die von der Regierung Informationen zur Ablegung von 
Rechenschaft fordern. 
zu geringer Evidenz keine generalisierbaren Schlussfolgerun-
gen zu den Auswirkungen auf die Wirtschaftsleistung und die 
Einkommensarmut getroffen werden.
Bereitstellung öffentlicher Leistungen und 
Nicht-Einkommensarmut 
Budgethilfe erhöht den Zugang zu öffentlichen Dienstleistun-
gen. Gelder aus der allgemeinen sowie der Sektorbudgethilfe 
sind maßgeblich für die Ausweitung der Bereitstellung von 
Leistungen, vor allem in den Sektoren Bildung und Gesund-
heit. Allerdings konnte nicht festgestellt werden, dass Budget-
hilfe die Qualität der zur Verfügung gestellten Dienstleistun-
gen oder die Verwaltung derselben verbessert. Die sich in den 
Empfängerländern abzeichnenden positiven Trends in der 
Nicht-Einkommensarmut lassen sich auf Basis der bestehen-
den Evidenz nicht mit Sicherheit auf die Budgethilfe 
zurückführen.
Hinreichende Evidenz zu Budgethilfe-Effekten auf die Erbrin-
gung von öffentlichen Leistungen liegt für die Wirkung von 
finanziellen Inputs, des Politikdialogs und der begleitenden 
technischen Zusammenarbeit/Entwicklung von Kapazitäten 
vor. Für die Wirkung von Konditionalität auf die Erbringung 
von öffentlichen Leistungen können hingegen keine generali-
sierbaren Schlussfolgerungen gezogen werden. Effekte von 
spezifischen Budgethilfe-Inputs auf die Verwaltung öffentli-
cher Leistungen und die Nicht-Einkommensarmut sind eben-
falls nicht durch ausreichende Evidenz abgedeckt.
Fazit
Diese Evaluationssynthese stellt den bislang umfassendsten 
Blick auf die existierende Evidenz zur Wirksamkeit von Budget-
hilfe, einer umstrittenen Modalität der Entwicklungszusam-
menarbeit, dar. Die Ergebnisse sichern bereits bestehendes 
Wissen systematisch ab und schaffen neues Orientierungswis-
sen für Entscheidungsträger der deutschen und internationa-
len Entwicklungszusammenarbeit.
Zusammenfassend belegt die breite Evidenz relevante Wirkun-
gen der Budgethilfe bei der Förderung wichtiger Entwicklungs-
ziele, zum Beispiel bei der Verbesserung im Bereich des 
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öffentlichen Finanzwesens und von Haushaltsprozessen sowie 
bei der Bereitstellung öffentlicher Güter und Leistungen. Vor 
diesem Hintergrund erscheint eine erneute Prüfung der Bud-
gethilfe als einer Finanzierungsform auch für diejenigen Geber 
lohnenswert, die sich weitgehend aus der Modalität zurück-
gezogen haben. Dabei sollte allerdings ein besonderes Augen-
merk auf die in dieser Evaluationssynthese ebenfalls identifi-
zierten verbleibenden Wissenslücken gelegt werden. Denn 
nach wie vor bestehen erhebliche Erkenntnisdefizite mit Blick 
auf wichtige Wirkmechanismen der Budgethilfe. Diese beste-
hen insbesondere in Bezug auf die Wirksamkeit auf der Ebene 
von Outcomes und Impacts aufgrund ungelöster methodischer 
Schwierigkeiten bei der kausalen Zuordnung von beobachte-
ten Veränderungen. Zwar belegt die Evidenz Wirkungen von 
Budgethilfe-Programmen generell, liefert jedoch nur geringe 
Erkenntnisse zu den individuellen Wirkmechanismen der  
einzelnen, insbesondere der nicht-finanziellen, Budgethilfe-
Inputs. Gleiches gilt für bisher vernachlässigte Querschnitts-
themen wie die Gleichberechtigung der Geschlechter und 
Verteilungseffekte von Wachstum. Des Weiteren besteht ein 
gravierendes Wissensdefizit mit Blick auf potenzielle Risiken 
der Modalität wie Korruption. Dieser Mangel an Evidenz über-
rascht besonders, da sich die politische Debatte um Budget-
hilfe vor allem kritisch auf das Thema Korruption richtet.
Ausblick
Diese verbleibenden Wissenslücken bedeuten, dass – obwohl 
fraglos profunde Belege für die Wirksamkeit von Budgethilfe 
vorliegen – auch bei breitestmöglicher Berücksichtigung der 
bislang bestehenden Evidenz nur bedingt Schlussfolgerungen 
zu den Wirkmechanismen spezifischer Budgethilfe-Inputs 
gezogen werden können. Damit einhergehend können auch 
nur in begrenztem Umfang Lehren für die Ausgestaltung und 
die Implementierung von Finanzierungsmodalitäten mit ähnli-
chen Eigenschaften wie die Budgethilfe, zum Beispiel ergebnis-
basierte Ansätze, gezogen werden. Ebenso kann auf Grundlage 
der vorhandenen Evidenz nicht ohne weiteres beantwortet 
werden, welche Folgen der in den letzten Jahren beobachtete 
weitgehende Ausstieg vieler bilateraler Geber aus der Budget-
hilfe für bereits erreichte Wirkungen hat und haben wird. 
Künftige empirische Arbeiten sollten daher detailliertere Un-
tersuchungen zu den Effekten und zugrunde liegenden 
Wirkmechanismen von einzelnen Budgethilfe-Inputs wie auch 
zu Wirkungen in wichtigen Querschnittsbereichen anstellen. 
Zudem muss die weiterführende Forschung eingehender ana-
lysieren, inwiefern sich potenzielle Risiken der Budgethilfe 
tatsächlich realisieren und gegebenenfalls gemindert werden 
können. 
Das DEval stellt deshalb eine komplementäre, auf den durch 
diese Evaluationssynthese generierten Erkenntnissen aufbau-
ende, Evaluierung zum Ausstieg aus der Budgethilfe an. Diese 
Evaluierung untersucht die Nachhaltigkeit der in dieser Studie 
belegten Budgethilfe-Effekte nach dem Aussetzen von Zahlun-
gen beziehungsweise dem vollständigen Ausstieg aus der 
Budgethilfe. In Verbindung mit den Erkenntnissen der Evalua-
tionssynthese verfolgt sie das Ziel, zu einem Gesamtbild der 
Wirksamkeit von Budgethilfe, der Konsequenzen des Ausstiegs 
sowie der zu ziehenden Schlussfolgerungen für die wirksame 
Ausgestaltung und Implementierung von Budgethilfe und 
verwandten Instrumenten, beizutragen.
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1.1 Budget support as an aid modality 
Around the turn of the millennium, international development 
cooperation underwent a paradigm shift. Mounting evidence 
showed that over the past decades development aid had failed 
to achieve its frequently shifting, yet always ambitious, goals. 
The evidence also suggested that the ineffectiveness had at 
least partly to do with the way aid was provided. Against this 
backdrop, Western donors began to embark on the Paris 
Agenda on Aid Effectiveness.xi 11
Past approaches to development cooperation were based  
on projects tightly controlled by donors and on political 
conditionality often of limited credibility.xii In many cases they 
failed to produce the intended development outcomes. 
Instead, donor-driven and often highly fragmented aid projects 
had in many cases proved detrimental to social and economic 
development in aid-recipient countries. This form of 
development cooperation aimed to strengthen domestic 
institutions and government performance, but instead 
established additional layers of aid-management institutions, 
that increased transaction costs, and undermined democratic 
control, ownership and local capacities.12
Besides shortcomings in conventional development projects, 
such as parallel systems outside the government’s budget, and 
low disbursement rates, criticism has also been directed to the 
so-called structural adjustment programmes (SAP) provided by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. 
They were widely used during the 1980s and early 1990s. They 
comprise concessional loans to indebted or bankrupt countries 
linked to the recipient government’s commitment to 
implement a pre-defined set of economic and political 
conditionalities based on the so-called Washington Consensus. 
In retrospect, these SAPs did not achieve their desired 
objective to reshape economic governance in the recipient 
countries. Critics have particularly stressed the intrusive 
nature of the programmes’ conditionality approach, which was 
assessed as ineffective and undermined more partnership-
based aid relations.13
Based on the problematic experience with conventional 
xi In the entire evaluation synthesis, sources are listed in endnotes (Arabic numeral system) while explanations or illustrations are given in footnotes (Latin numeral system).
xii For a recent review of political conditionality and its diversification beyond aid, see Koch (2015).
project aid and policy-based lending in the 1980s and 1990s, 
donors and recipients were committed to rearranging aid 
relations and increasing the effectiveness of development 
cooperation. The international community formulated a set of 
principles for more effective aid and, in 2005, signed the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which enshrined the 
following principles:14
 • ownership and responsibility by recipient governments 
 • alignment of donor support with recipient priorities and 
systems 
 • harmonization of procedures and approaches among 
donors 
 • results-orientation 
 • mutual accountability
To implement these principles in practice, new aid modalities 
had to be adopted, commonly subsumed under the term 
programme-based approaches (PBAs). These PBAs are defined 
by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD DAC) as 
“a way of engaging in development co-operation based on  
the principles of co-ordinated support for a locally owned 
programme of development, such as a national development 
strategy, a sector programme, a thematic programme or a 
programme of a speciﬁc organisation”15. PBAs are 
characterized by the following features: 
(i)  leadership by the host country or organization
(ii)  a single comprehensive programme and budget 
framework
(iii) a formalized process for donor co-ordination and 
harmonization of donor procedures for reporting, 
budgeting, ﬁnancial management and procurement
(iv) eﬀorts to increase the use of local systems for programme 
design and implementation, ﬁnancial management, and 
monitoring and evaluation. 
Budget support (BS) was one of the most significant forms of 
PBA. Usually provided jointly by multiple donors in support of 
recipient governments’ national poverty reduction and 
development strategy, this new aid modality soon became 
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increasingly popular among both bilateral and multilateral 
donors.16 The OECD defines budget support as “a method of 
financing a partner country’s budget through a transfer of 
resources from an external financing agency to the partner 
government’s national treasury.”17 While general budget 
support (GBS) represents a non-earmarked contribution to 
support government spending, in sector budget support (SBS) 
the funds are usually earmarked for utilisation in a specific 
sector. In addition to transferring financial resources to the 
recipient government’s budget,18 the standard package of 
budget support comprises non-financial elements of policy 
dialogue, conditionality, and technical assistance and capacity 
development (TA/CD) to support the reform process of the 
partner country. Budget support conditionality consists of two 
pillars: underlying principles and a Performance Assessment 
Framework (PAF). Underlying principles form the conditionality 
basis for providing general budget support and include 
principles such as macroeconomic stability, commitment of 
the government to implement national development plans and 
reforms in PFM, and adherence to democratic principles and 
human rights. PAFs are negotiated among donors and partners 
and consist of performance indicators that measure the 
government performance in specific areas of the reform 
process. Disbursements of budget support instalments are 
linked to performance in the PAF.19 The policy dialogue 
between donors and partners takes place on technical level,  
in particular to assess the partner government’s performance 
in PAF indicators, and on a strategic, higher-ranking level.  
TA/CD as third non-financial input, serves to strengthen the 
capacities of the partner government and institutions to 
increase the effectiveness and efficiency in the use of the 
financial input. The combination of financial and non-financial 
inputs is expected to have reciprocal effects, increasing the 
effectiveness of both financial and non-financial inputs in their 
impact to reduce poverty.
xiii Most importantly, donors reformed their conditionality approach. “Instead of imposing conditionality and demanding policy alignment from recipient countries, donors were now expected to 
draw their conditionality from a comprehensive, nationally elaborated strategy on development and poverty education” (Knoll 2008: 2).
xiv Data obtained from the OECD DAC CRS databank.
xv For additional information on the size of budget support programmes in selected countries, see annex 7.3.
Drawing on lessons from previous policy-based lending 
modalities,xiii the World Bank, the European Union (EU) and 
some larger member states set up the first multi-donor budget 
support programmes around the turn of the millennium. 
Budget support gained importance towards the second half of 
the 2000s. Donors expressed high expectations with regard to 
the new aid instrument and disbursed increasing shares of aid 
in the form of budget support.20 Together with the European 
Commission (EC), bilateral donors (e.g. the UK and the 
Netherlands) were frontrunners in the early phase of budget 
support. They were followed by other member states (among 
them Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Germany), which joined 
the budget support programmes but took a more selective 
approach based on stricter governance indicators. With budget 
support in full swing, EU member states and the EC spent 
roughly EUR 15.5 billion as general budget support (GBS) 
between 2006 and 2010.xiv Despite ambitious targets to 
channel up to 50% of government-to-government assistance 
through country systems, and making increased use of budget 
support and other PBAs,21 neither the EC nor bilateral 
champions of the instrument ever achieved such shares.xv 
1.2 The exit from budget support and the advent of 
new financing modalities
Towards the end of the 2000s, enthusiasm for the new aid 
instrument faded, particularly among bilateral donors, and the 
debate on budget support became increasingly politicized.22
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Box 1 The debate on budget support
Budget support, in particular GBS, is seen as a particularly suitable instrument to intensify ownership of the partner 
governments, alignment with national structures of the partner and harmonization among donors. In the combination of 
financial inputs (financing function) and the support of sector-specific and cross-sectoral reforms (governance function), 
systemic impacts on the partner country are expected. Through a harmonized contribution of several donors, geared towards 
the priorities of the partner country, a higher predictability of aid is expected. The reduction of poverty is to be achieved 
indirectly in supporting the activities of the partner government and the use of national systems of the partner.
In contrast, the debate also revolves around fiduciary and political risks of budget support in case the quality of the partner 
countries’ systems is insufficient or changes to the negative. As fiduciary risks, the debate discusses the misappropriation of 
budget support funds, such as corruption, as well as a misallocation of funds in non-poverty relevant sectors. On the side of 
political risks, budget support opponents fear negative effects on domestic accountability due to the one-sided support of the 
executive and less incentives to mobilize domestic revenues.
Also, there was a controversy over the ultimate goals of the instrument. In particular during early stages of budget support 
programmes, it was argued that the prime – if not sole – objective of budget support should be to finance recipient countries’ 
poverty-reduction strategies. Later, mostly among bilateral donors, budget support’s function to promote good governance 
through its conditionality, policy dialogue, and accompanying measures shifted to the centre of interest.23 This change in the 
aim hierarchy led, in combination with more sceptical risk assessments, to a more critical stance towards budget support.24
xvi Data obtained from the OECD DAC CRS databank.
xvii In 2014, the EC provided EUR 1.6 billion (21% of total EuropeAid disbursements) as budget support (see EC, 2015).
Together with feared risks, political difficulties in various 
recipient countries, in particular corruption cases and human 
rights violations, led to partly uncoordinated suspensions of 
budget support payments by individual donors.25 Arguably, 
with the change towards more conservative governments, 
European donors became increasingly concerned about 
fiduciary risks and started attaching stricter political 
conditionality to budget support.26 The financial volume 
provided as GBS by European member states and the EC fell to 
EUR 4.2 billion between 2011 and 2013.xvi Today, many bilateral 
donors, such as the Netherlands and the UK, have suspended 
or stopped GBS. On the request of its member states, the EC 
has imposed stricter entry criteria for GBS in its new budget 
support guidelines.27 With only moderate decreases in the 
overall disbursement figures for all forms of budget support,xvii 
the EC has shifted from GBS to SBS and 82% of ongoing EU 
budget support programmes are now being provided as Sector 
Development Contracts. GBS (i.e. Good Governance and 
Development Contracts as well as State Building Contracts 
directed towards fragile states) plays a minor role, with 4% and 
6% respectively.28
In bilateral donors’ quest to reduce fiduciary risk, new finance 
modalities tying aid disbursements even closer to programme 
performance and results have gained importance in recent 
years.29 Such results-oriented modalities, however, have a close 
linkage to performance-based tranches of budget support 
disbursements, aiming to incentivize partner governments to 
achieve the desired outputs or outcomes by paying them upon 
delivery rather than up front.30
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Box 2 New finance modalities
With the adoption of the sustainable development goals (SDG), the discussion on effective financing for development and 
innovative finance modalities gained new momentum. According to the UN, the gap for financing the SDGs is estimated to be 
around 2.5 trillion annually.31
Innovative finance approaches cover a broad spectrum of modalities. One focus is on the mobilization of additional private 
capital, for example through government guarantees or blending. Another prominent debate evolves around results-oriented 
modalities. The so-called results-based aid defines measurable outputs and outcomes, and financial means are disbursed once 
the agreed output or outcome is achieved. While some modalities link all payments to the achievement of predefined results, 
others only incorporate results-oriented components. This is the case for SBS and GBS, using variable performance tranches to 
link single disbursement tranches to the success in defined PAF indicators. Apart from the results-orientation, both results-
based aid and budget support have a strong focus on outputs and outcomes and use the partner countries’ national systems.32
This similarity of the modalities allows to derive lessons from the case of budget support for results-based aid – even more so 
as practical experience with newer forms of results-based aid, such as cash on delivery, is so far rare.
1.3 First findings on budget support and lack of 
impact on the political debate
In line with the growing use of budget support during the first 
decade of the millennium, efforts to assess the effects of 
budget support were undertaken early on.33 As early as 2001,  
a group of 20 donors, among them Germany, launched an 
evaluability study of GBS, which developed a first 
methodological framework for the evaluation of budget 
support.34 This framework subsequently guided a first major 
effort to evaluate the effectiveness of budget support 
undertaken in 2004/2005 by a consortium of donors and 
coordinated by the OECD DAC,35 with the aim of evaluating to 
what extent and under which circumstances budget support 
had generated effects in seven country cases (Burkina Faso, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Uganda, and 
Vietnam).
A synthesis of these country evaluations36 finds positive effects 
of budget support on aid management (harmonization and 
alignment), the quality of the policy dialogue conducted 
between donors and recipient governments, and the 
management of public finances in recipient countries. The 
impact of budget support, e.g. on economic growth, poverty 
reduction, or social sector service delivery, could not be 
evaluated as envisaged in the inception report of this 
evaluation effort, due to unresolved methodological 
challenges (in particular regarding the attribution of effects  
to budget support on the outcome and impact level).37
With increasing pressure on governments, mainly from 
parliaments in donor countries, to demonstrate results of 
development cooperation at impact level, further efforts were 
thus made to improve on the methodology for evaluating 
budget support. Under the auspices of the EC, a working  
group consisting of the budget support donors developed an 
intervention logic for budget support programmes38 that 
aimed to cover the entire causal chain, from the input to the 
impact level. The intervention logic describes the expected 
effects of budget support. The achievement of those effects is 
supported by implementing the principles of effective aid, 
such as alignment to recipient governments’ policies and 
systems, harmonization among donors and increased 
predictability in the disbursement of funds. By using the 
systems of the recipient country, also a reduction in transaction 
costs is expected. Expected effects include increased 
government spending in social sectors, strengthened PFM, less 
corruption, and improvements in domestic accountability and 
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democratic governance. On outcome and impact level, the 
expected effects are improved macroeconomic performance 
and reduced income poverty, as well as an increase in service 
delivery of public goods and reduced non-income poverty.
This enhanced framework was first piloted between 2009 and 
2011 in three countries (Mali, Tunisia, and Zambiaxviii)39 and has 
since been applied in a revised form in evaluations in various 
countries (also see Section 2.1).40 In general terms, these 
evaluations claim clearly positive effects of budget support’s 
financing function, and some results, however mixed, with 
respect to the instrument’s effectiveness in fostering good 
governance and policy making.
To the disappointment of the instrument’s proponents, 
however, these findings had little impact on the political 
debate related to budget support. This could possibly be 
attributed to remaining doubts regarding the methodology for 
evaluating budget support and thus the validity of the results. 
Methodological difficulties in evaluating budget support will 
be discussed in Section 2.1.
1.4 The need for comprehensive synthesis work
Acknowledging the limited impact of individual evaluations  
on the quality of the debate on budget support in donor 
countries, a number of efforts were undertaken to lift the 
debate onto a more solid evidence base through synopsis of 
various studies and evaluations.41 While these synthesis 
studies overall confirmed the evaluation findings, they were 
not able to change the debate on budget support, as political 
support for the instrument continued to dwindle in most 
Western donor countries. The lack of impact on the debate 
was arguably due to the fact that these studies were based  
on a limited number of studies and took specific perspectives 
(EC, bilateral, donor, individual aid agency). Moreover, 
synthesis studies tended to focus on presenting the results in 
a structured way without necessarily identifying which of the 
presented effects are widely backed by evidence.
xviii With the participation of the Netherlands and Germany.
xix The accompanying exit evaluation of budget support will be published in a separate report in mid-2017.
Against this background, this evaluation addresses the task of 
systematically reviewing existing evidence related to the 
effectiveness of budget support, as well as investigating the 
consequences on partner countries and donors of an exit from 
the instrument. This report presents the findings of the 
conducted evaluation synthesis.xix The findings are directed 
towards policy makers in Germany, other bilateral donors, and 
multilateral institutions, and implementing agencies that 
design and implement budget support programmes as well as 
related financing instruments.
This evaluation synthesis aims to provide lessons learned for 
the design and the implementation of future budget support 
and related financing modalities that, in a similar way to 
budget support, aim at fostering structural impact and 
supporting reform oriented partners. Also, the evaluation 
synthesis aims to contribute to a more objective discussion 
about the effectiveness of budget support by putting its main 
focus on the identification of findings that are covered by 
reliable evidence. To this end, the evaluation synthesis 
systematically reviews 95 sources, among them evaluations, 
academic and “grey” literature. The body of evidence is 
selected by using an explicit search strategy and clear 
inclusion/ exclusion criteria. To control for differences in the 
methodological quality of the different sources, all sources are 
rated in a quality assessment and divided into best evidence 
and second-best evidence. The sources are systematically 
coded based on the programme logic of budget support, and 
the codings (equals text sections) analysed to identify the 
effects of budget support. The findings are subject to a best-
evidence robustness check, which further ensures the 
reliability of evidence by assessing the robustness of findings. 
Only those findings that are covered in 10 or more reports are 
finally stated in the evaluation synthesis. (For a detailed 
description of the methodology, see Section 2) The evaluation 
synthesis offers a technical analysis of the evidence and 
resigns intentionally from interpreting the findings to avoid 
bias.
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This evaluation synthesis reviews the existing evidence on 
budget support in a systematic way and aims to answer two 
evaluation questions:
1.  Which effects of budget support are substantiated by 
reliable evidence?
2. Under which contextual conditions does budget support 
generate results?
This review of reliable budget support effects forms the basis 
for investigating the sustainability of budget support effects in 
the subsequent evaluation of the suspension of, and exit from, 
budget support. Together, the two products identify what is 
actually known about the effectiveness of budget support and 
the consequences that have to be faced when donors exit from 
the aid modality. Moreover, the products provide lessons 
learned about the design and implementation of future budget 
support programmes and related financing modalities.
This study is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the 
methodology and evaluation design of the evaluation 
synthesis. It further introduces the programme logic of budget 
support, the CEF being the basis for evaluating budget support 
and therefore also for this evaluation synthesis. The results of 
the quality assessment and a quantitative description of the 
literature analysed for this evaluation synthesis are given in 
Section 3. Section 4 presents the quantitative and qualitative 
findings of budget support effects on the different outputs, 
outcomes and impacts: aid-effectiveness principles, 
government expenditure, public financial management (PFM), 
corruption, domestic accountability and democratic 
governance, economic performance and income poverty, and 
service delivery and non-income poverty. Section 5 sums up 
the main conclusions on the effectiveness of budget support.
2.
SYNTHESIS DESIGN  
AND METHODOLOGY
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About 15 years into implementing budget support programmes 
on a broad scale, knowledge about the effectiveness of the  
aid instrument has been gathered in numerous evaluations 
and academic studies. Earlier synthesis work has made 
important contributions to advancing this knowledge by 
drawing together the findings of a number of relevant studies. 
However, these synthesis studies did not review the substantial 
body of evidence in a systematic way. This section describes 
the systematic approach applied in the design and 
methodology of this evaluation synthesis.
2.1 Evaluative challenges
Budget support is a complex aid instrument in contemporary 
development cooperation.42 Defined as a financing method to 
provide funding to a partner country’s budget by transferring 
resources from an external donor to the national treasury of 
the partner government (see Section 1),43 it follows an 
extensive intervention logic and combines financial and non-
financial inputs by multiple donors in order to achieve multiple 
outcomes.
There has been a long-standing methodological debate on how 
to adequately assess the contribution of complex budget 
support programmes to the envisaged changes at different 
levels. After a first set of country case studies conducted up 
until 2005 (see Section 1.3), evaluation experts under the lead 
xx The CEF presented in the methodological approach to evaluating budget support by the OECD DAC (2012) illustrates the intervention logic of budget support in its most recent form. Earlier 
versions include the Enhanced Evaluation Framework – EEF (see EC (2008), Methodology for Evaluations of Budget Support Operations at Country Level – Issue paper) and the Evaluation 
Framework – EF (see Lawson, A./ Booth, D. (2004).
xxi When referring to aid-effectiveness principles, this synthesis refers to these five principles – the three Paris principles plus the expected direct outputs of increased predictability and reduced 
transaction costs.
of the EC proposed a common approach to evaluating budget 
support. This approach includes the CEF, which describes the 
generic intervention logic for the aid instrument, and provides 
the so-called “Three-Step Approach” for evaluating budget 
support (see Annex 7.1).44 This propped approach was 
subsequently applied in a series of pilot evaluations45 and 
revised in 2012. In its latest form, the CEF (described below) 
served as a yardstick for the majority of multi-donor 
evaluations of budget support.46
The Comprehensive Evaluation Framework (CEF)
The sequence of effects expected to result from budget 
support programmes has been described in an intervention 
logic for the instrument. Its latest version, the CEF,xx illustrates 
the standard inputs of budget support and lists expected 
changes along the causal chain from direct outputs to induced 
outputs, outcomes, and impact (see Figure 1). If implemented 
in accordance with the principles of aid effectiveness, budget 
support is expected to produce direct outputs, e.g. increased 
predictability of external funds or reduced transaction costs of 
providing and receiving aid, and thus to increase aid 
effectiveness in the recipient country.47 The CEF refers to three 
of the five Paris principles of aid effectiveness as direct 
outputs (ownership, harmonization, and alignment) and 
stipulates that budget support positively affects aid 
effectiveness through increasing predictability and reducing 
the transaction costs of aid in the recipient country.xxi
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Figure 1: The Comprehensive Evaluation Framework for budget support
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On the next level in the intervention logic, the CEF describes 
induced outputs that “… are not directly produced by budget 
support inputs and direct outputs, but require another actor 
(in this case the government) to produce them.”48 These 
induced outputs are: improved macroeconomic management, 
increased quantity and quality of public services, and 
strengthened systems of PFM. This implies that changes at 
higher levels (from induced outputs, outcomes, and impact) 
are achieved indirectly by inducing changes within the 
recipient country’s system. Outcomes such as the increased 
use of publicly provided goods and services, or expected 
impacts such as a reduction of income and non-income 
poverty, depend on the recipient country’s administrative 
capacities and its government’s commitment to achieve the 
desired changes.
Budget support programmes interact in two ways with the 
broader context in which they are implemented. First, budget 
support is only one out of many drivers of change acting in 
parallel with other government programmes and aid 
interventions pursuing the same objectives. Second, changes 
in the wider economic, political and institutional context may 
influence the potential for budget support to be effective, 
given that the success of budget support depends on domestic 
context conditions, such as the quality of national policies or 
the efficiency of PFM systems. The programme logic formulated 
in the CEF assumes two major types of “driving force” to 
induce expected changes: “flow-of-funds effects”, which result 
from the financial input of budget support, and “policy and 
institutional effects”, caused by the non-financial inputs of 
policy dialogue, conditionality, and technical assistance/
capacity development (TA/CD) provided complementary to 
budget support funds in order to strengthen national country 
systems and policies.
Methodological debate
Despite the considerable resources invested in developing the 
methodological approach, fundamental difficulties in evaluating 
xxii In addition to problems around causation, Dijkstra and de Kemp (2015) point to challenges emerging from practically applying the intervention logic. When adhering to the ownership principle, 
basic trust in the partner country’s government and some congruence in donors’ and partners’ preferences is required. Another challenge is that budget support programmes are joint efforts by 
multiple donors. In the joint programme however, individual preferences of donors might deviate.
xxiii The seven thematic areas include: aid effectiveness principles, government expenditure, PFM, corruption, domestic accountability and democratic governance, economic performance and income 
poverty, service delivery, and non-income poverty. 
xxiv The role of theory in synthesis work has been described primarily as an ”organizing tool” to structure the synthesized evidence (see Alton-Lee, 2004). Starting from the optimistic programme 
logic, the present evaluation synthesis will critically assess existing evidence also in the light of competing theories for the individual chapters.
xxv The five criteria are relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability (OECD DAC, 1991).
budget support remain. Among others, Dijkstra and de Kemp 
(2015) identify as one of the main unsolved issues the 
challenge of defining the ”correct” counterfactual for budget 
support, i.e. a hypothetical situation (project aid, other forms 
of PBAs, or a situation without aid) against which the 
effectiveness of budget support as an aid modality could be 
assessed. xxii Moreover, the Three-Step Approach has been 
described as a “broad but weak” evaluation approach,49 as the 
approach is generally adequate to cover the large scope of 
budget support programmes and helped to generate a 
substantial body of evidence on the effectiveness of budget 
support, but weak with regard to establishing clear and 
unambiguous causal links between the different inputs and the 
outcomes of budget support. Schmitt and Beach (2015) point 
to the limited value of constructing counterfactuals for causal 
inference in budget support evaluations of single cases. 
Overall, scholars and evaluators agree that even more recent 
evaluations continue to face problems of attribution and that 
the explanatory power of budget support evaluations is 
particularly limited for the outcome and impact level.50
2.2 Design and methodology
This evaluation synthesis of budget support adopts a theory-
based approach and uses the intervention logic laid out in the 
CEF as the overall analytical framework. The CEF was used to 
identify the expected outcomes of budget support and to 
establish the comprehensive code system applied for data 
collection (see Section 2.2.4). The individual sections in 
Section 4 build on the CEF to further specify how different 
elements of budget support were implemented, describe how 
budget support contributed to results in the different thematic 
areas,xxiii and identify cross-linkages between different thematic 
areas.xxiv This evaluation synthesis structures findings on the 
effectiveness of budget support along seven thematic areas 
derived from the CEF. The evaluation team concentrated on 
the issue of effectiveness, which is one out of five DAC criteria 
for evaluating development assistance.xxv Given that most of 
13Synthesis design and methodology   |  2.
the reviewed evaluations and studies do not explicitly refer to 
the DAC criteria, this evaluation synthesis focuses on the 
effectiveness of budget support.
Over the past years, a considerable number of country-based 
evaluations have generated a substantial amount of evidence 
on the effectiveness of budget support, which in turn has been 
summarized in various synthesis studies.51 These synthesis 
studies broaden the picture of the effectiveness of budget 
support in different contexts. However, the studies typically 
have limited coverage, adopt selective perspectives and do not 
always review the data in a particularly systematic manner. For 
example, the criteria for including or excluding primary sources 
are not always made transparent. Moreover, existing synthesis 
studies tend to focus on presenting the results without 
discussing the qualitative heterogeneity and methodological 
challenges of individual country evaluations in sufficient detail. 
Methodological challenges in synthesis work have been the 
topic of a lively academic debate in the past years. Littell and 
Maynard (2014) describe three major forms of bias typically 
found in many research reports and reviews: outcome-
reporting bias (in which the reporting of results is influenced 
by their direction and/or statistical significance), publication 
bias (by only including published work) and dissemination bias 
(studies with significant results are published faster, reprinted 
more often and easier to locate).
In reaction to these challenges, the “systematic review” 
approach has been proposed as a viable procedure to address 
multiple biases in traditional research reports. As stated by 
Saini and Shlonsky (2012), “systematic reviews attempt to 
decrease the bias of traditional literature reviews by 
systematically and transparently synthesizing the greatest 
range of relevant, high-quality studies, published or 
unpublished, related to a single, pre-specified question.”52 
Littell and Corcoran (2010) define systematic reviews as 
“carefully organized, comprehensive, and transparent studies 
of previous research on a particular topic. Systematic reviews 
follow written protocols (detailed plans) that specify the 
central objectives, concepts, and methods in advance.”53 The 
Campbell Collaboration (2015), an interdisciplinary research 
xxvi See Dijkstra and de Kemp, 2015.
network that disseminates systematic reviews, describes four 
steps of a systematic review process:
 • an explicit search strategy 
 • clear inclusion/ exclusion criteria 
 • systematic coding and analysis of included studies 
 • meta-analysis (where possible). 
Systematic reviews typically comprise statistical analyses of 
high-quality studies, often linked to the use of randomized 
control trials. Although mostly applied to synthesize and 
analyse quantitative studies, the approach is increasingly 
being discussed for synthesizing qualitative studies as well.54 
Synthesizing the effectiveness of budget support, where 
counterfactual-based impact evaluations are not available  
and the existing evaluations and academic literature use 
different methodologies to analyse the effectiveness of  
budget support,xxvi requires a more qualitative approach.
This evaluation synthesis adopts a qualitative approach to 
systematically review the evidence on the effectiveness of 
budget support. It reviews evaluations of budget support as 
well as relevant academic and grey literature in order to 
address the described challenges and limitations of previous 
syntheses. With a review of 95 sources of three different  
types, the evaluation synthesis offers broad coverage and the 
analysis of different perspectives. The reviewed body of 
evidence is identified based on an explicit search strategy  
and clear inclusion and exclusion criteria (see 2.2.2), and the 
analysis includes a quality assessment to control for qualitative 
differences in the evidence base. Based on systematic coding, 
the evaluation synthesis includes only those findings that are 
covered by sufficient evidence (see 2.2.4). Thus, the main focus 
of this evaluation synthesis is on presenting reliable evidence 
rather than on summarizing the effects of budget support.
The Campbell Collaboration provides guidelines on when and 
how to include qualitative studies to augment quantitative 
systematic reviews. However, no clear guidelines exist on how 
to conduct a stand-alone qualitative systematic review.55 As a 
pragmatic approach, this evaluation synthesis therefore 
follows the general standards for systematic reviews,56 and the 
2.  |  Synthesis design and methodology 14
four steps described above, as closely as possible, but does  
not apply a strict blueprint to the analysis.xxvii The following 
sections outline how this evaluation synthesis applies the 
standards of a systematic review process.
2.2.1 A search strategy based on explicit criteria
Inspired by the systematic review methodology, the evaluation 
team employed specific search strategies for three types of 
sources.
The first type of source is evaluation reports, including EC/
multi-donor evaluations and agency evaluations.xxviii EC/multi-
donor evaluations of budget support were compiled by the 
evaluation team.xxix To ensure completeness, this list has been 
shared with two external experts in the field of budget support 
evaluation for comments and further suggestions. The initial 
list contained 16 items and was then augmented to include 20 
EC/multi-donor evaluations of budget support (see list of 
references). In addition to the 20 EC and multi-donor 
evaluations, the evaluation synthesis also includes evaluation 
reports of multilateral development agencies. As those reports 
are not always available online, the team approached the 
evaluation units at the World Bank, the African Development 
Bank (AfDB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The request resulted 
in a total of 45 agency evaluations and learning products 
related to budget support.
The second type of source is academic literature. For this type 
of source, the evaluation team systematically searched a wide 
range of online databasesxxx for relevant keywords. Publications 
including the keywords “budget support” OR “budgetary 
support” in the title, as well as (“budget support” OR 
“budgetary support”) AND (“effectiveness” OR “effects” OR 
“results” OR “outcomes” OR “impact” OR “evaluation”) in any 
field have been considered. The procedure was done in English, 
German, French and Spanish. The resulting list of academic 
literature was then checked by two reviewers in order to 
xxvii Note that the fourth step (Meta-analysis) proposed by Campbell Collaboration (2015) could not be applied in this evaluation synthesis due to the qualitative character and the variance of applied 
methodology of the included studies and evaluations.
xxviii EC/multi-donor evaluations include evaluations commissioned by multiple donors and evaluations commissioned by the EU alone but which follow the same methodology as the evaluations 
commissioned by multiple donors. Agency evaluations include evaluations commissioned by the World Bank and regional development banks. The distinction between EC/multi-donor and agency 
evaluations was only made in the course of the search strategy.
xxix Some evaluation reports comprise multiple volumes with relevant information (e.g. on methodological issues) provided separately from the main report. When these volumes were not available 
online, they have been requested from the authors or the commissioning entity.
xxx The databases include: JSTOR, Emerald Insight, Sage Journals, Wiley Online Library, Science Direct, Springer Link, OECD iLibrary, World Bank eLibrary, Google Scholar, Academia.edu, Web of 
Science, EBSCOhost, WISO, Scopus, Project Muse, Annual Reviews, EconLit.
xxxi Note that triangulation of sources was limited due to different levels of coverage of evidence for different effects of budget support. 
eliminate irrelevant titles (i.e. those not dealing with budget 
support). The initial search resulted in 157 items of academic 
literature.
The third type of source is grey literature. Given resource  
and time constraints, the evaluation team limited the search 
for grey literature by focusing on sources referenced in 
bibliographies of evaluations and synthesis reports. Including 
grey literature was considered important in order to minimize 
publication bias, allowing further triangulation of sources.xxxi 
Out of the 74 items identified from bibliographies, 59 were 
available online. Following requests by the evaluation team, 
the responsible agencies provided three more reports, 
bringing the total available body of grey literature to 62 items.
Some items from the three groups were reclassified at a later 
stage of the process. Several sources acquired through the 
systematic search for academic literature were re-categorized 
as grey literature if they had not been subject to any kind of 
peer review process either by academic publishers or research 
institutes. A complete list of the evaluation reports, academic 
literature and grey literature included in the review is 
presented in the list of references.
2.2.2 Relevance criteria for inclusion of sources
To ensure a transparent and systematic procedure, the 
evaluation synthesis applied predefined relevance criteria for 
the inclusion or exclusion of sources from the sample. The 
decision to include or exclude each source was taken 
independently by two reviewers based on two necessary 
(“must have”) criteria. Only sources fulfilling both criteria A 
and B described below were defined as relevant and were 
included in the evaluation synthesis. Cases of disagreement 
were discussed and settled in consensus. The two criteria were 
the following:
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Criterion A: The study analyses budget support based on own 
empirical analysis.
The study is based on own empirical analysis and generates 
new insights beyond the knowledge from secondary data. 
Evaluation/studies typically comprise either i) case studies for 
which a sufficient amount of primary data has been collected 
or ii) cross-country quantitative studies that go beyond 
descriptive statistics by conducting (inferential) quantitative 
analysis of existing datasets.
Criterion B: The study deals with implementation and/or 
effectiveness of budget support.
It is not required that the study covers the entire spectrum of 
budget support implementation and questions of 
effectiveness, but it must deal with at least one of the two 
aspects. For implementation, important aspects include donor 
harmonization, transaction costs or predictability of budget 
support inputs. Important aspects of effectiveness include, 
among others: poverty reduction, service delivery, corruption, 
PFM, and domestic accountability.
All EC/multi-donor evaluations and 12 out of 45 agency 
evaluations passed the relevance criteria. For academic 
literature, 42 out of 157 items fulfilled the criteria and 21 out of 
62 grey literature items passed the criteria.
xxxii Given the described challenges of evaluating budget support and the bulk of the evidence being produced by evaluations, the focus of the quality assessment was on the evaluation reports. For 
the academic and grey literature, a reduced set of quality criteria has been applied.
Quality assessment
The included body of 95 evaluations and studies were assessed 
regarding their methodological quality, as stated in the reports 
and supplementary documents. Given the different nature of 
evaluations vis-à-vis academic and grey literature, two 
different sets of quality criteria (QC) have been developed and 
applied by the evaluation team.xxxii Following recent 
methodological discussions,57 quality criteria for evaluations 
have been defined in several areas: intervention logic and 
evaluation questions, context, methodology, data collection 
and analysis, and justification of conclusions. The quality was 
rated along a 0–3 scale for most quality criteria (see Annex 
7.2). For the evaluation reports, the criteria for the quality 
assessment are presented in Table 1.
2.  |  Synthesis design and methodology 16
Table 1: Criteria for quality assessment of evaluation reports
Category Quality criterion
Intervention Logic and  
Evaluation Questions
QC 1: Formulation of evaluation questions (EQ)
QC 2: The evaluation answers to the formulated EQs
Context QC 3: The evaluation describes the economic and political context in the case country
QC 4: The evaluation describes the context of aid relations in the case country
Methodology QC 5: The evaluation makes use of an intervention logic (IL)
QC 6: The evaluation acknowledges problems of attribution and describes how it  
addresses them in the methodology section
QC 7: The evaluation reflects on the influence of (changing) context on programme outcomes in the methodology section
QC 8: The evaluation describes how it triangulates methods and sources in the methodology section
QC 9: The report describes general limitations of the evaluation in the methodology section
Data Collection and Analysis QC 10: The evaluation provides information on the collected data (figures, interview partners, document references)
QC 11: The scope of the empirical inquiry (stakeholder groups)
QC 12: The scope of the empirical inquiry (number of interviews)
QC 13: The evaluation provides information on the procedures for data analysis
Justification of Conclusions QC 14: The evaluation presents its conclusions with reference to methodological limitations
QC 15: The evaluation makes reference to the information that supports each conclusion
QC 16: The evaluation identifies and discusses the programme’s unintended effects 
QC 17: The evaluation elaborates plausible alternative explanations of the findings
QC 18: The evaluation justifies why rival explanations were rejected  
The evaluation team confined the search for information to 
particular parts of the evaluation report, focusing on 
statements made in the methodological section (QC 6, 7, 8, 9) 
or the conclusion (QC 14, 15). A limitation to this approach is 
that it is based on the information explicitly given in the 
evaluation reports and that results depend on the level of 
transparency of the individual sources. In order to address this 
limitation, to ensure stakeholder involvement, and to avoid 
omitting important information, the evaluation team shared 
information on the quality assessment with the authors of the 
reports. This information indicated areas (QCs) for which no 
information was found in the reports and the authors were 
invited to provide additional information for reassessment.
The quality criteria for academic and grey literature covered 
the same topics, but included less-specific criteria regarding 
methodology and data collection and analysis (see Table 2). As 
a large variety of methods was used across the studies, more 
general criteria were applied. Two of the quality criteria were 
changed and reassessed during the quality assessment, as 
indicated in Table 2, as the questions were too general to be 
answered for individual studies. The studies were given a score 
in the range 0–2, where 0 means the QC was not fulfilled, 1 
means it was partially fulfilled and 2 means that the study fully 
adhered to the QC. A more precise rating, as was done in the 
case of evaluations, was not possible due to the strong 
differences between the studies whereas the evaluations were 
easier to compare.
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Table 2: Criteria for quality assessment of academic and grey literature
Category Quality criterion
Research Question QC1: The study is peer reviewed
QC2: The study formulates a clear research question (RQ)
QC3: The study answers the formulated RQ
Methodology QC4: The study builds on a theoretical framework
QC5: The study is transparent about the methodological approach.
Formerly: The methodological approach is generally adequate to answer the RQ
QC6: The study provides information on data (collection) and procedures of data analysis.
Context QC7: The study reflects on the respective context and its influence on the research results.
Formerly: The study reflects on the influence of context on research results
Justified Conclusion QC8: The study establishes a transparent link between the conclusion and the analysed data
The quality assessment provides an overview of the 
methodological quality of the body of evidence and identifies 
the strengths and weaknesses of different (groups of) sources 
(described in more detail in Section 3). The quality assessment 
finds the overall quality of evaluations and reports to be 
moderate, but also relatively homogeneous across the sample 
of evaluations and studies. In view of this result, it would not 
be justifiable to use the quality score as an additional filter for 
inclusion or exclusion. Therefore the team decided to discard 
the initial intention to use the quality assessment as another 
hurdle to include/exclude sources. All identified evaluations 
and studies can be considered to be of sufficient 
methodological quality and are thus included in the evaluation 
synthesis.
Importantly, differences in quality were taken into account in 
the course of data analysis and synthesis of results. In order to 
distinguish between best evidence and second-best evidence, 
the evaluation team defined a cut-off at 50% of the maximum 
quality score and conducted a best-evidence robustness check 
for all identified effects (see 2.2.4). The cut-off at a quality 
score of 50% of the respective maximum achievable score for 
evaluations and studies is an arbitrary but pragmatic choice, 
given that the quality score is fairly evenly distributed across 
evaluation reports, dividing the body of evidence roughly into 
half “best” evidence and half “second-best” evidence.
2.2.3 Systematic coding
In line with the requirements set out for systematic reviews, 
and in order to ensure a maximum level of objectivity, data 
collection was conducted by developing a comprehensive code 
system and applying this to the body of included literature. 
The coding was conducted in two phases. In the first phase, 
two reviewers engaged in coding, testing and refining the code 
system and the procedure. This helped to establish and 
consolidate a common understanding over the use of codes 
and increased confidence when handling the large dataset. In 
the second phase, the actual coding was conducted by one 
evaluator only. Through several rounds of feedback and 
reassessment among the two evaluators in the course of the 
process, the reliability of coding results was continuously 
reviewed. This dialogic approach to data analysis served to 
ensure a maximum level of objectivity.
Building on the intervention logic of budget support spelled 
out in the CEF (see Figure 1), a comprehensive code system 
(see Figure 2) was developed that covers the variety of 
envisaged effects of budget support. In order to capture 
additional aspects not covered in the generic intervention 
logic, the evaluation team went beyond the aspects covered in 
the CEF and assessed and synthesized evaluation questions 
actually posed in evaluations of budget support, e.g. regarding 
gender and corruption. The complete variety of aspects for 
synthesis was then arranged in a preliminary code system.
2.  |  Synthesis design and methodology 18
This preliminary code system was tested and refined by two 
reviewers, who applied it to a subset of six sources (evaluations 
reports and studies) in a first round of coding. As the difference 
between the codings for macroeconomic effects (induced 
output level) and economic performance (outcome level) was 
often not clear-cut in the sources, the codes were merged into 
one code under the label macroeconomic performance. The 
same was done in the case of the two codes public spending 
and allocative efficiency, which were combined under the  
code composition of public spending. After this a total of  
84 codes (including the aggregate codes) was arranged in a 
comprehensive code system (see Figure 2) and applied to 
collect data from the full set of relevant sources.
The comprehensive code system was then applied to collect 
data on effects of budget support. Evaluation reports, 
academic and grey literature were coded, focusing on the 
concluding section or, if available, concluding sections within 
thematic sections. The decision to confine data collection  
to conclusions has been taken by the evaluation team and 
discussed with the reference group and peer reviewers. This 
approach is in line with the interest in actual findings. 
Moreover, it helped to keep the number of codings at a 
manageable level and enabled the evaluation team to cover  
all areas of budget support effects. However, focusing on the 
conclusion of evaluations comes with the risk of underreporting 
unintended and negative outcomes that are mentioned in the 
main text but not in the conclusions. 
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   Capacities to Implement
   Public Goods Orientation
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   Donor Group Tensions
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Figure 2: Comprehensive code system
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All 95 included sources were systematically coded, which 
resulted in 5856 codings (i.e. text sections). The coding process 
was conducted using MAXQDA®, a software package for 
qualitative data analysis. Text segments were coded using 
code combinations to specify the particular outcome area (e.g. 
PFM, domestic accountability, service delivery etc.) as well as 
the specific inputs (i.e. the set of budget support inputs – 
funds, policy dialogue, conditionality, TA/CD)xxxiii that affected 
the changes in outcome. In order to document the direction  
of individual effects, labels were assigned to the coded text 
segments rating effects as positive,xxxiv negative, absent, 
improving, or deteriorating. The labels improving and 
deteriorating, compared to positive and negative, were 
assigned when effects changed in the course of budget 
support disbursements. The categories for the effect  
direction were established during the first round of coding.  
It is important to stress that the classification of an effect’s 
direction depends on the strength of wording that describes 
the effect and therefore is not an exact and objective measure 
of strength of the respective effect, but serves as a proxy. As  
a consequence, effects are not comparable across different 
studies and evaluations conducted by different scholars or 
consultants. Notwithstanding these limitations, the effect size 
labels provide important orientation with regard to the overall 
direction (positive, negative, absent) for the entire body of 
evidence (Section 3) and the individual effects (see Section 4).
Context factors were included for data collection, and the 
evaluation team coded different dimensions of context 
(country context, aid relations context, donor context) as well 
as success and failure factors. Unfortunately, however, the 
reports and studies provide context information mainly at a 
general level without linking individual context factors explicitly 
to the specific effects of budget support. The influence of 
context on budget support effectiveness is therefore described 
to a varying extent for the different effects in Section 4. Given 
these limitations in the evidence base, synthesis results on 
context factors could only be established for a subset of the 
xxxiii Note that for most text segments, no specific input of budget support has been identified. Therefore, most effects have been linked to the budget support programme in general using the code 
“Budget Support Programme”.
xxxiv Positive effects were initially rated more fine-grained as weak, moderate, strong, which helped to structure the evidence in the qualitative data analysis.
xxxv Note that the number of sources supporting individual findings from the qualitative analysis can diverge from the overall amount of statements identified in the quantitative analysis. The 
quantitative analysis draws on the number of text segments per code and effect direction thereby accounting for all segments as coded. The qualitative analysis comprised a more selective 
approach in which the evaluator decides upon the use of individual text segment while doing the qualitative analysis.
effects, based on the identified success and failure factors 
described in the sources.
2.2.4 Data analysis and reporting
In order to provide a structure for reporting, the evaluation 
team clustered related codes along the lines of seven thematic 
areas: aid effectiveness principles, government expenditure, 
PFM, corruption, domestic accountability and democratic 
governance, economic performance and income poverty, and 
service delivery and non-income poverty. These clusters 
combine multiple codes from a common thematic area (i.e.  
the cluster PFM contains the codings on overall PFM, budget 
management and budget transparency) and include various 
effects across different levels of the intervention logic. 
The evaluation team conducted a quantitative analysis of the 
frequency of codings and a qualitative analysis of the effects 
for the seven thematic areas. The quantitative analysis built on 
descriptive statistics of the frequency of codings, sources 
reporting the effect, and effect directions. It provided important 
information on how the different thematic areas are covered 
by the body of evidence. The analysis identified those outcomes 
that are well covered by evidence and those that are not, or 
are insignificantly covered. Both presence and absence of 
budget support effects are treated as important findings of 
this evaluation synthesis. The aggregate number of sources 
and codings, as well as the direction of effects (positive, 
negative or absent) compiled as part of the quantitative 
analysis are further used to underpin the qualitative findings.xxxv
After finalizing the process of coding, the evaluation team 
conducted a qualitative analysis. To this end, the dataset was 
exported into a spreadsheet listing all text segments, with 
additional information such as effect weight, country, quality 
assessment (best evidence, second-best evidence), and input 
codes coded to the same text segment (budget support 
programme, funds, policy dialogue, conditionality, TA/CD).  
For each thematic area, the qualitative analysis followed a 
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standardized procedure involving three main steps. First, the 
evaluators carefully read all codings for the particular thematic 
section. Second, the evaluators used paraphrases and keywords 
to further structure the evidence. Third, by sorting and 
grouping codings in different ways (by country, by effect 
weight, by quality, by paraphrase content and by input code), 
the evaluators were able to identify scope and patterns of 
identified effects. Drawing together the results from the 
qualitative and quantitative analysis allowed the evaluation 
team to ensure internal transparency of the evidence base and 
to carve out a comprehensive picture of the evidence base  
on budget support in relation to the programme theory 
underlying the generic intervention logic of the instrument 
(see Section 4).
In order to assess the reliability of findings, the evaluation 
team applied multiple measures in the data analysis and 
reporting phase. First, the team identified reported effects 
with a questionable attribution to budget support which have 
not been considered in the qualitative analysis. This has been 
the case in particular regarding effects of budget support on 
outcome and impact level. 
Second, the data analysis includes a robustness check. Based 
on the quality assessment and its resulting categorization of 
sources in best evidence and second-best evidence, the 
robustness check examines the composition of sources from 
the two categories. Findings that are backed up by sources in 
the “best evidence” category are considered robust. Findings 
from best and second-best evidence pointing in the same 
direction are also considered robust. In cases where statements 
are covered by both best and second-best evidence and 
contain contradictory effects, the lack of robustness is noted 
and discussed. Note that in all effects presented in Section 4, 
findings were covered by either only best or both best and 
second-best evidence pointing in the same direction, showing 
the robustness of findings. 
Third, effects are only reported in this evaluation synthesis 
when they are covered in at least ten sources. This is obviously 
an arbitrary choice of what represents a “sufficient” evidence 
base. On the one hand, one could argue that 10 out of 95 
sources seem to be a low benchmark. On the other hand, it 
reflects a rather conservative approach given the variety of 
expected effects of budget support: As the majority of studies 
focus on a subset of effects and the total number of sources 
covering one specific effect is way lower than 95, the coverage 
of an effect in 10 or more sources is only achieved in the case 
of some frequently reported effects. Thus, the chosen cut-off 
serves the purpose of this evaluation synthesis to identify the 
secured effects of the aid instrument. In order to make the 
implications of this choice as transparent as possible for the 
reader and to allow for stricter or more lenient interpretations 
of the evidence base, the text indicates for all findings in how 
many sources each finding was stated.
3.
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Table 3: Characteristics of evaluations reports
Document group Institution Published Research Period Covered Countries Design
Evaluations (32) EC (9) 2011–2016 1996–2015 Burundi, Mali, Morocco, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, 
South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda 
Case studies
Consortium IDD, 
Mokoro, Ecorys, DRN 
and NCG (7)
2006 1994–2004 Burkina Faso, Malawi, Mozambique, Nicaragua, 
Rwanda, Uganda, Vietnam
Case studies
Others (4) 2005–2012 1995– 2010 Ghana, Nicaragua, Tanzania, Zambia Case studies
World Bank (9) 2008–2015 2007–2014 Burkina Faso, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, 
Mozambique, Santa Lucia, Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam
Case studies
AfDB (2) 2011 1999 -2009 Sierra Leone, Tanzania Case studies
IDB (1) 2015 2014 No country cases Technical note
xxxvi The latest WB evaluations, published in 2016, are not included in this evaluation synthesis as they were only published after data collection for this synthesis was complete.
This section provides information on the body of evidence. It 
describes general characteristics of the sources used in this 
evaluation synthesis as well as the results and interpretation 
of the quality assessment. Second, it quantitatively describes 
the evidence, identifying the outcomes that are well covered 
by evidence and those that are not, or are insignificantly 
covered. Whereas the aggregate numbers of sources and 
codings are part of this section, the quantitative findings 
relating to specific outcomes are described in Section 4.
3.1 Characteristics of the sources of evidence 
This evaluation synthesis assesses the evidence on budget 
support effects on multiple outcomes in 95 documents. Of the 
95 documents, 32 are evaluations, 42 are academic literature, 
and 21 are grey literature.
The 32 evaluations were all undertaken by the EC, a consortium 
led by the International Development Department of the 
University of Birmingham (IDD), the World Bank, the AfDB, or 
the IDB, and published between 2005 and 2016. The evaluations 
altogether cover an evaluation period from 1994 to 2015xxxvi 
and are, with one exception, based on a case-study design, 
focusing on one country each (see Table 3 for information on 
each category). 
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Table 4: Characteristics of academic and grey literature
Document Group Institutions Document type Published Research Period Covered Countries Design
Academic Literature 
(42)
e.g. DIE,
EP, IMF, IOB, ODI, 
UNU-WIDER, 
WB, WHO
Discussion papers (22) 2005–2015 1992–2012 43 countriesxxxvii Case studies (9)
Comparative case studies (5)
Large n (8)
e.g. IOB Journal Articles (8) 2008–2015 2000–2011 6 countriesxxxviii Case studies (4)
Comparative case studies (1)
Large n (3)
e.g. IDD, IOB, ODI Reports (12) 2000–2015 1994–2014 13 countriesxxxix Case studies (6)
Comparative case studies (2)
Large n (3)
Synthesis (1)
Grey Literature (21) e.g. ecdpm, ISS, 
KAS, Oxfam, PPC, 
U4
Discussion papers (10) 2004–2013 1995–2011 12 countriesxl Case studies (6)
Comparative case studies (1)
Large n (3)
e.g. EU, OPM/ODI Reports (11) 2003–2014 1992–2014 12 countriesxli Case studies (9)
Synthesis (2)
 43 countriesxxxvii, 13 countriesxxxviii, 12 countriesxxxix, 6 countriesxl, 12 countriesxli
xxxvii Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
xxxviii Ethiopia, Ghana, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Zambia.
xxxix Burkina Faso, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam, and Zambia.
xl Afghanistan, Burundi, DRC, Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Palestine, Tanzania, Uganda, and Vietnam. 
xli Andhra Pradesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Georgia, Ghana, Moldova, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Tanzania, Uganda, Ukraine, and Zambia.
xlii QC8, QC14, QC17 and QC18 use a different scale, see Annex 2.
The academic literature on budget support can broadly be 
categorized into discussion papers, journal articles and 
reports. They are published between 2003 and 2015. The 
discussion papers cover a sum of 46 countries, the journal 
articles six countries and the reports 15 countries. Altogether, 
the research period ranges from 1992 to 2014. In terms of 
design, academic and grey literature use either a case-study 
design, a comparative case-study design or a large-n design. 
See Table 4 for more information on each category.
3.2 Reliability of evidence: methodological quality
Quality assessment of evaluation reports
The final results of the quality assessment for evaluations are 
displayed in Table 5. Each row indicates the quality assessment 
for one source. As described in Section 2.2.2 and in Annex 7.2, 
the quality of each report was assessed on a scale of 0–3 
points for most of the QC.xlii The maximum possible score is 49 
points. 
All the assessed evaluation reports are placed in a middle 
range (i.e. second and third quartile), with quality scores from 
15 to 34. Not one evaluation report comes close to reaching 
the maximum score against standard quality criteria for 
evaluations. This result arguably reflects the important 
methodological challenges in evaluating budget support. At 
the same time, the quality assessment strongly suggests that 
the overall quality of evaluation work on budget support is 
sufficiently strong to synthesize conclusions from the overall 
body of evidence.
To distinguish between evidence backed by stronger quality 
evaluations and those of lesser quality, based on the applied 
criteria, the sample was divided into best evidence (top half of 
the table) and second-best evidence (bottom half of the table). 
Table 5 and Table 6 indicate the division into best and second-
best evidence by the grey line. 17 out of 32 evaluations are thus 
categorized as best evidence. 
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The criteria 1–8 for the quality assessment of evaluation 
reports are listed in Table 1. The quality was rated along a 0–3 
scale for most quality criteria. The rating scale for each 
criterion is presented in Annex 7.2. Depending on the given 
rating, the cells in this table were colour-coded, 0 in light 
yellow, 1 in yellow, 2 in light blue and 3 in blue. Empty cells 
indicate that the QC could not be rated due to unspecified 
information in the source (e.g. the source states that 
interviews were conducted, but contains no statement on how 
many and with whom). In contrast, missing information was 
rated with zero. The ratings for each quality criteria were 
added to build the total score per QC (last row in table). To 
recognize patterns of highest and lowest scores, the total 
score was also colour-coded. The high rankings were coded 
blue, dark blue for the two highest rankings and lighter shades 
of blue for high rankings, while low rankings were coded 
orange, with dark orange for the two lowest rankings and 
lighter orange for low rankings.
With regard to the individual quality criteria, the three criteria 
that scored highest among all evaluations are QC2, QC11, and 
QC1 (in order of highest score – see dark blue colour coding in 
Table 5). The high score for the formulation of an evaluation 
question (QC1) and answering this question (QC2) indicates 
that the evaluations have a clear focus and manage to provide 
findings on this question. QC11 refers to the scope of the 
empirical inquiry of different stakeholder groups, and the high 
score implies that almost all of the budget support evaluations 
cover both perspectives in data collection (donor and partner 
country). Other criteria that scored above average are QC12, 
QC15, and QC10 (in order of highest score – see blue colour 
coding in Table 5). This shows that the evaluations rely on a 
considerable amount of data collected in the form of interviews 
(QC12), usually make reference to the information that supports 
each conclusion (QC15), and provide information on the 
collected data (QC 10). The high ratings on data collection for 
all stakeholder groups, based on a large number of interviews, 
are a positive indication of the quality of the data on which the 
evaluations are based.
The criteria that scored lowest among all the QCs are QC18 
xliii While the other QCs were rated on a scale from 0–3 points, QC14, 17 and 18 were rated along a different scale. QC 14 and QC17 were rated from 0–2 and QC 18 was rated 0 or 1. Due to the 
higher specificity, these criteria were rated on less detailed scales. However, even if the maximum score had been 3 points, very few of the reports actually obtained the maximum ranking for QC 
14 and QC 18, which means these QC would still score very low.
xliv This low score might also be influenced by the fact that these QC were rated along a 0–2 ranking system and the score could have been higher if a 0–3 ranking had been used. 
and QC14 (see orange colour coding).xliii Very few of the 
evaluations mention the limitations of the evaluation design in 
the conclusion (QC14) and also few explain why rival 
explanations are rejected (QC18). Other criteria that scored 
low are QC13, QC8, QC16, and QC17, indicating that few 
evaluations mention a triangulation of methods (QC8) and 
identify possible alternative explanations (QC17).xliv Also, few 
mention the information on the procedures for data analysis 
(QC13) and the discussion of unintended effects (QC16). It is 
noteworthy that quality criteria on limitations or unintended 
effects of the evaluations had particularly low scores (QC16, 
QC17, QC18), pointing to the risk of a positive bias in budget 
support evaluations. To address this bias, findings from 
evaluations were triangulated with findings from academic 
and grey literature as far as findings were available in both 
document types. 
Also, the criterion QC6 (the evaluation acknowledges 
problems of attribution and describes how it addresses them 
in the methodology section) scored low. This illustrates the 
unresolved methodological challenges in budget support 
evaluations regarding the attribution of effects at outcome 
and impact level to budget support. The problematic 
attribution at this level is also a central finding of the 
qualitative analysis presented in Section 4.
Quality assessment of academic and grey literature
The results of the quality assessment of academic and grey 
literature are reported in Table 6. The quality scores range 
from 0 to 15, with a maximum possible score of 16. The 
assessed studies thus cover the entire range of quality scores. 
The grey line in the middle of the table again indicates the 
division between best evidence (top half of the table) and 
second-best evidence (bottom half of the table). Empty cells 
indicate that the QC could not be rated due to unspecified 
information in the source.
Overall, the results of the quality assessment of academic and 
grey literature show a large spread across the entire range of 
quality scores. The academic literature scored better than grey 
literature on the applied QC (see Table 6), most likely as a 
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result of more stringent quality assurance processes for peer-
reviewed publications.
With regard to the individual criteria, the studies score highest 
on QC3 and QC2 (in order of highest score – see blue and dark 
blue colour coding in Table 6), rating the inclusion of a 
research question (QC2) and the answers to this question 
(QC3) in the studies. QC1 (the study is peer reviewed) reached 
the lowest score, as all grey literature was rated zero for this 
QC (as stated in section 2.2.1, the existence of a peer review 
process was decisive in the classification as academic or grey 
literature). No particular patterns can be distinguished in the 
distribution of scores across the remaining QC, and thus no 
further conclusions can be drawn on general quality 
characteristics of this body of evidence.
The criteria 1-8 for the quality assessment of academic and 
grey literature are listed in Table 2. The studies were given a 
score in the range 0–2, where 0 means the QC was not 
fulfilled, 1 means it was partially fulfilled and 2 means that the 
study fully adhered to the QC. Depending on the given rating, 
the cells in this table were colour-coded, 0 in light yellow, 1 in 
yellow, and 2 in light blue. Empty cells indicate that the QC 
could not be rated due to unspecified information in the 
source (e.g. the source states that interviews were conducted, 
but contains no statement on how many and with whom). In 
contrast, missing information was rated with zero. The ratings 
for each quality criteria were added to build the total score per 
QC (last row in table). To recognize patterns of highest and 
lowest scores, the total score was also colour-coded. The high 
rankings were coded blue, dark blue for the highest ranking 
and middle blue for the second highest ranking, while the 
lowest ranking was coded orange. White cells mark the middle 
categories, being neither particularly high nor low.
3.3 Aggregate number of sources and codings 
In total, 5856 codings were applied to the 95 sources. Each text 
section on the effect of a budget support input on an outcome 
was coded. The budget support input either refers to the 
overall programme or specifically to funds, policy dialogue, 
conditionality, or TA/CD. The outcomes consist of the 
compliance or non-compliance with the described aid-effective-
ness principles, direct outputs, induced outputs, outcomes and 
impacts (see Figure 3). In addition, text sections on cross-
cutting issues (e.g. gender, peace and security) and unintended 
outcomes were coded in the sources. Figure 3 shows the total 
number of codings per analytical level and document type.
Figure 3: Frequency of codings by analytical level and document type
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The highest number of codings relates to inputs (summarizing 
all budget support inputs: the overall budget support 
programme, budget support funds, policy dialogue, 
conditionality and TA/CD) (see also Section 2). Other codes 
with high coverage are the implementation in accordance with 
aid-effectiveness principles,xlv induced outputs, outcomes and 
impacts, each with more than 500 codings for the aggregate of 
all document types. Among the document types, the highest 
number of codings is found in evaluations. The number of 
xlv Including the principles of alignment, harmonization and ownership, predictability and reduced transaction costs.
codings is lower for direct outputs, as the difference between 
the implementation of budget support following aid-
effectiveness principles and direct outputs of budget support 
programmes has not always been clearly stated in the sources. 
Due to this fact, the codings on the aid-effectiveness principles 
already include some information on direct outputs. The large 
number of codings on outcome and impact level was critically 
assessed regarding the convincing attribution of the effects to 
the budget support programme. In cases where the attribution 
Figure 4: Aggregate number of sources per outcome
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of the effect to the budget support programme was 
insufficiently traceable, the effect was not considered in the 
qualitative analysis.
The different codes for outcomes and impact were clustered 
into the broader topics “government expenditure”, “corruption”, 
“public financial management”, “domestic accountability”, 
“service delivery” and “economic development”. Figure 4 
shows the sum of all sourcesxlvi and Figure 5 the sum of all 
xlvi Every report is only counted once per outcome.
codings on budget support effects on the respective 
outcomes. The best coverage, both in terms of sources and 
codings, is available for budget support effects on PFM, with 
over 220 codings in 64 out of 95 sources. Also well covered by 
evidence are budget support effects on service delivery, 
domestic accountability, income poverty, level of public 
spending, and three of the aid-effectiveness principles 
(harmonization, ownership, and predictability), which are 
mentioned in more than 40 out of 95 sources (see Figure 4). 
Figure 5: Aggregate number of codings per outcome
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Table 7: Aggregated effects of specific budget support inputs on all outputs, outcomes and impacts   
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Inputs Total BS Programme Funds Policy dialogue Conditionality TA  / CD
# Sources 85 80 57 42 59 37
Total effect codings 2098 1255 358 181 182 122
Postive effect 1551 923 279 145 106 98
No effect 353 226 44 23 37 23
Negative effect 134 67 22 8 36 1
Improving effect 25 15 6 2 2 0
Deteriorating effect 35 24 7 3 1 0
Low coverage is found for budget support effects on 
corruption legislation and anti-corruption agencies. These 
effects are covered in fewer than ten sources, with a maximum 
of 20 codings per topic. All other codings lie in between, i.e. 
they are included in fewer than 40, but more than ten sources.
Figure 5 shows the sum of all codings. Note that several text 
sections on an outcome can be coded per report. The highest 
number of text sections is coded for PFM (nearly 190) and the 
lowest are coded for corruption policies, corruption legislation, 
and anti-corruption agencies (each fewer than 20).
3.4 Strength of budget support effects on output 
and outcome level
In addition to the aggregate numbers of sources and codings, 
the direction of identified budget support effects was 
analysed. The quantitative analysis assesses whether budget 
support led to positive, negative, or absent effects on the 
central outcomes. Note that the last category “absent effect” 
is different from the case where a particular effect is not 
covered by the sources. It refers to a situation when an 
expected effect is sufficiently covered in the body of evidence, 
but no effect (positive or negative) could be found, either 
because there was no effect or because it could not be 
detected with the selected method. 
For effects on all levels (direct output, induced output, 
outcome, and impact level), 2098 codings were assigned in 85 
sources (see Table 7). Among those 2098 codings, 1551 text 
sections were described as a positive effect, while 134 were 
rated negative. 353 text sections mention the absence of any 
effect or the absence of evidence for effects of budget support 
on different outcomes.
Table 7 illustrates in how many sources and codings budget 
support effects on a specific code are reported. It differentiates 
between text sections that report effects of budget support 
programmes in general, which can be found in the column “BS 
programme” and text sections that report an effect of a 
specific input (funding, policy dialogue, conditionality, or TA/
CD), as seen in the last four columns in Table 7. The column 
“total” indicates the total number of codings on the GBS 
programmes and the specific inputs together. The number of 
codings is further divided by the direction of the effect (weak 
positive, moderate positive, strong positive, no, negative, 
improving, or deteriorating). The orange bars indicate the 
number of codings for each effect direction compared to the 
total number of codings on the combination of code and input. 
This explanation also refers to all other graphs of this type in 
Section 4.
As can be seen in Table 7, the text sections mostly refer to 
effects of the budget support programmes in general, while 
the differentiation between financial inputs (funding) and 
non-financial inputs (policy dialogue, conditionality, TA/CD) is 
made in fewer cases. The largest number of codings are found 
on positive effects, and the fewest codings are found on 
improving and deteriorating effects. Of the specific inputs, the 
effect of funding has the most codings and the effect of TA/CD 
has the fewest codings.
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This section synthesizes the evidence on effects of budget 
support in different thematic areas including aid-effectiveness 
principles, government expenditure, PFM, corruption, 
domestic accountability, economic performance and income 
poverty, and service delivery and non-income poverty. The 
results are drawn from the qualitative and quantitative data 
analysis.xlvii 
Each sub-section in this section follows the same structure. 
The analysis is divided into three parts: first, a description of 
the expected budget support effects as laid out in the 
intervention logic recognized by the OECD DAC, second, a 
description of the coverage of evidence for each specific 
budget support effect, and third, a description of the empirical 
evidence for the respective effect. The analysis of the evidence 
sub-divides coverage into the attribution of generic effects to 
the entire budget support programme, and the attribution of 
input-specific effects to individual budget support funding, 
policy dialogue, conditionality and TA/CD.
The analysis of the empirical evidence differentiates between 
“empirically established effects”, for which there is sufficiently 
strong evidence in the sources (the effect is mentioned in 10 or 
more reports), and those expected effects for which no 
generalizable conclusions can be drawn due to insufficient 
coverage in the sources. As one of the goals of this evaluation 
is to inform the political debate with reliable evidence, the 
findings on insufficient evidence are considered equally 
important as the established evidence on budget support 
effects. The coverage indicates in which topics more in-depth 
work on effects and underlying causal mechanisms is 
necessary.
Among the empirically established effects, the evidence-base 
for an effect is deemed sufficient when the effect is covered in 
10 – 34 reports, as strong when the effect is covered in 35 – 49 
reports and as very strong when the effect is covered in 50 – 95 
reports. As an additional step, the quality assessment (see 
Section 2.2), with its resulting categorization of sources into 
best evidence and second-best evidence is used as a best-
evidence robustness check for all effects. 
xlvii The number of sources indicated in Table 11, and subsequent tables reporting the results of the quantitative analysis, can differ from the number of codings per effect direction analysed in the 
qualitative analysis. While the quantitative analysis is based on the total of all coded effects, in the qualitative analysis a) only one coding on the same effect per source is included, b) only codings 
with a plausible attribution to budget support are included, c) where possible, weak and strong positive effects are distinguished. As a consequence, the number of sources covering positive and 
negative effects of budget support is higher in the quantitative than in the qualitative analysis. To ensure the reliability of evidence, findings on budget support effects were based on qualitative 
findings, while the quantitative analysis was used for the description of coverage.
The coverage of evidence for all budget support effects at the 
level of direct outputs, induced outputs, outcomes and impact, 
as laid out in the CEF, is illustrated in Table 8. All reported 
effect directions are summarized in Table 9. A detailed 
description of the findings is provided in sections 4.1 to 4.6. 
Attribution of the effects to budget support on a 
generic level – insufficient coverage of the effects of 
specific budget support inputs
A large number of sources attribute observed effects to 
budget support programmes on a generic level. In most 
cases, the evidence base is insufficient to link the observed 
effects to specific budget support inputs (see Table 8). This 
lack of input-specific attribution and in-depth work on the 
effects and underlying causal mechanisms of budget 
support limits the lessons that can be learned from the 
studies on and evaluations of budget support. However, on 
the generic level, there is a sufficient evidence base on 
budget support effects to analyse the effect directions (see 
Table 9). Budget support programmes have predominantly a 
positive or mixed effect on the topics laid out in the CEF. 
 
Table 8 presents the coverage of budget support effects in the 
evidence. It displays the number of reports that mention 
budget support effects per topic. The yellow cells highlight 
those topics for which fewer than 10 reports provide evidence. 
(This is not to be confused with an absent or negative effect of 
budget support on these topics.) The blue cells mark all topics 
covered by 10 or more reports. 
As can be seen from the first two columns in Table 8, all but 
two topics have sufficient evidence. Thus, on the generic level, 
most effects of budget support programmes are sufficiently 
covered by evidence. The exceptions are effects on anti-
corruption agencies and corruption legislations. However, as 
illustrated by the last four columns, the evidence attributes 
most observed effects to budget support programmes on a 
general level, but a specific attribution of effects to individual 
budget support inputs is rarely covered by the evidence. 
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Table 8: Coverage of evidence for all budget support effectsxlviii
Total Overall BS 
Programmes
Financial 
Inputs
Non-Financial Inputs
Policy 
Dialogue
Conditionality TA / CD
Aid-effectiveness 
Principles
Alignment 38 37 (8) (9) (6) (4)
Harmonization 44 41 (4) 14 17 (5)
Ownership 46 36 (6) 16 23 (2)
Predictability 47 29 30 (2) 13 (1)
Transaction Costs 38 34 14 (6) (4) (0)
Government 
Expenditure
Level of Public Spending 38 20 30 (2) (3) (0)
Composition of Public Spending 28 19 18 (4) (2) (0)
Domestic Revenue Mobilization 34 24 12 (2) (7) (3)
Public Financial 
Management
Public Financial Management 58 52 (9) 19 15 29
Budget Management 34 27 (7) (7) (7) (5)
Budget Transparency 29 24 (3) (3) (4) (4)
Corruption Anti-corruption Agency (9) (9) (2) (1) (1) (2)
Corruption Legislation (5) (5) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Corruption Level 19 15 (3) (1) (2) (1)
Corruption Policies 13 10 (0) (2) (3) (1)
Domestic 
Accountability
Domestic Accountability 44 42 (8) (9) (7) (8)
Supreme Audit Institutions 17 15 (6) (2) (3) (4)
Role of Parliament 21 20 (4) (4) (1) (2)
Civil Society Organizations 25 24 (4) (8) (1) (2)
Governance 31 27 (1) (8) (6) (4)
Economic Performance 
and Income Poverty
Macroeconomic Performance 31 28 (8) (3) (4) (1)
Income Poverty 40 36 17 (7) (4) (1)
Service Delivery and 
Non-income Poverty
Public Service Delivery 47 40 28 10 (7) 10
Administration for Service Delivery 25 18 (6) (5) (5) (6)
Non-income Poverty 33 32 (9) (2) (0) (0)
xlviii In Table 8, the coverage of budget support effects on outputs, outcomes and impacts is categorized as follows: coverage in fewer than 10 reports (number of reports in brackets) yellow;  
10 – 34 reports (sufficient coverage) light blue; 35 – 49 reports (strong coverage) blue; 50 – 95 reports (very strong coverage) dark blue.
Coverage of evidence for all budget support effectsxlviii 
Table 9 shows the effect direction for all effects that are 
sufficiently covered by evidence. 
The statements included in this table are made in more than 10 
sources and are therefore considered as sufficiently covered.  
 
 
The interpretation of the “traffic light” is as follows: red means 
there is no budget support effect on the output, outcome or 
impact, yellow means there is a mixed effect and green means 
there is a positive effect. White means that the attribution of 
the observed effects to budget support is not possible.
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Table 9: Evidence on the effectiveness of budget support
4.  |  Evidence on budget support36
Table 10: Codes on aid-effectiveness principles
Topic Code Definition
Aid-effectiveness Principles Alignment Coordination and consistency of aid with government priorities
Harmonization Harmonization of donor’s aid policies and procedures
Ownership Recipient governments formulating and implementing own priorities and  
strategies for national development and poverty reduction
Predictability Certainty about amounts and timing of aid disbursements
Transaction costs Transaction costs per Euro of aid disbursed, including costs for preparation, 
negotiation, disbursement and monitoring 
xlix Note that these principles are derived from the CEF and are not the same as those formulated in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.
4.1 Aid-effectiveness principles
The aid-effectiveness principles as defined in this evaluation 
synthesis (see 2.1 for an explanation) include alignment, 
harmonization and ownership as well as predictability and 
reduction of transaction costs.xlix The specific definitions of the 
principles as used in this evaluation synthesis are stated in 
Table 10.
Summary finding: Positive effects on alignment, 
harmonization, and ownership, but low coverage for 
specific budget support inputs
The effects of budget support programmes on aid-
effectiveness principles are sufficiently covered by  
evidence on a generic level, with the highest coverage  
for predictability and the lowest coverage for alignment. 
Conclusions on these effects are presented in the  
paragraph below. The specific attribution of changes in 
aid-effectiveness principles to budget support inputs is 
insufficiently covered by evidence for most of the codes. 
The attribution of changes in alignment to financial and 
non-financial budget support effects and of changes in 
transaction costs to non-financial effects is lacking. For  
all five aid-effectiveness principles, the effect of the input 
TA/CD is insufficiently covered.
Budget support programmes have a positive effect on 
alignment, harmonization and ownership, although budget 
support’s effectiveness depends on the number and quality 
of donors’ common interests and the adherence of partner 
governments to the conditionalities attached to budget 
support programmes. Financial inputs of budget support  
do not have a positive effect on predictability. This is due  
to the delay of aid disbursements and uncoordinated 
decisions of donors following breaches of the conditionalities 
by the partner governments. The non-financial inputs policy 
dialogue and conditionality have a positive effect on 
harmonization, but do not contribute to increased 
ownership. Conditionality might even have a negative  
effect on predictability. Transaction costs increased after 
introducing budget support, but declined when joint 
processes were established. When donors withdraw from 
budget support, the suspension of tranches increases 
transaction costs again, as only small sums are paid out in 
relation to the operating expenses.
 
4.1.1 Expected effects
According to the generic intervention logic, the effectiveness 
of budget support depends on how the programme is 
implemented, in particular the extent to which donors adhere 
to aid-effectiveness principles when implementing budget 
support. Budget support is expected to ensure alignment and 
foster ownership by adhering to partner countries’ own 
national development strategies and by using the partner 
governments’ systems and procedures. With donors jointly 
providing non-financial inputs and coordinating disbursements 
and monitoring activities, budget support is expected to foster 
harmonization of donor procedures. By providing the funding 
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Table 11: Budget support effects on alignment  
Inputs Total BS Programme Funds Policy dialogue Conditionality TA  / CD
A
lig
nm
en
t
# Sources 38 37 8 9 6 4
Total effect codings 91 61 8 11 6 5
Positive effect 76 48 7 11 6 4
Absent effect 6 5 0 0 0 1
Negative effect 1 1 0 0 0 0
Improving effect 5 4 1 0 0 0
Deteriorating effect 3 3 0 0 0 0
l Burkina Faso, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Santa Lucia, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Vietnam, and Zambia.
li E.g. in Burkina Faso, Dominican Republic, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Santa Lucia, Uganda, Vietnam, and Zambia.
through government channels and by linking the 
disbursements to progress against an annual performance 
assessment, budget support is expected to improve 
predictability. Moreover, a reduction of transaction costs is 
expected, as budget support is provided in a way that does not 
require separate project management, planning or monitoring 
systems, but uses existing partner country systems.58 
4.1.2 Alignment
Coverage
In the sample, 38 sources cover the total effect of budget 
support on alignment (see Table 11). Compared to the other 
aid-effectiveness principles, alignment has the lowest coverage 
(together with transaction costs). Generic effects of budget 
support programmes on alignment are reported by 37 sources. 
The effects of each of the specific inputs are covered in fewer 
than 10 sources: the effects of funding on alignment are 
covered in eight sources, of policy dialogue in nine sources, of 
conditionality in six sources and of TA/CD in four sources.
That said, too few sources report on the input-specific 
attribution of changes in alignment to budget support funding. 
Whether or not the effects hypothesized in the CEF apply in 
reality, and specifically to the promotion of government 
ownership and accountability through aligned budget support 
funding, cannot be answered. Also, the reports do not focus on 
the input-specific attribution of changes in alignment to non-
financial inputs. Due to this evidence gap, it is not known if 
and how budget support improves coordination and 
consistency with government priorities. Without knowledge of 
the specific impact of budget support funding and non-
financial inputs on alignment, no lessons can be learned on 
how to increase the effectiveness of this or similar aid 
modalities.
Established evidence
In line with the expectation formulated in the intervention 
logic, budget support increases the alignment of aid with the 
national policies of partner countries. This effect is covered in 
29 sources59 and found in 16 countriesl that received budget 
support.60 The positive effect of budget support refers to the 
progress in aligning aid to national development plans and 
poverty reduction strategies,li 61 in increasing the use of 
government systems to implement the aid modality62 and in 
aligning the aid to the specific economic and institutional 
context.63
The evidence from these sources suggests that although 
donors’ alignment with government priorities improved as a 
result of budget support, the overall alignment of budget 
support programmes was insufficient. Reasons mentioned in 
the sources are the weak alignment of donors’ aid policies with 
the priorities and national government strategies of the 
partner countries at sub-national level, and insufficiencies  
in the integration of existing accountability systems and 
supreme audit institutions (SAI). Another reason mentioned 
for shortcomings in alignment is that the design and 
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Table 12: Budget support effects on harmonization 
Inputs Total BS Programme Funds Policy dialogue Conditionality TA  / CD
H
ar
m
on
iz
at
io
n
# Sources 44 41 4 14 17 5
Total effect codings 123 73 4 20 19 7
Positive effect 84 55 1 15 10 3
Absent effect 19 6 1 3 5 4
Negative effect 17 10 2 1 4 0
Improving effect 1 1 0 0 0 0
Deteriorating effect 2 1 0 1 0 0
lii The term “generalizable conclusions” implies results that are backed by strong empirical evidence; it is not meant to describe universally accepted results.
liii Burkina Faso, Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Vietnam, and Zambia.
liv Such as in Afghanistan, Burundi, CAR, DRC, Ethiopia, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zambia.
lv E.g. Malawi, Nicaragua, Ruanda, Uganda, and Zambia.
lvi Such as in Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zambia.
implementation of the budget support programmes is still 
strongly donor driven.64 
4.1.3. Harmonization 
Coverage
Effects on harmonization are strongly covered in 44 sources 
with 123 codings (see Table 12). The generic attribution of 
changes in harmonization to budget support programmes is 
covered in 41 sources. The input-specific attribution of changes 
in harmonization to the individual budget support inputs 
policy dialogue (14 sources) and conditionality (17 sources) is 
also covered in a sufficient number of sources. The effects of 
funds are only covered in four sources and of TA/CD in five 
sources. The effects of these inputs on harmonization are not 
deemed to be sufficiently covered by empirical evidence to 
derive generalizable conclusionslii on their effectiveness. 
Evidence on the particular effects of budget support funds and 
TA/CD on harmonization is thus not available, and the 
expectation that budget support funding increases the 
harmonization of joint donor procedures65 in, for example, 
monitoring and disbursement, cannot be empirically 
corroborated.
Established evidence
Budget support improves harmonization among donors, but 
only under certain conditions. Progress in donor harmonization 
is reported in 19 sources66 covering 13 countries.liii Specifically, 
according to the evidence, budget support improves the 
harmonization of the donors’ aid policies and procedures 
(covered in 13 sources).67 Yet, diverging priorities of donors, 
such as different priority sectors and a lack of common goals, 
undermine donors’ willingness to provide budget support 
disbursements in a harmonized way, and weaken the 
effectiveness of budget support on harmonization.liv 68 
Harmonization is further undermined by the uncoordinated 
disbursement decisions of individual donors, an issue that is 
consistently reported in the reviewed body of evidence.69 This 
is particularly evident for country caseslv where financial 
inputs are disbursed following additional bilateral agreements, 
and breaches of these agreements lead to unilateral decisions 
by individual donors.70 Thus, progress in harmonization is 
evident in the overall procedures for budget support 
disbursements, but less so regarding individual disbursement 
decisions and practices.
With respect to the non-financial inputs policy dialogue and 
conditionality, the evidence on effects on harmonization is 
mixed.71 Overall, policy dialogue is found to be effective for 
harmonization, even in cases of large and heterogeneous 
donor groups, as it provides an institutionalized setting for 
donor coordination and the harmonization of policies and 
practices.lvi 72 However, the continuation of bilateral meetings 
in addition to the policy dialogue, for example individual 
missions to discuss implementation specifics and performance 
assessment, undermine the positive effect of policy dialogue
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Table 13: Budget support effects on ownership 
Inputs Total BS Programme Funds Policy dialogue Conditionality TA  / CD
O
w
ne
rs
hi
p
# Sources 46 36 6 16 23 2
Total effect codings 133 76 6 17 32 2
Positive effect 91 52 5 15 18 1
Absent effect 24 15 0 1 7 1
Negative effect 12 5 1 1 5 0
Improving effect 5 3 0 0 2 0
Deteriorating effect 1 1 0 0 0 0
lvii Malawi, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zambia.
lviii Benin, Burkina Faso, Dominican Republic, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam and Zambia.
lix In the cases of Ethiopia, India/Andhra Pradesh, Palestine, and Santa Lucia.
and conditionality on harmonization.73 Conditionality, 
predominantly the PAF, also fosters harmonization as it 
establishes a joint approach to a government performance 
assessment and defines common indicators for measuring  
this performance.74 However, insufficient harmonization in 
indicators of the PAF and donors’ quest for different priorities 
are limiting the effects of budget support on harmonization.lvii 75
4.1.4 Ownership
Coverage
Budget support effects on ownership are covered by 46 
sources and found in 133 codings (see Table 13), the largest 
number of codings among the aid-effectiveness principles. The 
generic effects of budget support programmes, unspecified for 
inputs, on ownership are reported in 36 sources. The effect of 
policy dialogue is covered in 16 sources and that of 
conditionality in 23 sources. Funding is discussed in only six 
sources and TA/CD in two sources. Therefore, no generalizable 
conclusions on the effect of funding and TA/CD on ownership 
can be drawn and it remains unclear if TA/CD is indeed 
effective in giving the recipient countries a greater say in the 
design, policy dialogue, and conditionalities76 of budget 
support programmes. No lessons can thus be drawn to inform 
future programmes of budget support or related aid modalities 
with respect to the impact of funding and TA/CD on 
ownership.
Established evidence
Budget support fosters ownership by the partner governments 
in terms of formulating and implementing their own priorities 
and strategies for national development and poverty reduction. 
This positive effect is found in 18 sources77 covering 15 country 
cases.lviii In four countries, no effects of budget support on 
ownership are found.lix 78 The evidence shows that the 
effectiveness of budget support depends, among other factors, 
on the degree of ownership the partner governments assume 
towards development plans and poverty- reduction strategies.79 
Also, the degree of ownership seems to be connected to the 
content of reform and the politics of the government in 
power.80 While positive effects were found mostly in the early 
period of budget support programmes, the evidence suggests 
that the effect on ownership diminished over time, coinciding 
with a higher frequency of budget support suspensions. Some 
examples are Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam, and 
Zambia.81
While there is sufficient coverage of policy dialogue and 
conditionality as non-financial inputs of budget support in the 
sources,82 the reported direction of effects is inconsistent 
across these sources. The effectiveness of conditionality is 
positively influenced when the PAF is derived from the 
national development plans of the recipient country, and when 
the PAF process is strongly led by the government.83 The 
evidence suggests that, among the PAF indicators, alignment 
with planning and budgeting strategies is particularly effective 
in increasing ownership.84 Other sources, however, question 
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Table 14: Budget support effects on predictability 
Inputs Total BS Programme Funds Policy dialogue Conditionality TA  / CD
P
re
di
ct
ab
ili
ty
# Sources 47 29 30 2 13 1
Total effect codings 104 36 43 3 21 1
Positive effect 60 22 31 1 6 0
Absent effect 13 8 2 0 3 0
Negative effect 25 4 7 1 12 1
Improving effect 4 0 3 1 0 0
Deteriorating effect 2 2 0 0 0 0
lx E.g. Burkina Faso, India/Andhra Pradesh, and Mozambique.
lxi Although the reports apply different comparisons, most reports compare the predictability of budget support disbursements with project aid and in fewer cases, with basket funding. For a 
conservative assessment, this evaluation describes improvements in predictability in comparison to project aid.
lxii Benin, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Senegal, and South Africa. 
how effective and sustainable the observed increases in 
ownership are.85
The positive effects of policy dialogue in fostering ownership 
for development policies are undermined by a lack of 
collaboration between donors and partners,86 and by the 
exclusive and government-focused nature of the dialogue. As 
the participation of wider civil society or even 
parliamentarians in the dialogue is not always guaranteed, 
budget support does little to induce a shift from narrow 
government ownership of national development plans and 
policies to wider democratic ownership for these processes.87 lx 
4.1.5 Predictability
Coverage
The effect of budget support on predictabilitylxi is covered  
in 47 sources, the highest coverage being among the aid-
effectiveness principles (see Table 14). Regarding the generic 
attribution of changes in predictability to budget support 
programmes, the effectiveness of predictability is covered in 
29 sources. Regarding the specific inputs, the predictability of 
funding is covered in 30 sources, effects of conditionality are 
reported in 13 sources, effects of policy dialogue in two sources 
and effects of TA/CD in one source. As there is insufficient 
coverage on policy dialogue and TA/CD, no generalizable 
conclusions on these effects can be derived regarding the 
effectiveness of these two inputs.
Established evidence
Although a considerable number of sources cover effects on 
predictability (47 sources), the direction of the effects found is 
inconsistent across sources. There is evidence for positive 
effects of budget support on predictability, but these positive 
effects are mostly described as weak (12 sources).88 Other 
sources report a development over time, with no changes in 
predictability at the beginning of programmes, but increases 
in predictability at later stages of the budget support 
programme cycle (12 sources).89 No improvements or even 
negative effects are reported in 16 sources.90 The inconsistency 
in effect direction indicates that the effectiveness of budget 
support on predictability is highly dependent on context 
conditions.
Weak positive effects of budget support on the predictability 
of aid are reported for seven countries.lxii 91 In most of the 
sources, such improvements in predictability are defined  
as a slight decrease in deviations of budget support 
disbursements from commitments. Conditions found for 
positive effects of budget support programmes are the 
disbursement of budget support funds following a multi-year 
arrangement (three-year or five-year basis), better and early 
notification of disbursements by donors, and effective mutual 
accountability to hold donors responsible for their 
commitments. 92 
Regarding changes over time, improvements in aid 
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Table 15: Budget support effects on transaction costs
Inputs Total BS Programme Funds Policy dialogue Conditionality TA  / CD
Tr
an
sa
ct
io
n 
C
os
ts
# Sources 38 34 14 6 4 0
Total effect codings 90 55 20 10 5 0
Positive effect 51 33 14 2 2 0
No effect 12 6 2 3 1 0
Negative effect 22 13 4 3 2 0
Improving effect 3 2 0 1 0 0
Deteriorating effect 2 1 0 1 0 0
lxiii E.g. in the cases of Mozambique, Nicaragua, and to some extent Rwanda.
lxiv Afghanistan, Malawi, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Palestine, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Uganda.
lxv Afghanistan, Burundi, CAR, DRC, India/Andhra Pradesh, Malawi, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Vietnam, and Zambia.
lxvi The reports use slightly different definitions of transaction costs, but most include the costs for preparation, negotiation, disbursement and monitoring of transactions. This definition was applied 
in this evaluation synthesis.
predictability seem to develop with the progress in budget 
support programmes.lxiii 93 However, problems in fulfilling 
disbursement conditions, which lead to delayed or suspended 
instalments, undermine predictability. This effect is reinforced 
by diverging donor responses to breaches of underlying 
principles by the partner government, and resulting individual 
decisions about budget support suspensions.94
Also, the evidence finds that unrealistic and inadequately 
communicated conditionalities result in unpredictable 
disbursements.95 Such negative effects of conditionality on 
predictability are covered in 10 sources96 and reported in the 
case of nine countries.lxiv
No overall improvements on predictability are found in the 
case of 11 countries.lxv Late confirmations of tranche releases 
on the part of donors, discrepancies among donors in the 
timing of disbursements, and late timing of budget support 
disbursements within the fiscal year lead to the ineffectiveness 
of budget support in promoting predictability. The evidence 
shows that late disbursements have negative, unintended 
effects on the policy process, leading to unplanned domestic 
borrowing and to financial challenges for sector ministries.97 
Moreover, frequent changes in disbursement conditions and 
the use of performance-based tranches in budget support 
programmes further reduce budget supports’ ability to 
positively influence predictability.98 The approval of tranche 
releases on an annual basis does not promote multi-year 
planning and eventually the early incorporation of funds in the 
budget process.99 
4.1.6 Transaction costs
Coverage
The total number of effects of budget support on transaction 
costslxvi is covered in 38 sources (see Table 15). The generic 
attribution of changes in transaction costs to budget support 
programmes is examined in 34 sources. Regarding the 
individual inputs, the effects of funding on transaction costs 
are covered in 14 sources. For the non-financial inputs, the 
coverage is fewer than ten reports, as effects of policy dialogue 
are reported in six sources, of conditionality in four, and of  
TA/CD in no sources. Therefore, no lessons can be derived 
from the implementation of non-financial inputs on the 
reduction of transaction costs, but generalizable conclusions 
can be drawn for the effect of financial inputs and the GBS 
programmes on transaction costs.
Established evidence
The evidence supports a positive effect on the reduction of 
transaction costs, but effects fall short of expectations (22 
sources).100 The evidence only covers effects on transaction 
costs on the side of the partner government. Effects on the 
side of the donors are insufficiently covered. This section thus 
only describes the side of the partner government. 
The evidence shows time-varying effects of budget support on
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Table 16: Government expenditure codes
Topic Code Definition
Government Expenditure Level of public spending Total amount of government spending
Composition of public spending Allocation of government spending to different sectors
Domestic revenue mobilization Acquiring additional sources for public/state income
lxvii E.g. in Ghana, Nicaragua, Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam, and Zambia.
lxviii The income side is covered in this section – and not in the section PFM – as a counterpart to government expenditure and in order to discuss the crowding-out effect.
transactions costs for partner governments, with initial 
increases in the transaction-cost burden, and subsequent 
reductions as processes become routinely established. This is, 
for example, the case in Ghana, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Mozambique, and Nicaragua. 101 
Despite some reduction in transaction costs, the evidence 
reports on different reasons why the decrease in transaction 
costs does not meet expectations.102 Factors hindering a 
stronger reduction are found to be the substantial capacity 
needs of both partners and donors for an institutionalized 
dialogue, accurate monitoring and reporting. In contrast to the 
assumption that budget support lessens the need for separate 
project management and monitoring,103 the evidence shows 
that capacity needs are reinforced by additional assessments 
and missions of individual agencies.104 Also, a further reduction 
in transaction costs is limited by the amounts disbursed and 
the operation mode for disbursements. The increased use of 
variable tranches by donors, the low share of budget support 
of total aid volumes towards the end of the budget support 
programmes, and the necessity of managing short-term 
volatilities in disbursements are such factors.105
As a result of financial inputs of budget support on transaction 
costs, the evidence suggests that in certain phases of budget 
support disbursements, the total volume of aid disbursed is 
higher and transaction costs per Euro of aid disbursed are 
found to be lower than for project aid.lxvii 106 However, when the 
amount of budget support funding decreased and suspensions 
started to be used by donors more frequently, this positive 
effect on transaction costs diminished.107 
 
 
4.2 Government expenditure
The topic government expenditure is sub-divided into the 
specific outcomes level and composition of public spending 
and domestic revenue mobilization (DRM).lxviii The definitions 
of these codes are stated in Table 16.
Summary finding: Budget support (funding) increases 
public spending in social sectors – deficit in describing 
effects of non-financial inputs
The attribution of changes in government expenditure to 
budget support programmes on a generic level is 
sufficiently covered by evidence, with the highest coverage 
for the level of public spending and the lowest coverage for 
the composition of public spending. The effects of budget 
support funding are sufficiently covered for all codes on 
government expenditure, while not a single non-financial 
input and its effect on government expenditure is 
sufficiently covered. Due to this substantial deficit, no 
generalizable conclusions on the expected positive 
influence of non-financial inputs going beyond the sole 
financing function of budget support can be drawn. 
Budget support, especially the financial input, increases 
public spending. This increase is mostly apparent in social 
sectors such as health and education. Flexible funding in 
combination with performance assessments seems to 
positively influence the composition of public spending. 
There is no evidence that access to budget support funds 
reduces the mobilization of domestic revenues. At the same 
time, there are no, or only slight, improvements in DRM, 
putting at risk the sustainability of budget support effects 
on (social) public spending.
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Table 17: Budget support effects on level of public spending
Inputs Total BS Programme Funds Policy dialogue Conditionality TA  / CD
Le
ve
l o
f P
ub
lic
 S
pe
nd
in
g
# Sources 38 20 30 4 2 0
Total effect codings 97 30 61 4 2 0
Positive effect 81 25 52 3 1 0
No effect 5 1 4 0 0 0
Negative effect 4 1 2 0 1 0
Improving effect 1 0 1 0 0 0
Deteriorating effect 6 3 2 1 0 0
lxix A systemic effect is generated by a flow of funds through the government’s own system (Nilsson, 2004).
lxx Burkina Faso, Burundi, Ghana, Mali, Morocco, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Vietnam
lxxi Burundi, Malawi, Rwanda, and Uganda.
4.2.1 Expected effects
Budget support programmes, in particular their financing 
function, are expected to have substantial effects on the level 
and composition of public spending.108 According to the generic 
intervention logic, the provision of resources through the 
partner government’s own budget facilitates the government 
in planning the allocation of funds systematically and in 
aligning allocation with its strategic priorities. Budget support 
as an aid modality is also expected to increase a government’s 
spending capacity.109 Another expected effect of budget support 
programmes is public spending more strongly orientated 
towards the poor through the promotion of fiscal and 
macroeconomic stability, including the aggregate allocation of 
resources, higher quantities of aid “on-budget”, higher allocation 
to priority sectors and higher consistency between recurrent 
and investment sides of the budget.110 A purported risk of 
budget support is that the provision of on-budget funding may 
undermine incentives for the partner governments to mobilize 
sufficient domestic revenue to finance national policies, and 
thus crowd out domestic revenue instead of providing 
additional resources for public spending.111
4.2.2 Level of public spending
Coverage
The level of public spending has the best coverage among the 
four outcomes under the topic government expenditure. It is 
discussed in 38 sources, with 97 coded text sections (see Table 
17). A generic attribution of changes in the level of public 
spending to budget support programmes is described in 20 
sources. The sources refer mostly to the systemic effect of 
budget support funds, with 30 sources mentioning the effects 
of funding on government expenditure. Non-financial inputs 
are rarely mentioned in the sources, with only four sources 
mentioning effects of policy dialogue, two sources mentioning 
conditionality, and none of the sources mentioning TA/CD. 
Since the effects of non-financial inputs on the level of public 
spending are covered in fewer than 10 sources, no generalizable 
conclusions on the direct effect of non-financial inputs can be 
drawn, whereas the sufficient coverage of the systemic effectlxix 
of budget support funding allows for conclusions on the 
effectiveness of budget support in this regard.
Established evidence
Overall, budget support is found to increase the level of public 
spending in recipient countries. Such an increase in public 
spending is reported in 14 sources, covering 12 countries.lxx 112 
When budget support programmes were suspended, in some 
country caseslxxi the gained fiscal space was completely 
eliminated.113 The positive effects are also found to depend on 
the degree of predictability and volatility of budget support 
funds, 114 donor pressure to increase social spending, and the 
scale and flexibility of funding in relation to policy goals. 115 The 
evidence suggests that a combination of high flexibility in 
financing and performance assessments for national strategies 
increases the effectiveness of public spending for service 
delivery, for example, as constraints in the allocation of off-
budget aid could be compensated and the budget more 
flexibly managed. 116
It is the funding provided by the budget support programmes 
4.  |  Evidence on budget support44
Table 18: Budget support effects on composition of public spending 
Inputs Total BS Programme Funds Policy dialogue Conditionality TA  / CD
C
om
po
si
ti
on
 P
ub
lic
 S
pe
nd
in
g
# Sources 28 19 18 2 3 0
Total effect codings 63 28 29 2 4 0
Positive effect 51 20 27 2 2 0
No effect 5 5 0 0 0 0
Negative effect 6 3 1 0 2 0
Improving effect 0 0 0 0 0 0
Deteriorating effect 1 0 1 0 0 0
lxxii Burkina Faso, Burundi, Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Uganda, and Vietnam.
that leads to the provision of additional funds reflected in the 
national budget. The specific results of the funding effect 
presented in the evidence are an increase in fiscal space and 
more funding for the government to finance priority sectors.117 
As more funding appears to translate into more spending, this 
finding suggests that no crowding out of domestic revenues 
takes place (see Box 3).
Box 3 No evidence of “crowding out” of domestic 
revenue by budget support
One of the suspected risks of budget support provision was 
that this aid modality would reduce incentives for 
governments to raise domestic revenues and, as a 
consequence, crowd out domestic revenue: the “crowding 
out effect”.129 However, the sources analysed in this 
evaluation synthesis do not offer evidence that access to 
budget support funds reduced the mobilization of domestic 
revenues. In particular, the absence of such crowding out 
effects was reported in 12 countries: Burkina Faso, Ghana, 
Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Sierra 
Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam, and Zambia.130
4.2.3 Composition of public spending
Coverage
The composition of public spending as an outcome of budget 
support is covered in 28 sources and 63 text sections, which is 
the weakest coverage found among the different codes on 
government expenditure. There is sufficient coverage on the 
generic effect of budget support programmes (19 sources) and 
funding as a specific budget support input (18 sources) on the 
composition of public spending. There is little to no evidence 
on the three non-financial inputs, with two sources mentioning 
effects of policy dialogue and three sources mentioning effects 
of conditionality (see Table 18). Somewhat surprisingly, the 
analysis thus finds that what, in some respects, can be 
considered the centrepiece of the intervention logic of budget 
support – namely that the combination of financial resources 
with non-financial inputs aimed at improving the use of those 
resources – is barely covered in the body of evidence. The 
assumption that the combination of policy dialogue, 
conditionality and TA/CD has a positive influence on the 
spending policy, and thus supports pro-poor spending beyond 
the sole financing function of budget support, cannot be 
confirmed or disconfirmed.
Established evidence
A strong body of evidence indicates a positive link between 
budget support and the composition of public spending (48 
text sections in 27 sources).118 Evidence for higher social-sector 
spending is found in nine countries.lxxii 119 The evidence finds 
that additional funds provided through budget support are 
important for the implementation of national development 
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Table 19: Increased spending in pro-poor sectors
Sector Country Source
Health Burkina Faso, Burundi, Ghana, Ethiopia, Malawi, 
Mali, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra 
Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam, Zambia 
ADE, 2015; AfDB, 2011b; Alavuotunki, 2015; de Kemp et al., 2011a; Lawson, 2007; 
Lawson et al., 2007; Lawson et al., 2013; Lawson et al., 2014; World Bank, 2008; 
World Bank, 2015a; World Bank, 2015b
Education Burundi, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam, Zambia 
ADE, 2015; AfDB, 2011b; de Kemp et al., 2011a; Dijkstra et al., 2012; Lawson, 2007; 
Lawson et al., 2006; Lawson et al., 2007; Lawson et al., 2013; Lawson et al., 2014; 
ODI, 2009; Purcell et al.,2006; Thunnissen/Morillon, 2014; World Bank, 2008; 
World Bank, 2015a; World Bank, 2015b
Agriculture Burundi, Tanzania ADE, 2015; AfDB, 2011b; Lawson et al., 2013
Infrastructure Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda ADE, 2015; AfDB, 2011b; Bogetic et al., 2015; Lawson et al., 2013
Water and Sanitation Tanzania, Uganda AfDB, 2011b; Lawson et al., 2013; World Bank, 2015a
lxxiii The sectors listed in Table 19 are the sectors being discussed in more than one source regarding the composition of public spending. 
lxxiv Burkina Faso, Burundi, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Tunisia.
plans.120 Some country cases state that the access to new 
discretionary funding is used to increase spending in social 
sectors rather than to reallocate funds to other sectors.121 In 
particular, the evidence suggests that certain expenditures, 
such as (non-salary) recurrent expenditure and expenditures 
for intergovernmental transfers, would thus have been difficult 
to finance without the additional funds provided by budget 
support programmes. Budget support contributes to reducing 
fiscal deficits and thus macroeconomic stability by allowing 
additional development-oriented spending within the limits of 
an expanded resource envelope.
The increases in spending are found to be predominantly in 
health and education (see Table 19). Increased expenditure in 
the health system was found in 15 country cases, 11 of them 
being low-income countries (LICs). An increase in spending on 
education is reported in 13 country cases, eight of them being 
LICs. In contrast, allocation of increased funds into agriculture, 
infrastructure (e.g. roads) and water and sanitation is only 
found in two to three country cases, and the evidence base is 
fewer than 10 sources.lxxiii Increases in social sector spending 
seem to be limited to the health and education sectors. 
Although most of the sources stating this effect report 
increases in pro-poor spending, not all of them document  
if a comprehensive poverty-spending analysis has been 
conducted. Thus, it is not clear if the observed increases in 
social sector spending are equivalent to an increase in pro-
poor spending. 
 
 
Overall, the sources draw a distinctly positive picture with 
regard to budget support’s influence on social spending and in 
most cases do not report on possible negative effects, which 
translates into the positive picture drawn in Table 19. The very 
few negative effect codings refer to the negative influence of 
budget support suspensions on the fiscal situation as the 
suspensions prompted a change in governments’ investment 
priorities towards the productive sector, with a subsequent 
decline in allocations to social sectors.122 
4.2.4 Domestic revenue mobilization
Coverage 
Effects of budget support on DRM are covered in 34 sources 
and 70 text sections (see Table 20). Generic effects of the 
budget support programmes are covered in 24 sources, and  
12 sources mention the effects of funding. The effects of non-
financial inputs on DRM are not sufficiently covered (policy 
dialogue covered in two sources, conditionality in seven 
sources and TA/CD in three sources), thus no generalizable 
lessons can be derived on the effects of non-financial inputs 
on DRM.
Established evidence
Most of the reports indicate no effect of budget support on 
DRM (32 text sections in 18 sources).123 Although there is 
sufficient evidence that the provision of budget support does 
not diminish DRM (see Box 3), in only a few country caseslxxiv 
do the sources identify positive effects of budget support 
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Table 20: Budget support effects on domestic revenue mobilization
Inputs Total BS Programme Funds Policy dialogue Conditionality TA  / CD
D
om
es
ti
c 
R
ev
en
ue
 M
ob
ili
za
ti
on
# Sources 34 24 12 2 7 3
Total effect codings 70 43 14 3 7 3
Positive effect 23 16 3 1 2 1
No effect 39 24 8 2 3 2
Negative effect 8 3 3 0 2 0
Improving effect 0 0 0 0 0 0
Deteriorating effect 0 0 0 0 0 0
programmes on revenue mobilization.124 A poor record on 
DRM is reported in several countries (Burkina Faso, Sierra 
Leone, Tanzania, and Uganda), such as low tax and non-tax 
revenues.125 
However, the negative dynamic is not attributed to budget 
support programmes, with the exception of Sierra Leone. In 
this case the evidence suggests that budget support might 
have provided disincentives to increase DRM.126 
The persistent low-revenue mobilization in many countries 
undermines the sustainability of budget support effects. When 
budget support disbursements started to decrease, the 
remaining available funds were insufficient to keep the 
increased spending in social sectors up. As a consequence, 
domestic borrowing and redirection of funds away from non-
poor sectors started to increase, such as occurred in Malawi 
and Uganda.127 Low levels of domestic revenue thus enhanced 
the negative effect of budget support suspensions on the level 
and composition of public spending.128
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Table 21: Public financial management codes
Topic Code Definition
Public Financial 
Management (PFM)
Public financial management (PFM) System for the management of public finances; the code unites a set of topics 
(e.g. budget planning and execution, accounting), thus budget management and 
budget transparency are more specific sub-categories of PFM, but are often 
included in general statements on PFM
Budget management Management of public spending
Budget transparency Openness and accountability related to public spending
 
4.3 Public financial management
This section summarizes results for the codes on PFM, budget 
management and budget transparency. The definitions of these 
codes as used in this evaluation synthesis are stated in Table 
21. Most of the codings refer to the broader code PFM as 
outcome, and both the generic attribution and an input-
specific attribution of changes in PFM to non-financial budget 
support inputs are covered by evidence. This allowed for a 
differentiated analysis of GBS effects and specific non-financial 
inputs on PFM. To report the findings in detail, this section is 
organized by budget support inputs rather than by codes, as in 
the other sub-sections in this section.
Summary finding: Effects well covered, budget support 
effective in improving PFM of recipient countries
Of all the codings, the generic attribution of changes in 
PFM to budget support programmes is best covered by the 
evidence. The evidence also covers the input-specific effects 
of non-financial budget support inputs on PFM, although 
not on budget management and budget transparency. For 
all three codes, budget support funding effects – also 
referred to as systemic effects – are insufficiently addressed 
in the sources.
Budget support programmes are effective in improving the 
PFM of recipient countries, especially budget formulation 
and planning, and the comprehensiveness and transparency 
of the budget. The improvements in PFM are specifically 
attributed to the non-financial inputs policy dialogue and 
TA/CD, as priority is generally given to improving PFM 
 
 
 
within these inputs. The progress in PFM depends on 
institutional capacity and political will for PFM reform of 
the recipient government.
 
4.3.1 Expected effects
According to the generic intervention logic of budget support, 
improvements to recipient countries’ PFM systems count as 
one of the key outputs expected to be induced by budget 
support (see Figure 1). The intervention logic (see section 2.1) 
draws a direct causal chain from non-financial inputs of budget 
support programmes to efficient and transparent PFM. In 
addition, it is assumed that financial inputs also have a direct 
systemic effect on PFM, as budget support funds are 
channelled through a country’s own budgetary system instead 
of being channelled through parallel off-budget processes. By 
using – rather than bypassing – the countries’ own budgetary 
and PFM systems, budget support is thereby expected to 
create incentives for intrinsic improvements to the countries’ 
PFM systems to make optimal use of these resources. Financial 
and non-financial inputs are thus expected to reinforce each 
other in improving PFM and specifically the budget processes 
in recipient countries.131
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Table 22: Budget support effects on PFM
Inputs Total BS Programme Funds Policy dialogue Conditionality TA  / CD
Pu
bl
ic
 F
in
an
ci
al
 M
an
ag
em
en
t # Sources 58 52 9 19 15 29
Total effect codings 229 122 10 30 17 50
Positive effect 198 100 8 28 14 48
No effect 20 13 1 1 3 2
Negative effect 3 2 0 1 0 0
Improving effect 0 0 0 0 0 0
Deteriorating effect 8 7 1 0 0 0
B
ud
ge
t M
an
ag
em
en
t
# Sources 34 27 7 7 7 5
Total effect codings 72 42 8 8 8 6
Positive effect 61 32 8 8 7 6
No effect 8 7 0 0 1 0
Negative effect 3 3 0 0 0 0
Improving effect 0 0 0 0 0 0
Deteriorating effect 0 0 0 0 0 0
B
ud
ge
t T
ra
ns
pa
re
nc
y
# Sources 29 24 3 3 4 4
Total effect codings 51 34 4 4 4 5
Positive effect 40 24 3 4 4 5
No effect 7 6 1 0 0 0
Negative effect 2 2 0 0 0 0
Improving effect 1 1 0 0 0 0
Deteriorating effect 1 1 0 0 0 0
lxxv Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Vietnam, and Zambia.
4.3.2 Budget support programmes in general
Coverage
Among all outcomes, the best coverage is found for the coding 
on general PFM (see Table 22). Budget support effects on PFM 
are mentioned by 58 sources, in a total of 229 text sections. 
Generic effects of budget support are mentioned in 52 sources. 
Effects on budget management are covered in 34 sources in 
total, and generic effects of the budget support programmes 
on budget management are assessed in 27 sources. Effects of 
budget support on budget transparency are included in 29 
sources in total; the generic effects of budget support on 
budget transparency are covered in 24 sources. This means 
that generalizable conclusions can be drawn for the general 
effects of budget support programmes on PFM, budget 
management, and budget transparency.
Established evidence
Budget support programmes have a positive effect on PFM  
in recipient countries. Improvements in PFM are mentioned  
in 21 sources, reporting improvements in 14 countrieslxxv.132  
One of the main reasons for this strong contribution is that 
budget support enhances the joint focus of donors and the 
government on the capacity constraints of government 
performance, in particular in the area of PFM.133 Governments 
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Table 23: Specific improvements in PFM
Effect on PFM Country Source
Improved budget 
formulation/ 
planning
Ethiopia, Ghana, Morocco, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia 
Batley et al., 2006; Claussen et al., 2006; Hedger et al., 2010; Lawson et al., 2003b; 
Ofori/Atta, 2012; Smith, 2009; Steffensen, 2010; Thunnissen/Morillon, 2014; 
Tidemand, 2009; World Bank, 2008
Improved budgeting/ 
accounting
Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Georgia, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia 
Claussen et al., 2006; EU, 2014; Gosparini et al., 2006; Hedger et al., 2010;  
Lawson et al., 2013; Lawson et al., 2016; Leiderer/ Faust 2012; Lister et al., 2006; 
Purcell et al., 2006; World Bank, 2008; World Bank, 2009a; World Bank, 2013b
Increased 
comprehensiveness 
and transparency of 
the budget
partly Burkina Faso, Burundi, Ghana, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, 
Tunisia, Uganda, Vietnam 
Batley et al., 2006; Bogetic et al., 2015; Claussen et al., 2006; Dijkstra, 2013;  
DRN 2011; Lanser et al., 2006; Lawson et al., 2007; Lawson et al., 2013; Lawson et 
al., 2014; Lister et al., 2006; Smith, 2009; World Bank, 2009a; World Bank, 2015b
lxxvi Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Zambia.
lxxvii Ghana, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Tanzania.
lxxviii Ghana, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, and Vietnam.
lxxix Burkina Faso, Malawi, Mali, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Zambia.
lxxx e.g. Burkina Faso, and Uganda.
in countries that receive budget support generally show clear 
commitment to PFM reform, probably as a result of donor 
selectivity, given that commitment to PFM reforms usually 
constitutes an underlying principle on which the provision of 
budget support is conditioned. 
At the generic level, the evidence finds positive effects on 
budget formulation and planning, budgeting and accounting 
and comprehensiveness and transparency of the budget (see 
Table 23). Positive effects on budget formulation and planning 
are observed in 10 sources covering nine countries, six of them 
being LICs and three of them being middle-income countries 
(MICs). Improvements in budgeting and accounting are 
identified across 12 sources in 11 countries (8 LICs, 3 MICs). The 
evidence shows generic positive effects on budget transparency 
(13 sources; see also section 4.5 on domestic accountability).
Overall, the sources draw a distinct positive picture on  
budget support’s influence on PFM (see Table 22), and only  
a few sources report negative effects. These sources discuss 
negative effects of budget support suspensions on fiscal 
discipline and a decline in performance in PFM, in particular 
regarding budget credibility and transparency134 (see 
paragraphs below).
In some country case examples,lxxvi the introduction or further 
roll-out of a financial management information system,135 the 
introduction of laws and regulations regarding public finance 
and budget management, or the enhancement of existing legal 
frameworks led to improvements in PFM.136 Regarding 
institutions of accountability, the Office of the Auditor General 
and the role of Parliament in the budget process are 
strengthened in some cases (see also section 4.5 on domestic 
accountability).137 In other cases, budget support resulted in 
improvements of procurement processes,lxxvii 138 more reporting 
(also internal and external auditing) and control over 
government expenditure.lxxviii 139 
In spite of the distinctly positive effects of budget support 
programmes on PFM, the budget support effects on PFM 
reforms did not live up to expectations. The underachievement 
of PFM reform is among other reasons explained by weak 
capacities and weak institutional structures undermining 
stronger progress, which is mentioned in seven country  
cases.lxxix 140 Furthermore, in many countries reforms have  
yet to be implemented and budget information provided at 
local government levels as the reforms focused so far on 
improvements at central level.lxxx 141
Compared over the life-span of budget support programmes, 
the initial momentum to implement PFM reform was lost as a 
slow-down or delays in PFM reforms set in towards the later 
years of budget support programmes, for example in Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Vietnam, and Zambia.142 Explanations provided in the 
sources are the diminution of reform commitment coinciding 
with the reduction of budget support contributions, and the 
long maturation process needed for the implementation of 
PFM reforms.143
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4.3.3 Financial and non-financial inputs
Coverage
An effect of TA/CD on PFM is described in 29 sources, an 
effect of policy dialogue in 19 sources, and 15 sources state an 
effect of conditionality on PFM. There is insufficient evidence 
on effects of funding on PFM, which is only covered in nine 
sources. The insufficient coverage of funding effects on PFM 
means that generalizable conclusions on effects, as laid out in 
the intervention logic,144 such as the systemic effect of budget 
support, cannot be drawn from the evidence.
As shown in Table 22, for both budget management and 
budget transparency the coverage of the individual inputs is 
insufficient, and therefore no generalizable conclusions with 
respect to effects of individual inputs on budget management 
and budget transparency can be drawn. As the sources do  
not clearly differentiate between the codes PFM, budget 
management and budget transparency, some findings on the 
effect of non-financial inputs on budget management and 
transparency are subsumed under the topic PFM, which is 
more broadly used in the sources.
Established evidence
Overall, the non-financial inputs of budget support have a 
positive effect on improvements in PFM. 145 This is reported in 
19 sources. 146 Two of these reports attribute achievements in 
PFM mainly to non-financial inputs of budget support, 
implying that it was primarily non-financial rather than 
financial budget support inputs that had a positive effect on 
PFM, due to increased awareness for reform needs in the field 
of PFM and the supply of inputs for the PFM reform process.147 
This finding supports the assumption of the budget support 
intervention logic, that the combination of financial and non-
financial inputs reinforces positive effects on PFM.
TA/CD as a non-financial input of budget support programmes 
(see Box 4) has proven positive effects on PFM, as it addresses 
capacity needs in PFM and governance institutions (attested in 
10 sources).148 TA/CD improved, for example, both planning 
and budgeting in six countries,lxxxi 149 by helping build 
capacities on an institutional level at the Office of the Auditor 
lxxxi Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zambia.
lxxxii e.g. in Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Rwanda.
lxxxiii e.g. in Nicaragua and Zambia.
lxxxiv E.g. Mali, Morocco, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, and Vietnam.
lxxxv E.g. in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Sierra Leone.
General (OAG) and offering technical assistance in budget 
management and other PFM functions.150 One of the few 
criticisms with regard to TA/CD accompanying budget support 
is the lack of coordination in the technical assistance provided 
by donors, both within budget support programmes and in the 
interaction of budget support programmes, with TA/CD 
offered in other programmes, for example in Uganda and 
Zambia.151
Box 4 Evidence on accompanying TA/CD
Although the effects of TA/CD on PFM are positive, 
evidence is predominantly found in more recent evaluation 
reports. Most evaluations applied a narrow definition, and 
counted TA/CD only as part of the budget support package 
if it is part of the same financing agreement; it therefore 
analysed effects of TA/CD only to a limited extent. In 
practice, however, donors accompany their budget support 
programmes with parallel TA/CD and consider these 
accompanying measures as part of the budget support 
package. Based on a broader definition of accompanying 
measures (all forms of TA/CD that are provided 
simultaneously to budget support and pursue related 
objectives), Krisch et al. (2015) emphasize the relevance of 
TA/CD, and more recent evaluations recognize the 
contributions of TA/CD, as an important element of budget 
support, in directly strengthening national systems, 
particularly those of PFM.
 
Regarding policy dialogue, the sources included in the 
evaluation synthesis attest a positive effect on PFM, in 
particular on budget managementlxxxii and budget 
transparency.lxxxiii 152 The dialogue works in favour of PFM, as 
PFM and related PAF indicators are prioritized, such as 
alignment of funds towards national strategies and policy 
frameworks.153 While the policy dialogue initiated reforms in 
most cases,lxxxiv it also helped to keep the recipient 
government on track in the follow up of reforms.lxxxv 154 
Although policy dialogue overall has a positive effect on PFM, 
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Table 24: Corruption codes
Topic Codes Definition
Corruption Anti-corruption agency Agency investigating against corruption cases 
Corruption legislation Regulations to fight corruption 
Corruption level Degree of corruption
Corruption policies Practices and rules regarding corruption
some sources argue that budget support dialogue does not 
use its potential to the fullest. Only modest effects of budget 
support dialogue on PFM are visible in areas where the 
political support for reforms is lacking, or where changes in  
the priorities of socio-economic policy are necessary.155 This is 
also attributed to the conflictive nature of dialogue in some 
countries and the absence of joint dialogue strategies.156
The sources state that conditionality in the form of PAF and 
diagnostic tools helps to improve PFM, as the focus of donors 
and government shifts towards improvements in PFM indicators 
(a large share of PAF indicators dealt with improvements in 
PFM157) and constant review processes on the performance  
in PFM provide incentives to persistently implement PFM 
reforms.158 With regard to budget transparency, the PAF 
positively influences the traceability of government processes 
and expenditures.159 However, whether PFM criteria in the PAF 
are conducive to functional PFM changes seems to depend 
highly on the willingness to reform.160 Moreover, in some 
countries it is assumed that PFM capacity constraints were 
aggravated by insufficient harmonization of procedures and 
extensive control requirements.161 
4.4 Corruption
The topic corruption is divided into the codes corruption level, 
corruption policies, corruption legislation and anti-corruption 
agencies. For the specific definitions of the codes as used in 
this evaluation synthesis see Table 24.
Summary finding: Surprisingly low coverage on highly 
debated effects on corruption
Evidence on budget support’s effects on corruption is 
scarce in the sources. Considering that two out of four 
codes on corruption do not meet the threshold of coverage 
in 10 reports, and only a low number of codings is available, 
most effects on corruption are insufficiently backed by 
evidence. This lack of evidence on corruption is both 
surprising and problematic as the political debate revolves 
to a large extent around budget support’s effects on 
corruption.
However, the analysed data show no negative effect of 
budget support on corruption and thus do not confirm this 
assumed risk. One effect that is sufficiently covered by 
evidence relates to the monitoring of corruption, which 
increases due to budget support. However, the prosecution 
of people accused of corruption is still low and the number 
of convictions even lower.
 
4.4.1 Expected effects
Taking a certain level of corruption as a given, the political 
debate controversially discusses the fiduciary risks connected 
to the disbursements of budget support. The budget support 
intervention logic, on the other hand, assumes that increases 
in transparency and accountability due to budget support 
contribute to a reduction in corruption.
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Table 25: Budget support effects on corruption
Inputs Total BS Programme Funds Policy dialogue Conditionality TA  / CD
A
nt
i-
co
rr
up
ti
on
 A
ge
nc
y
# Sources 9 9 2 1 1 2
Total effect codings 19 13 2 1 1 2
Positive effect 17 12 1 1 1 2
No effect 2 1 1 0 0 0
Negative effect 0 0 0 0 0 0
Improving effect 0 0 0 0 0 0
Deteriorating effect 0 0 0 0 0 0
C
or
ru
pt
io
n 
Le
gi
sl
at
io
n
# Sources 5 5 0 0 0 0
Total effect codings 5 5 0 0 0 0
Positive effect 5 5 0 0 0 0
No effect 0 0 0 0 0 0
Negative effect 0 0 0 0 0 0
Improving effect 0 0 0 0 0 0
Deteriorating effect 0 0 0 0 0 0
C
or
ru
pt
io
n 
Le
ve
l
# Sources 19 15 3 1 2 1
Total effect codings 25 17 3 1 3 1
Positive effect 10 8 1 1 0 0
No effect 13 7 2 0 3 1
Negative effect 1 1 0 0 0 0
Improving effect 1 1 0 0 0 0
Deteriorating effect 0 0 0 0 0 0
C
or
ru
pt
io
n 
Po
lic
ie
s
# Sources 13 10 0 2 3 1
Total effect codings 19 11 0 3 4 1
Positive effect 11 6 0 3 2 0
No effect 8 5 0 0 2 1
Negative effect 0 0 0 0 0 0
Improving effect 0 0 0 0 0 0
Deteriorating effect 0 0 0 0 0 0
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4.4.2 Effects on corruption
Coverage
Out of 95 sources, effects on corruption levels are covered in a 
total of 19 sources, effects on corruption policies in 13 sources, 
effects on corruption legislation in five sources, and effects on 
anti-corruption agencies in nine sources (see Table 25). The 
number of codings is either the same or only slightly higher 
than the number of reports covering the effect, which implies 
that none of the sources extensively cover effects on corruption. 
None of the effects of specific inputs on any of the corruption 
codes reaches the threshold for empirically established effects, 
thus no conclusions can be drawn on the impact of financial 
and non-financial inputs on corruption. Whether an increase in 
transparency and accountability due to budget support leads 
to a reduction in corruption cannot be answered based on 
these findings. Future research is needed to close the 
knowledge gap regarding budget support effects on corruption.
Established evidence
Due to the low number of codings on all corruption codes (see 
Table 25), very few effects on corruption meet the threshold to 
be included as established evidence. Overall, the number of 
codings presented in Table 25 suggests that there is no negative 
effect of budget support on the corruption level. The evidence 
is mixed regarding the question of whether there is no effect of 
budget support on corruption or whether there is a positive 
one. The one positive effect that is addressed in more than 10 
reports is the improvement in monitoring of corruption due to 
budget support (12 sources).162 This stems from positive budget 
support effects on domestic accountability and PFM. In 
particular, TA/CD as budget support input strengthened 
institutions and stakeholders to detect corruption, mainly anti-
corruption agencies. However, the prosecution of people 
accused of corruption is still low and the number of convictions 
even lower (4 sources).163
For corruption policies, budget support clearly has no negative 
effect. Once again, evidence is mixed regarding no or positive 
budget support effects, although corruption is formally on the 
agenda of the (high level) policy dialogue and directs the 
partner governments’ attention towards their anti-corruption 
policies.164
lxxxvi Note that SAI can be part of the supply as well as the demand side and fulfil both functions depending on the institutional and legal status. 
4.5 Domestic accountability  
and democratic governance
The topic domestic accountability and democratic governance 
is sub-divided into the supply side of domestic accountability, 
the demand side of domestic accountability and democratic 
governance. Institutions on the supply side of domestic 
accountability include government institutions like the 
ministry of finance and planning, national statistic offices,  
and supreme audit institutions (SAI),lxxxvi expected to supply 
(budget) information to the general public. The demand side of 
domestic accountability consists of actors, like the parliament, 
civil society and media, who use this information to hold the 
government to account. These sub-topics define the structure 
of the following paragraphs. Table 26 indicates the specific 
definitions of the codes used in this evaluation synthesis.
Summary finding: Budget support improves the supply 
side of domestic accountability and strengthens SAI on 
a generic level, no input-specific attribution
The generic attribution of changes in domestic accountability 
to budget support programmes is sufficiently covered by 
evidence, with the highest coverage for domestic 
accountability and the lowest coverage for SAI. However, 
none of the codes has sufficient coverage on financial and 
non-financial inputs and their effects to draw generalizable 
conclusions.
Budget support contributes to improvements on the supply 
side of domestic accountability. Budget support strengthens 
the budget process as it is channelled through the national 
budget system. It substantially augments the role of SAI, 
where improvements are found, particularly regarding the 
quality and quantity of audit reports. With regard to the 
demand side of accountability, long-term effects of budget 
support on the role of parliament and civil society could not 
be identified.
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Table 26: Domestic accountability and democratic governance codes
Topic Sub-topic Codes Definition
Domestic 
Accountability  
and Democratic 
Governance
Supply side Domestic accountability Governmental liability related to public spending
Supreme audit institutions National agencies responsible for auditing government revenue and spending  
and their strengthened function
Demand side Role of Parliament Strengthened function of parliament
Civil society organizations Strengthened function of non-governmental organizations
Democratic 
governance
Governance Relates to areas of governance that are not covered under domestic accountability, 
such as rule of law, intra-government accountability, decentralization
lxxxvii Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Vietnam, and Zambia.
4.5.1 Expected effects
As per the CEF, governance and accountability objectives  
are at the core of the intervention logic of budget support. 
Besides their aim to reduce poverty and promote socio-
economic development, donors set good governance as an 
ultimate objective of budget support. The CEF describes 
improvements in human rights and democracy at the impact 
level. Furthermore, good governance is not only an end in 
itself but serves as a cross-cutting issue to increase the 
effectiveness of budget support to achieve its objectives.165  
On the intermediary level of induced outputs, budget support 
is expected to positively affect the supply and the demand  
side of domestic accountability. Expected effects include 
strengthened public sector institutions of PFM, improved 
budget transparency and strengthened linkages between 
government and oversight bodies166.
4.5.2 Supply side of domestic accountability
Coverage
Budget support effects on domestic accountability are covered 
in 44 sources and in a total of 123 codings, which is the highest 
coverage among all codes on domestic accountability (see 
Table 27). Statements regarding the generic attribution of 
changes in domestic accountability to budget support 
programmes are found in 42 sources. The input-specific effects 
of funding (8 sources), policy dialogue (9 sources), conditionality 
(7 sources) and TA/CD (8 sources) are all insufficiently covered 
in the body of evidence with respect to the benchmark of 10 
sources. Effects of budget support on SAI are covered in 17 
sources, with 15 sources covering the generic effect of budget 
support programmes, and fewer than 10 sources describing 
effects from individual inputs of budget support. This means 
that no conclusions can be drawn on the effects of specific 
budget support inputs on domestic accountability of SAI. 
Established evidence
The overall finding that emerges from synthesizing the 
reviewed evidence is that budget support generally 
contributes to improvements on the supply side of domestic 
accountability. Positive effects have been identified in nine 
countries.lxxxvii 167 The effects of budget support on the supply 
side of domestic accountability include significant effects on 
PFM, particularly the increased comprehensiveness and 
transparency of the budget (see section 4.3). Interestingly, 
observed changes in domestic accountability have usually not 
been attributed to one or a combination of particular inputs of 
budget support. Instead, the great majority of statements 
describe aggregate effects of the budget support programme 
more generally.
Positive effects of all budget support inputs on the supply side 
of domestic accountability are reported in 38 sources.168 As 
budget support is channelled through the national budget 
systems, it further increases the relevance of these systems. 
National processes in the budget cycle are backed by budget 
support because external flows are managed by the Ministry 
of Finance and are subject to decision making by Cabinet and 
approval by Parliament.169
There is sufficient coverage on the link between budget 
support and SAI. Of the 17 sources covering effects on SAI, 14 
report positive effects.170 The most significant improvements 
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Table 27: Budget support effects on the supply side of domestic accountability
Inputs Total BS Programme Funds Policy dialogue Conditionality TA  / CD
D
om
es
ti
c 
A
cc
ou
nt
ab
ili
ty
# Sources 44 42 8 9 7 8
Total effect codings 123 88 9 9 9 8
Positive effect 100 71 5 9 8 7
No effect 19 14 4 0 0 1
Negative effect 3 2 0 0 1 0
Improving effect 1 1 0 0 0 0
Deteriorating effect 0 0 0 0 0 0
Su
pr
em
e 
A
ud
it
 In
st
it
ut
io
ns
# Sources 17 15 6 2 3 4
Total effect codings 34 18 6 2 4 4
Positive effect 29 14 6 2 4 3
No effect 4 3 0 0 0 1
Negative effect 1 1 0 0 0 0
Improving effect 0 0 0 0 0 0
Deteriorating effect 0 0 0 0 0 0
have been identified regarding the quality and quantity of 
audit sources as well as their timely publication. However, the 
evidence suggests that achievements have been limited to the 
technical level, and budget support was not able to promote 
solutions related to political issues such as the follow up and 
implementation of audit recommendations, the enforcement 
of prosecution, and the recovery of funds.171
Ten sources point to the potentially conflicting relation 
between the ultimate objective to strengthen domestic 
accountability and the external accountability demands from 
donors vis-à-vis the recipient government.172 In fact, two 
extreme examples that point to adverse accountability effects 
are Burundi, where the budget support donor group took over 
accountability functions from local institutions, and Uganda, 
where donors dominated the dialogue at the expense of 
domestic stakeholders.173 At the same time, there are also 
some examples where accountability systems improved in  
a way that is of value to both domestic and international 
stakeholders, and where donors’ accountability demands 
helped fill a gap in the recipient country’s monitoring and 
review processes.174 However, key for achieving such win–win 
situations is the use of policy dialogue as a means to raise 
domestic awareness and knowledge of key policy debates and 
to publicly share all information in order to allow domestic 
accountability institutions to follow up.175
4.5.3 Demand side of domestic accountability
Coverage
Evidence regarding the demand side of domestic accountability 
and democratic governance is limited.176 The effects of budget 
support on the role of parliament are covered in 21 sources,  
of which 20 cover the generic effects of budget support 
programmes. The effects of budget support on civil society  
are covered by 25 sources, with 24 covering the generic effects 
of budget support programmes. As displayed in Table 28, 
individual inputs of budget support are insufficiently covered 
by evidence. This means that no generalizable conclusions can 
be drawn on the specific effect of each input on the demand 
side of domestic accountability. For example, it cannot be 
assessed whether the assumption that non-financial inputs 
strengthen civil society engagement and the oversight 
function of parliament applies in reality.
4.  |  Evidence on budget support56
Table 28: Budget support effects on the demand side of domestic accountability
Inputs Total BS Programme Funds Policy dialogue Conditionality TA  / CD
R
ol
e 
of
 P
ar
lia
m
en
t
# Sources 21 20 4 4 1 2
Total effect codings 56 39 6 5 4 2
Positive effect 38 27 5 3 2 1
No effect 18 12 1 2 2 1
Negative effect 0 0 0 0 0 0
Improving effect 0 0 0 0 0 0
Deteriorating effect 0 0 0 0 0 0
C
iv
il 
So
ci
et
y 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
ns
# Sources 25 24 4 8 1 2
Total effect codings 68 51 6 8 1 2
Positive effect 51 36 6 7 1 1
No effect 14 12 0 1 0 1
Negative effect 2 2 0 0 0 0
Improving effect 0 0 0 0 0 0
Deteriorating effect 1 1 0 0 0 0
lxxxviii Rwanda, Uganda, Vietnam, and Zambia.
Established evidence
The effects of budget support in strengthening the oversight 
function of parliaments are covered by 21 sources, of which 14 
indicate a positive effect. However, only two of the codings 
indicate a strong positive effect, and the majority of the 
codings (18) indicate a weak positive effect. Nine sources find 
no effect.177 Moreover, some evaluations and studies make 
statements on (changes of) the role of parliaments in the 
budget process without sufficiently attributing these to the 
presence of the budget support programme. The main barriers 
to effective budget oversight by parliament identified in the 
literature are limited capacities, lack of information, and 
political constraints.178
Results are even more inconsistent for the effect on the 
participation of civil society organizations (CSO) in the budget 
process. The quantitative analysis results in 18 sources that 
report positive effects.179 However, the qualitative assessment 
of the text segments reveals that statements mostly describe 
marginal improvements without attributing the observed 
changes to the budget support programme. The majority of 
text segments have thus been taken as weak positive effects. 
Another 10 sources state absent or negative effects.180 In some 
country caseslxxxviii the evidence indicates that CSOs have not 
been sufficiently integrated.181 However, in Malawi and 
Mozambique a dialogue between the Ministry of Finance, the 
sector ministries, and the National Statistical Office (Malawi)/
National Institute of Statistics (Mozambique) was established. 
CSOs participated through the Poverty Observatory.182 This 
“inclusive” budget support dialogue helped to create political 
space for CSOs and the media to participate and address 
issues of political and financial accountability.183 Despite 
improvements in CSO participation in budget processes 
described in these and other country case studies,184 more 
critical studies voice concerns on the ability of CSOs to 
effectively hold the government to account.185 
Overall, budget support seems to perform below its potential 
to effectively support the demand side of domestic 
accountability. The failure to directly support non-state actors 
in the budget process has been linked to a lack of focus of 
non-financial inputs (e.g. policy dialogue, conditionality, and 
TA/CD) of budget support (for example, in Mozambique and 
Zambia).186 Moreover, the induced improvements on the side 
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Table 29: Budget support effects on governance
Inputs Total BS Programme Funds Policy dialogue Conditionality TA  / CD
G
ov
er
na
nc
e
# Sources 31 27 1 8 6 4
Total effect codings 65 41 1 8 8 7
Positive effect 53 33 1 7 6 6
No effect 11 7 0 1 2 1
Negative effect 0 0 0 0 0 0
Improving effect 0 0 0 0 0 0
Deteriorating effect 1 1 0 0 0 0
 
of SAI and, to a lesser extent, also on the side of parliament 
and CSOs have been largely of a technical nature, while 
progress towards a broader governance objective has not been 
realized.187 Donors did not succeed in changing the recipient 
government’s priorities towards the demand side of 
accountability or to improve democratic governance more 
generally. 188
4.5.4 Democratic governance
Coverage
The effects of budget support on governance are covered in  
31 sources, of which 27 deal with generic effects of budget 
support. In line with the other codes on domestic 
accountability, the effects of individual inputs on governance 
are not sufficiently covered by evidence (see Table 29). This 
means that no generalizable conclusions can be drawn on the 
effects of specific inputs on governance, specifically regarding 
the expected effect of policy dialogue on improving governance 
through better policy choices.189
Established evidence
The majority of sources describe positive effects of budget 
support on governance,190 and few sources report absent 
effects.191 However, the effects on governance are not clear cut, 
as suggested by the quantitative results displayed in Table 29 
above. The qualitative assessment of the 65 codings reveals a 
more nuanced picture. Most sources only draw hesitant 
conclusions on the effects of budget support on good 
governance. Statements generally describe “limited” or “mild” 
effects, without providing details on the specific contribution 
of the budget support programme. The codings include  
broad statements and cover different aspects of governance. 
The improvement in governance particularly refers to stronger 
intra-government accountability structures.192 In contrast to 
conventional project aid, which is typically implemented via 
specific sector ministries, budget support disbursements  
are allocated by the Ministry of Finance. In Uganda and 
Mozambique, the additional on-budget resources provided 
through budget support contributed to strengthening the 
accountability relation between the Ministry of Finance, sector 
ministries, and the national statistical office.193 Moreover, 
instead of turning to the donor community, sector ministries, 
in order to secure funding, stick to the national budget 
process.194 Uncertainty remains with regard to the effect of 
budget support on decentralization. While budget support 
facilitated decentralization in some countries (Mali, 
Mozambique, South Africa, Uganda (in earlier years), Tanzania, 
and Vietnam),195 the instrument did not achieve progress in 
decentralization in Nicaragua, Rwanda, Tunisia, and Uganda  
(in later years).196
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Table 30: Economic performance and income poverty codes
Topic Code Definition
Economic 
Performance and 
Income Poverty
Macroeconomic performance Macroeconomic management that improves economic growth and stability
Income poverty Disposable income of below the poverty line
lxxxix Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, CAR, DRC, Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zambia.
4.6 Economic performance and income poverty
This section analyses evidence on macroeconomic 
performance and income poverty. The definitions of the codes 
as used in this evaluation synthesis are stated in Table 30.
Summary finding: Pre-existing macroeconomic 
stability reinforced, but causal chain from economic 
growth to less income poverty not supported 
(problems of attribution)
The generic attribution of changes in macroeconomic 
performance and income poverty to budget support 
programmes is sufficiently covered by evidence. Concerning 
specific budget support inputs, only the effect of funding on 
income poverty is sufficiently covered, for all other inputs, 
no generalizable conclusions on effects can be drawn. 
While positive developments in macroeconomic performance 
are not attributed to the presence of budget support 
programmes alone, the evidence finds that budget support 
programmes reinforce pre-existing macroeconomic 
stability. A certain repayment of domestic debt as one 
trigger of economic growth is also plausibly attributed to 
budget support programmes. The evidence on budget 
support effects on income poverty is mixed. Most sources 
find no or only slightly positive effects, but reliable evidence 
on the contribution of budget support to these changes is 
relatively scarce. 
4.6.1 Expected effects
Based on the intervention logic, two major effects are 
expected from budget support programmes on economic 
performance and income poverty: a systemic effect and a 
policy and institutional effect. The systemic effect is expected 
to allow the government an increase in public spending or 
saving, or a reduction in public borrowing (see Section 4.2). 
The budget support funding might in turn also have 
macroeconomic effects, particularly on economic growth, and 
on interest and exchange rates. The assumption is that budget 
support creates added demand for domestic products and 
allows a reduction in government borrowing. Second, policy 
and institutional effects result from non-financial budget 
support inputs via improved macroeconomic and sector policy 
management.197 The progress in economic development due to 
budget support is expected to result in a reduction of income 
poverty.198 However, this is the product of the entirety of 
government policies, decisions on spending, and budget 
allocation, and is influenced by budget support only to a 
limited degree.199
4.6.2 Macroeconomic performance
Coverage
The effects of budget support on macroeconomic performance 
are covered in 31 sources, of which 28 cover effects of budget 
support programmes at a generic level. Effects of the 
individual budget support inputs funding, policy dialogue, 
conditionality and TA/CD on macroeconomic performance are 
covered in an insufficient number of sources (see Table 31). The 
evidence base is insufficient for conclusions to be drawn on 
the effectiveness of specific budget support inputs as 
formulated in the intervention logic, e.g. the expected positive 
effect of budget support funding on, for example, the balance 
of payments, savings and macroeconomic stabilization200.
Established evidence
Overall, the evidence describes positive effects on 
macroeconomic performance. These effects are reported for  
17 countries,lxxxix 201 of which 13 are LICs.202 However, most 
sources agree that the evidence base is insufficient to clearly 
attribute improvements in macroeconomic performance to the 
presence of budget support programmes.203 Many sources do 
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Table 31: Budget support effects on macroeconomic performance
Inputs Total BS Programme Funds Policy dialogue Conditionality TA  / CD
M
ac
ro
ec
on
om
ic
 P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
# Sources 31 28 8 3 4 1
Total effect codings 65 43 14 3 4 1
Positive effect 56 36 14 3 2 1
No effect 1 1 0 0 0 0
Negative effect 6 4 0 0 2 0
Improving effect 0 0 0 0 0 0
Deteriorating effect 2 2 0 0 0 0
xc Ghana, Mozambique, Mali, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Tunisia, Vietnam, and Zambia
xci Ghana, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Zambia.
not attribute improvements in economic performance to 
budget support alone, but also, sometimes more prominently, 
to programmes of IMF and to the political commitment of the 
partner governments to achieve macroeconomic stability 
(particularly in the form of monetarist policies).204 What the 
evidence does attribute to the presence of budget support is 
that budget support programmes reinforce already existing 
macroeconomic stability, as the programmes involve a higher 
number of international partners in the macroeconomic 
debate, and foster fiscal discipline by the provision of on-
budget funds.205 
Growth of gross domestic product is reported in nine 
countriesxc, four of them LICs and five MICs,206 but the 
attribution to budget support programmes is inconsistent 
across the sources. Some sources suggest that budget support 
is supportive of economic growth, as budget support funds 
enable increases in government spending without a 
simultaneous increase in domestic borrowing.207 Other  
sources find that economic growth is predominantly caused  
by debt relief, high domestic commodity prices and IMF 
programmes.208 The repayment of domestic debt as one trigger 
of economic growth is plausibly attributed to budget support 
programmes. This effect is found in six sources209 and in five 
country cases.xci The underlying rationale is that budget 
support enabled an increase in internal repayment of the 
budget deficit. This argument is supported by the immediate 
increase in domestic borrowing as a result of budget support 
suspensions.210
While the link between increased economic performance and 
budget support programmes is questionable, a few sources 
suggest the negative impact of budget support suspensions on 
economic performance. Coinciding with low domestic-revenue 
mobilization, mixed and even adverse effects on 
macroeconomic performance, such as fiscal indiscipline, 
macroeconomic instability and increases in budget deficit, are 
reported.211
Budget support has a weak positive effect on private sector 
development, especially on the business environment. The 
reported effects range from an assessment as “unsatisfactory” 
in Burundi, Ethiopia, and Mozambique, through weak positive 
effects in Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Santa Lucia, to strong 
positive effects in South Africa and Tunisia. The relevance of 
budget support effects on private sector development in 
policy and aid strategies is mentioned in early evaluation 
sources, but generally seems to be gaining in importance.212
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Table 32: Budget support effects on income poverty
Inputs Total BS Programme Funds Policy dialogue Conditionality TA  / CD
In
co
m
e 
Po
ve
rt
y
# Sources 40 36 17 7 4 1
Total effect codings 127 87 24 8 7 1
Positive effect 77 51 15 6 4 1
No effect 38 29 6 2 1 0
Negative effect 5 4 0 0 1 0
Improving effect 3 2 1 0 0 0
Deteriorating effect 4 1 2 0 1 0
xcii Burkina Faso, Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Uganda, and Vietnam.
xciii Burundi, Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Nicaragua (under the Bolaños government), Rwanda, and Sierra Leone (in the Western region).
xciv Mali, Nicaragua (under Ortega government), Sierra Leone (Eastern and northern regions), South Africa, Uganda, and Zambia.
4.6.3 Income poverty
Coverage
The coverage on budget support effects on income poverty in 
the sources is strong (in 40 out of 95 sources)213 (see Table 32). 
The generic effect of budget support is analysed in 36 sources, 
and 17 sources analyse the input-specific effect of budget 
support funding on income poverty. The effect of non-financial 
inputs is insufficiently covered by evidence (seven sources for 
policy dialogue, four sources for conditionality and one source 
for TA/CD). Thus, no generalizable conclusions on the effects 
of individual non-financial inputs on income poverty can be 
drawn. 
Established evidence
As stated in Section 4.6.1, the increase in economic performance 
due to budget support is expected to result in a reduction of 
income poverty. While increases in economic performance and 
growth are confirmed by the evidence, the generic attribution 
of these improvements to budget support programmes is not 
in all cases plausibly confirmed or disconfirmed by the 
evidence. 
The attribution of changes in income poverty to budget 
support programmes is particularly difficult as budget support 
promotes general reforms, which only indirectly enhance 
poverty reduction. Moreover, in some country casesxcii 
reductions in income poverty were not visible at the time of 
evaluation due to time lags between cause and effect. This 
fundamental challenge is mostly reported in more recent 
sources.214 The causal link between budget support and income 
poverty is hence strongly diluted, which is reflected in the 
effects presented by the evidence.
The body of evidence, overall, finds inconsistent effects on 
income poverty:215 the majority of sources report either no or 
slightly positive effects of budget support on income poverty. 
No effect of budget support programmes on income poverty is 
reported in seven countries.xciii 216 In contrast, positive effects 
of budget support on income poverty are found in eight 
sources,217 covering seven countries.xciv 
While the attribution to budget support remains unclear,  
the evidence suggests that the effects on income poverty did 
not develop as expected, and offers a variety of reasons why 
this is the case. Most of these reasons reported are specific to 
the respective country context, but some are found in several 
cases. One reason mentioned is a poor conceptualization of 
pro-poor policies (Tanzania and Zambia)218, which neglected 
inequalities in the poor’s access to assets (Zambia, 
Mozambique, Uganda, and Nicaragua).219 The evidence also 
refers to policy mistakes, particularly in the agriculture sector, 
such as subsidies and programmes that did not target poor 
farmers. Overall, macroeconomic growth did not reach the 
relevant population groups, particularly in rural areas.220
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Table 33: Service delivery and non-income poverty codes
Topic Code Definition
Service Delivery 
and Non-Income 
Poverty
Public service delivery Provision of public services
Administration for service delivery Managing the provision of public services
Non-income poverty Lack of access to goods and amenities that are deemed to be needed for an 
acceptable standard of living
xcv Non-income poverty is defined by the level of social exclusion and the lack of education, health, and social welfare (Lawson et al., 2013; Lawson et al., 2014; Lawson et al., 2016). The dimensions of 
non-income poverty most commonly covered in evaluations are education and health (through indicators from the Millennium Development Goals (e.g. mentioned in Lister, 2006), or the HDI 
(Lawson et al., 2013)).
4.7 Service delivery and non-income poverty
The subsequent sections on service delivery and non-income 
poverty summarize the evidence from codings on overall public 
service delivery, public administration for service delivery and 
non-income poverty. The specific definitions of these codes as 
used in this evaluation synthesis are stated in Table 33.
Summary finding: Access to public services increased, 
but of low quality that impairs the effect on non-
income poverty – problems of attribution
The generic attribution of changes in service delivery and 
non-income poverty to budget support is sufficiently 
covered by evidence, with the highest coverage for public 
service delivery and the lowest coverage for administration 
for service delivery. Regarding the effects of specific budget 
support inputs, the effects of funding, policy dialogue and 
TA/CD on public service delivery are also sufficiently 
covered, though conditionality is not. For administration of 
public service delivery and non-income poverty, none of the 
specific inputs has sufficient coverage in the sources. 
Overall, budget support is effective at increasing access to 
public services. Funds from SBS and GBS are decisive in 
increasing service delivery, particularly in the education and 
health sectors. Yet, budget support does not prove to be 
effective at improving the quality of provided services or 
the administration responsible for delivering the services. 
The evidence describes positive effects on non-income 
poverty in the recipient countries, but the effects are not 
attributed to budget support alone.
4.7.1 Expected effects
Outcomes expected from budget support are improvements in 
public service delivery and the reduction of non-income 
poverty. By providing financial means to the recipient 
government’s budget, increased expenditure is expected to be 
used to finance the expansion of service delivery in the social 
sectors and is supposed to lead to reduced levels of non-
income poverty.xcv Through its non-financial elements, budget 
support is also designed to influence sector policies and 
increase the quality of social services by strengthening the 
administrative capacities for service delivery.
4.7.2 Public service delivery
Coverage
Effects of budget support on public service delivery are 
examined in 47 sources and are mentioned in a total of 186 
text sections, which means that public service delivery has the 
second strongest coverage in the entire body of evidence (see 
Table 34). Generic effects of budget support programmes are 
covered in 40 sources, and 28 cover effects relating to the 
financing function of budget support. Effects of policy 
dialogue and TA/CD are both covered in 10 sources. Effects of 
budget support on conditionality are, however, insufficiently 
covered, with seven sources, and thus no generalizable 
conclusions on the effects of this specific input can be drawn.
The coverage for public administration for service delivery is 
lower, but still sufficient, with 25 sources on the effects of 
budget support. Generic effects of budget support are covered 
in 18 sources, but there is only weak coverage for specific 
inputs of budget support. Funding and TA/CD are covered in 
six sources and policy dialogue and conditionality are covered 
in five sources. Specific inputs of budget support are thus 
insufficiently covered to derive generalizable conclusions.
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Table 34: Budget support effects on service delivery
Inputs Total BS Programme Funds Policy dialogue Conditionality TA  / CD
Pu
bl
ic
 S
er
vi
ce
 D
el
iv
er
y
# Sources 47 40 28 10 7 10
Total effect codings 186 106 43 15 9 13
Positive effect 150 94 35 11 3 7
No effect 33 12 6 4 5 6
Negative effect 2 0 1 0 1 0
Improving effect 0 0 0 0 0 0
Deteriorating effect 1 0 1 0 0 0
A
dm
in
is
tr
at
io
n 
fo
r  
Se
rv
ic
e 
D
el
iv
er
y
# Sources 25 18 6 5 5 6
Total effect codings 50 27 6 6 5 6
Positive effect 44 24 6 5 4 5
No effect 4 3 0 0 0 1
Negative effect 2 0 0 1 1 0
Improving effect 0 0 0 0 0 0
Deteriorating effect 0 0 0 0 0 0
xcvi Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.
xcvii Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.
xcviii Ethiopia, Mali, Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zambia.
xcix Ghana, Malawi, Morocco, and Sierra Leone.
Established evidence
There is a large body of evidence on the effect of budget 
support on public service delivery (47 sources). A majority of 
these sources provide evidence for a positive effect of budget 
support on public service delivery, which has been identified in 
44 sources. Some sources report that it was not possible to 
assess the instrument’s effects on service delivery because 
effects were not yet perceptible in the country cases at the 
time of evaluation.221 The evidence suggests that funds 
provided through budget support (together with domestic 
resources) are predominantly used for investment or to cover 
running costs in the social sectors (e.g. salaries for health 
workers or teachers) and thus increase people’s access to basic 
services. However, due to fungibility of funds, the sources 
cannot state with absolute certainty for which purposes 
budget support disbursements were used. 
Substantial improvements in the outreach of public services 
are noted, particularly in the sectors of education (10 countriesxcvi 
in 19 sources)222 and health (11 countriesxcvii in 18 sources).223  
The effect of budget support on administration of service 
delivery is covered in 25 sources,224 but the direction of the 
effect is inconsistent. While improvements are described in 
eight countries,xcviii in four countriesxcix no effects on capacity 
and administration for service delivery are found.225 
Despite substantial improvements in people’s access to public 
services due to budget support, the evidence does not provide 
clear results on the effects of budget support on the quality of 
provided services. In ten countries where budget support 
contributes to expanding the scope of public services, 14 
sources find stagnating levels of low quality in basic services.226
More recent evaluations, while identifying further increases in 
coverage of service delivery and positive trends in overall 
literacy rates,227 identify trade-offs and failures of budget 
support to effectively address issues of quality in service 
delivery. A trade-off is the priority given to schooling access 
over quality and efficiency in primary education. A failure is 
the neglect of service management and delivery issues at 
63Evidence on budget support  |  4.
Table 35: Budget support effects on non-income poverty
Inputs Total BS Programme Funds Policy dialogue Conditionality TA  / CD
N
on
-i
nc
om
e 
Po
ve
rt
y
# Sources 33 32 9 2 0 0
Total effect codings 72 58 12 2 0 0
Positive effect 52 41 9 2 0 0
No effect 19 16 3 0 0 0
Negative effect 1 1 0 0 0 0
Improving effect 0 0 0 0 0 0
Deteriorating effect 0 0 0 0 0 0
c See also the IDD Evaluations, conducted in 2005 and published in 2006, focus on the output and outcome level with reference to the long term-nature of poverty impact (Lister, 2006). 
district level.228 
The evidence indicates that budget support did not manage to 
address the “missing middle”229 in service delivery, in terms of 
processes for management of frontline service providers, the 
actual delivery of services, human resources management, and 
the accountability for service provision.
Effects of the non-financial inputs policy dialogue and TA/CD 
are sufficiently covered, but coverage is nonetheless low and 
effects are inconsistent in their direction. Overall, positive 
effects are noted in a number of sources,230 particularly with 
regard to SBS. In other cases, however, authors find negative 
effects or no effects associated with the provision of non-
financial inputs.231 Shortcomings have been noted, particularly 
with respect to strengthening the administrative capacities for 
service delivery232 and the development of frontline service 
delivery systems and staff.233 
4.7.3 Non-income poverty
Coverage
For non-income poverty, effects of budget support are covered 
by 33 sources and discussed in 72 text sections (see Table 35). 
Generic effects of budget support are stated in 32 sources. 
Coverage for specific inputs is insufficient, with nine sources 
reporting effects of funding and two sources reporting effects 
of policy dialogue. Descriptions of the effects of conditionality 
and TA/CD on non-income poverty are not found in the course 
of the systematic coding process. Since there is insufficient 
evidence on the individual inputs’ effect on non-income 
poverty, no generalizable conclusions on the effectiveness of 
specific budget support inputs, as formulated in the 
intervention logic, can be drawn. Knowledge of the effects of 
the specific budget support inputs that might inform future 
programmes or related instruments is thus lacking.
Established evidence
Despite a considerable number of sources (33) that address 
changes in non-income poverty, reliable evidence on the 
contribution of budget support to these changes is relatively 
scarce. It is important to note, however, that the majority  
of statements point in the same direction, suggesting 
improvements with regard to non-income poverty and  
drawing the distinct picture that there are no negative  
effects of budget support on non-income poverty.
While changes at impact level are described for most cases,234 
attribution statements relating to the contribution of budget 
support to these trends is found only in a subset of sources  
(8 sources).235 This is because evaluations face problems in 
plausibly linking changes in non-income poverty to budget 
support programmes.236c Although the evidence suggests a 
link, uncertainty prevails as to the contribution of budget 
support to positive trends in non-income poverty. 
The evidence suggests that budget support does not reach its 
full potential, and explains the shortcoming with donors’ focus 
on quantitative targets to increase access to basic services,237 a 
lack of pro-poor policy orientation by the recipient 
government,238 dysfunctional accountability mechanisms,239 
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and the weakness of budget support to affect local systems for 
service delivery.240 
While the synthesis literature addresses the issues of gender 
equality241 and general equality in access to public services,242 
sustainability of budget support funds243 and the effects of 
suspended budget support programmes on public service 
delivery,244 these issues were covered in fewer than 10 sources 
and are therefore not further discussed. 
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5.
CONCLUSION
5.  |  Conclusion66
This evaluation synthesis provides insights on what is known 
and what is not known about the effectiveness of budget 
support based on a much broader evidence-base than previous 
studies. By putting the main focus on the reliability of results, 
this evaluation synthesis clearly separates empirically 
established evidence from claims for which no sufficient 
empirical foundation exists and thus informs decision makers 
of both budget support programmes and related finance 
modalities. It answers the question of which effects of budget 
support are substantiated by reliable evidence and under 
which contextual conditions budget support generates results. 
It also shows for which outcomes evidence is not sufficient and 
thus highlights where further research is necessary to close 
remaining knowledge gaps. 
5.1 Systematic approach
The evaluation synthesis focuses on the reliability of evidence 
by following a systematic approach, which consists of relevance 
criteria for search and inclusion of sources, a quality assessment, 
systematic coding and data analysis. The evaluation team 
systematically selected and reviewed 95 sources – evaluations 
as well as academic and grey literature. The evaluation 
synthesis thus offers broad coverage and the analysis of 
different perspectives on budget support effects. To control for 
qualitative differences in the evidence, a quality assessment 
based on a predefined set of quality criteria was conducted. 
The quality assessment showed the methodological quality of 
budget support reports and studies to be moderate but 
relatively homogeneous across sources, and all assessed 
sources were therefore deemed to be of sufficient 
methodological quality to be integrated as evidence in the 
evaluation synthesis. Despite the sufficient quality, the body  
of evidence was divided into best and second-best evidence  
on the basis of the quality assessment results. The threshold 
for best evidence was set at 50% of the maximum possible 
score. This facilitated a measure to examine the robustness  
of findings, a best-evidence robustness check. Findings are 
considered robust if they are covered by either best or by  
both best and second-best evidence. This was the case for all 
findings reported in this evaluation synthesis. Last, but not 
least, effects were only considered reliable and hence included 
as empirically established evidence if they were covered in 10 
or more different sources. 
5.2 Summary of findings
From the overall evidence on budget support effects analysed 
in this evaluation synthesis, six main findings emerge:
 • Most expected effects of budget support are backed by 
sufficient evidence.
 • Most proven effects of budget support are positive or  
at least in presence of certain context factors positive,  
such as a high number and quality of donors’ common 
interests and the adherence of partner governments to  
the conditionalities.
 • Observed effects are mostly attributed to the whole  
budget support programme. Information on the specific 
effects of individual inputs of budget support (financial 
input, conditionalities, policy dialogue and TA/CD) is  
rarely provided.
 • A multitude of sources convincingly describes the 
attribution of observed changes to budget support on 
output and induced output level. On the outcome and 
especially the impact level, attribution of observed  
changes to budget support programmes is often not 
plausibly supported by evidence.
 • Important and highly debated risks of budget support  
are inadequately researched by the covered sources, thus 
statements on risks are not possible.
 • The strength of budget support effects depends strongly  
on context conditions, such as institutional capacity and 
political will for reform of the recipient government.
5.2.1 Coverage of budget support effects
A great majority of statements attribute observed changes to 
budget support programmes on a generic level. However, 
observed changes are not sufficiently attributed to one or a 
combination of the specific budget support inputs: funding, 
policy dialogue, conditionality and TA/CD.
The grey shaded area in Figure 6 indicates coverage below the 
benchmark of 10 reports for generic budget support effects 
(dark blue) or specific budget support inputs (blue and 
different shades of orange). While only a few generic budget 
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support effects, namely on anti-corruption agencies and 
corruption legislation, are insufficiently covered by the 
evidence, most individual budget support inputs are 
insufficiently covered. 
Thus, certain budget support effects that in some respect can 
be considered the centrepiece of the intervention logic of 
budget support are barely covered in the body of evidence, 
such as the effect of non-financial inputs on the composition 
of public spending and domestic accountability. Exceptions 
with a sufficiently high coverage, for example, are effects of 
budget support funding on the level and composition of public 
spending, on DRM, public service delivery, and income poverty, 
and of non-financial inputs on PFM.
Figure 6: Coverage of budget support effects
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Although budget support’s effects on corruption are widely 
discussed in the political sphere, the evidence insufficiently 
covers budget support effects on corruption in two out of four 
corruption codes. While the evidence sufficiently covers 
positive budget support effects on increases in the monitoring 
of corruption, and there is explicit evidence that budget 
support does not have a negative effect on corruption, it can 
generally not be assessed whether budget support contributes 
to a reduction in corruption or has no effect. 
5.5.2 Established evidence
Figure 7 illustrates the direction of generic budget support 
effects on the outputs, outcomes, and impacts, as laid out in 
the intervention logic. The graph contrasts the assumptions on 
budget support effects formulated in the intervention logic 
with the evidence on budget support effects. While the graph 
indicates the direction of most budget support effects 
(positive, mixed, negative, no effect, implausible attribution, 
insufficient evidence), the effect on corruption can in part not 
be rated due to low coverage and is therefore not colour 
coded.
Positive effects
First, budget support has positive effects on the alignment of 
aid with national policies of partner countries, the ownership 
of partner governments in formulating and implementing own 
strategies for national development, and the harmonization of 
donor’s aid policies. Budget support increases harmonization 
among donors under the condition that sector interests and 
priorities of donors align to a certain degree.  
Second, budget support, especially budget support funding, 
increases the level of public spending. This increase is mostly 
apparent in the social sectors health and education.
Third, budget support programmes have a positive effect on 
the PFM of recipient countries. Improvements are, for 
example, reported in budget formulation and planning, in 
budgeting and accounting, and in the comprehensiveness and 
transparency of the budget. These improvements can 
specifically be attributed to the non-financial inputs policy 
dialogue and TA/CD.
Fourth, budget support generally contributes to improvements 
on the supply side of domestic accountability, mainly by 
channelling budget support funding through the national 
budget systems. Positive effects on domestic accountability 
include a strengthened role of supreme audit institutions, 
improvements in planning and managing national budget 
processes, and an increase in budget transparency.
Last, but not least, budget support has, as assumed in the 
intervention logic, a positive effect on people’s access to 
public services. Funds from SBS and GBS are decisive to 
increase the quantity of service delivery, particularly in the 
education and health sectors. 
Mixed effects
Most of the budget support effects show mixed results. The 
effectiveness of budget support in those cases is dependent 
on immanent factors, such as the programme cycle of budget 
support programmes or suspensions, and on context conditions. 
Mixed effects also refer to evaluation question 2: Under which 
contextual conditions does budget support generate results?
The evidence finds time-varying effects of budget support on 
transaction costs for partner governments. While transaction 
costs initially increase, they are subsequently reduced as 
processes become routinely established. 
The absence of one suspected risk of budget support, the 
crowding-out of domestic revenue, is confirmed by the 
evidence. However, only a few sources identify positive effects 
of budget support programmes on revenue mobilization.
Whereas budget support increases domestic accountability 
 on the supply side, effects are mixed on the demand side of 
domestic accountability and for democratic governance. 
Changes in parliament and CSO participation in the budget 
process are not sufficiently attributed to the presence of 
budget support programmes. Budget support programmes 
contribute to stronger intra-government accountability 
structures, whereas effects on decentralization are 
inconsistent across countries.
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The evidence on macroeconomic performance suggests that 
budget support reinforces pre-existing macroeconomic 
stability. However, many sources do not attribute improvements 
in economic performance to budget support alone, but also, 
sometimes more prominently, to programmes of the IMF and 
to the political commitment of the partner governments to 
achieve macroeconomic stability.
One factor limiting the effectiveness of budget support in a 
couple of outcomes is the suspension of budget support 
Figure 7: Expectation and reality of budget support effects
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disbursements. With suspensions of budget support, former 
gains in fiscal space and a government’s room for manoeuvre 
diminished, enhanced by the low levels of DRM. Suspensions 
had mixed and even adverse effects on macroeconomic 
performance, and transaction costs started to increase. The 
extent to which budget support effects can be sustained after 
a majority of donors either suspend disbursements or stop 
their use of the aid modality will be analysed in detail in a 
second evaluation on budget support: the evaluation on the 
exit from budget support.
No effects
Budget support programmes, overall, do not improve 
predictability, due to late confirmations and disbursements  
of budget support tranches, and uncoordinated decisions by 
donors following breaches of conditionalities by partner 
governments.
While budget support programmes have a positive effect on 
people’s access to public services, budget support is not found 
to increase the quality of delivered services.
Implausible attribution
The evidence on budget support effects on income poverty is 
mixed. Most sources find no or only slightly positive effects, 
but reliable evidence on the contribution of budget support to 
these changes is relatively scarce.
The evidence describes positive effects on non-income poverty 
in the recipient countries, but the effects are not attributed to 
budget support only.
5.3 Interpretation and recommendations
This evaluation synthesis presents the most comprehensive 
analysis to date of existing evidence on the effectiveness of 
budget support, a highly controversial modality of development 
cooperation. The findings systematically substantiate existing 
knowledge and generate new insights for decision makers in 
German and international development cooperation.
The study finds convincingly broad evidence that budget 
support is indeed an effective modality in promoting 
important development outcomes, such as improvements in 
public financial management and budget processes and 
improved provision of public goods and services. In view of 
these findings it appears worthwhile for donors – including 
those who have largely withdrawn from budget support – to 
re-assess the modality. In doing so, however, particular 
attention will need to be paid to the remaining evidence gaps 
identified in this evaluation synthesis. Specifically, there is a 
lack of knowledge with regard to the effectiveness of budget 
support at outcome and impact level due to unresolved 
methodological challenges and problems of attribution. Also, 
while the evidence proves effects of budget support 
programmes on a general level, little is known on the specific 
contribution of individual, particularly non-financial, budget 
support inputs. The same is true for hitherto largely neglected 
cross-cutting topics, such as budget support’s effects on 
gender equality and distributional effects of growth. 
More importantly, however, the evaluation synthesis also  
finds that – whereas positive effects of budget support are 
well covered in evaluations and other sources – the empirical 
evidence on potentially important fiduciary and other risks  
of budget support, such as corruption or adverse macro-
economic effects (e.g. increases in public debt), remains 
surprisingly scarce. It thus seems fair to conclude that the 
collective body of evidence on budget support is somewhat 
skewed, not so much in terms of what it finds, but significantly 
so in where it looks: the body of evidence provides important 
findings of sufficiently high quality on the effects of budget 
support – as can be seen in the results of the quality 
assessment – but in doing so, it either does not refer to risks 
or adverse effects of budget support, or does so only 
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marginally. This is surprising insofar as the political debate  
on budget support in most donor countries tends to exhibit 
the opposite bias: whereas positive effects of budget support 
appear to have been largely ignored or dismissed as 
hypothetical and not proven in recent political discourse on 
the modality,245 the perceived risks of the aid modality received 
considerably more attention.246
The remaining gaps imply that, even from an extensive 
analysis of existing evidence such as this and despite strong 
evidence for positive effects of budget support in general,  
only limited conclusions can be drawn with regard to specific 
effects attributable to individual budget support inputs. Going 
hand in hand, there are only limited lessons to be learned for 
the design and implementation of aid modalities with similar 
features as budget support, such as results-based approaches. 
This also makes it difficult to predict the impact on development 
outcomes achieved through budget support of a widespread 
withdrawal of bilateral donors from the instrument. 
Future empirical work therefore needs to closely analyse the 
effects and causal mechanisms of specific budget support 
inputs, as well as budget support effects on important cross-
cutting issues. Also, future work should analyse in more depth 
in how far potential risks of budget support materialise in 
practice and how those risks can be mitigated.
To account for this need of more empirical work on the topic, 
DEval conducts a complementary evaluation of the exit from 
budget support, building on the findings of this evaluation 
synthesis and investigating the sustainability of budget 
support effects when donors suspend or exit from budget 
support. In conjunction with the findings presented here, this 
evaluation contributes to forming a more complete picture of 
the effectiveness of budget support, the consequences when 
donors exit from the aid modality, and the lessons for the 
design and implementation of future budget support 
programmes and related aid instruments.
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7.1 Three-step approach
The Three-Step approach247 is the most used approach in 
evaluations using the Comprehensive Evaluation Framework. 
The approach acknowledges that effects of budget support can 
be traced up to the level of induced outputs of the CEF, while 
the attribution of effects on outcomes and impact level to 
budget support is very difficult. It also takes into account that 
the induced outputs (level 3) are also influenced by other 
factors than the budget support programmes and that 
outcomes and impact (level 4 and 5) are part of the effects of 
the partner governments’ policy performance, depending on 
the national poverty reduction strategies, the institutional 
quality and the political will for reforms.
The three steps of the approach are:
1. Aid effects evaluation
The first step is an assessment of the inputs, direct outputs 
and induced outputs (level 1, 2, and 3 in the CEF) of the budget 
support programmes and an evaluation of the causal link 
between these levels, including the external factors 
influencing the effects in level 3.
2. Policy impact evaluation
The second step is an analysis of the outcomes and impact 
(level 4 and 5 in the CEF) of the national policies that were 
supported by budget support programmes. This analysis 
includes identifying factors (possibly direct and induced 
outputs) influencing these outcomes and impact.
3. Qualitative contribution analysis
The third step combines the results of steps 1 and 2, to identify 
the effect of budget support on the outcomes and impact 
(level 4 and 5). Because the link between budget support and 
outcomes and impact is not straightforward, this analysis is 
done qualitatively, based on logical reasoning.
The three steps do not have to be followed in chronological 
order. However, steps 1 and 2 always have to precede step 3.
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Category Quality criterion Rating
Intervention Logic and 
Evaluation Questions
QC 1: Formulation of  evaluation questions 
(EQ)
0 = no EQ formulated 
1 = one general EQ formulated 
2 = multiple EQs formulated 
3 = more than 5 EQs formulated covering at least three levels of the intervention 
logic
QC 2: The evaluation answers the 
formulated EQs
0 = no link between conclusions and EQ 
1 = some EQs are answered 
2 = all EQs are partly answered 
3 = all EQs are fully answered
Context QC3: The evaluation describes the 
economic and political context in the case 
country
0 = not at all 
1 =  described only to a limited extent 
2 = socio-economic context described 
3 = comprehensive context analysis
QC4: The evaluation describes the context 
of aid relations in the case country
0 = not at all 
1 =  described only to a limited extent 
2 = aid relation described 
3 = comprehensive context analysis
Methodology QC5: The evaluation makes use of an 
intervention logic (IL)
0 = no IL applied 
1 = generic IL applied 
2 = country specific IL applied 
3 = country specific IL reconstructed with stakeholders
QC 6: The evaluation acknowledges 
problems of attribution and describes how 
it addresses them in the methodology 
section
0 = no discussion 
1 = limited discussion 
2 = discussion and solutions presented 
3 = convincing discussion and adequate solutions 
* give reasons
QC 7: The evaluation reflects on the 
influence of (changing) context on 
programme outcomes in the methodology 
section
0 = no reflection 
1 = monochronic and general 
2 = monochronic and specific for EQs OR diachronic and general 
3 = diachronic and specific for EQs
QC 8: The evaluation describes how it 
triangulates methods and sources in the 
methodology section
0 = no triangulation described 
1 = triangulation of either methods OR sources described 
2 = triangulation of methods AND sources described
QC 9: The report describes general 
limitations of the evaluation in the 
methodology section
0 = no discussion 
1 = some limitations listed 
2 = some limitations discussed 
3 = comprehensive discussion of limitations
7.2 Quality criteria evaluation reports (including scaling system)
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Category Quality criterion Rating
Data Collection and Analysis QC 10: The evaluation provides 
information on the collected data (figures, 
interview partners, document references)
0 = no information 
1 = some information 
2 = comprehensive information 
3 = 2+reflects on the condition of data collection
QC 11: The scope of the empirical inquiry 
(stakeholder groups)
0 = no interviews conducted 
1 = interviews cover only one perspective (donor or recipient) 
2 = interviews cover both perspectives 
3 = interviews cover multiple factions from both perspectives 
QC 12: The scope of the empirical inquiry 
(number of interviews)
0 = no interviews conducted 
1 = 1 to 10 
2 = 11 to 30 
3 = 31 and more
QC 13: The evaluation provides information 
on the procedures for data analysis
0 = no information 
1 = some information 
2 = comprehensive information 
3 = 2+evaluation documents how information from each procedure was scored, 
analysed, and interpreted
Plausible Conclusion QC 14: The evaluation presents its 
conclusions with reference to 
methodological limitations
0 = limitations not mentioned at all 
1 = limitations mentioned in the conclusions 
2 = specific limitations discussed for individual conclusions
QC 15: The evaluation makes reference to 
the information that supports each 
conclusion
0 = no reference made 
1 = sporadic references but not systematic for all conclusion 
2 = systematic reference 
3 = fully transparent (e.g. using an evidence grid) 
QC 16: The evaluation identifies and 
discusses the programme’s unintended 
effects 
0 = no information 
1 = unintended effects identified 
2 = unintended effects identified and discussed 
3 = unintended effects part of the evaluation design (in EQ) and systematically 
reported
QC 17: The evaluation elaborates plausible 
alternative explanations of the findings.
0 = no alternative explanations elaborated 
1 = some are elaborated 
2 = alternative explanations for individual findings elaborated
QC 18: The evaluation justifies why rival 
explanations were rejected  
0 = rejection of rival explanations not justified 
1 = rejection of rival explanations justified
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Country Evaluation Period Size of Donor Group Joint Assistance 
Framework
Net ODA as % of GNI  
(period average)
BS as % of  
government expenditure 
(period average)
Burkina Faso 1994–2004 9 yes 14,9063346 6,91%
Burundi 2005–2013 8 no 29,4475301 17,79%
Ghana 2003–-2006 12 yes 11,6232235 16,39%
Malawi 1994–2004 8 yes 22,9248008 3,54%
Mali 2003–2009 10 yes 11,6185121 8,18%
Morocco 2005–2012 6 no 1,38735183 0,24%
Mozambique 2005–2012 19 no 18,3217492 22,77%
Mozambique 1994–2004 17 no 28,209749 13,19%
Nicaragua 2005–2008 9 yes 11,073732 10,45%
Nicaragua 1994–2004 14 yes 15,8793815 8,65%
Rwanda 1994–2004 9 no 30,4292521 23,51%
Sierra Leone 2002–2015 6 no 19,4207975 (without 2015) 27,57% (without 2015)
South Africa 2000–2011 11 no 0,33869829 0,02%
Tanzania 2006–2012 14 yes 9,5033332 16,07%
Tanzania 1995–2004 14 in development 12,8363009 12,73%
Tunisia 1996–2008 1/3 joint programs 1,06853849 0,23%
Uganda 2004–2013 12 yes 11,2638873 12,42%
Uganda 1994–2004 12/20 planned 13,6741075 12,99%
Vietnam 1994–2004 17 no 4,31553652 5,56%
Zambia 2005–2010 9 yes 9,34195719 50,31% (only 2010 available)
7.3 Overview on budget support programmes
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